Exploring the contribution of individual differences and planning policy parameters to demand planning performance. by Kharlamov, Alexander A.
 warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/90832  
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Exploring the Contribution of Individual 
Differences and Planning Policy Parameters 
to Demand Planning Performance 
 
by 
 
Alexander Alexandrovitch Kharlamov 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Engineering 
 
 
 
University of Warwick, WMG 
 
October 2016 
 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... i 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ v 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................ vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... ix 
DECLARATION ............................................................................................................ x 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... xi 
ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................... xii 
1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Research rationale ........................................................................................... 1 
1.1.1 Imperfect decision makers .................................................................... 2 
1.1.2 Working around human limitations ..................................................... 5 
1.2 Demand planning ............................................................................................. 7 
1.2.1 The importance of demand planning .................................................. 7 
1.2.2 Dealing with demand uncertainty ....................................................... 8 
1.2.3 The problem with demand planning ................................................... 9 
1.3 The research gap and the subsequent research question .................... 11 
1.4 Thesis structure ............................................................................................. 14 
1.5 Chapter summary .......................................................................................... 15 
2 Demand planning: process, performance and support ................................. 17 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 17 
2.2 Demand planning process ........................................................................... 17 
2.2.1 Balancing supply and demand ............................................................ 17 
2.2.2 Demand planning process ................................................................... 18 
2.2.3 Planning horizon .................................................................................... 20 
2.2.4 The nature of available information .................................................. 21 
2.2.5 Statistical and judgemental forecasting process ............................. 23 
2.2.6 Demand planning process summary ................................................. 25 
2.3 Demand planning performance .................................................................. 26 
2.3.1 System nervousness in the supply chain .......................................... 26 
ii 
2.3.2 Demand planning process failures: system nervousness and naïve 
interventionism ................................................................................................ 28 
2.3.3 System nervousness ............................................................................. 29 
2.3.4 Naïve interventionism .......................................................................... 31 
2.3.5 Demand planning performance and individual differences .......... 33 
2.4 Humans and systems: supporting demand planning decisions............ 34 
2.4.1 Resisting the ‘machines’ ....................................................................... 34 
2.4.2 System guidance and restrictiveness ................................................ 35 
2.4.3 Supporting demand planning decisions ............................................ 41 
2.5 Chapter summary .......................................................................................... 41 
3 Underpinning theory and hypothesis ............................................................... 43 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 43 
3.2 Rationality and decision making ................................................................. 44 
3.2.1 The unrealistic view of humans as perfect optimisers .................. 46 
3.2.2 The need for small and large worlds ................................................. 47 
3.2.3 Model of human behaviour: deterministic versus stochastic 
theories and Cumulative Prospect Theory ................................................. 50 
3.2.4 Cumulative Prospect Theory .............................................................. 56 
3.3 Myopic Loss Aversion .................................................................................. 59 
3.3.1 MLA analytical framework and hypotheses .................................... 62 
3.4 Human and system: individual differences .............................................. 65 
3.4.1 Overview of individual differences ................................................... 66 
3.4.2 Individual exposure to demand planning processes: experience 
versus theoretical knowledge ....................................................................... 69 
3.4.3 Naïve interventionism hypothesis ..................................................... 72 
3.4.4 Personality inventory: Big Five .......................................................... 73 
3.4.5 Specific personality construct measures .......................................... 73 
3.4.6 Other individual differences ............................................................... 74 
3.4.7 Individual differences hypothesis overview .................................... 75 
3.5 Complete conceptual framework, testable hypotheses and 
predictions ............................................................................................................. 76 
3.6 Chapter summary .......................................................................................... 78 
4 Research design .................................................................................................... 81 
iii 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 81 
4.2 Ontological and epistemological perspective .......................................... 82 
4.3 Decision making experiments: methodological considerations ........... 83 
4.3.1 Why experiment.................................................................................... 84 
4.3.2 Experimental task .................................................................................. 84 
4.3.3 External validity ..................................................................................... 85 
4.3.4 Compensation ........................................................................................ 86 
4.3.5 Sample size requirements ................................................................... 87 
4.3.6 Ethical considerations .......................................................................... 87 
4.4 Experimental task: newsvendor problem ................................................. 89 
4.4.1 Why newsvendor problem .................................................................. 89 
4.4.2 Newsvendor problem origin ............................................................... 90 
4.4.3 Decision making research using newsvendor ................................. 90 
4.4.4 Newsvendor formulation .................................................................... 94 
4.5 Measuring individual differences ............................................................... 96 
4.6 Experimental design ..................................................................................... 98 
4.6.1 Experimental design overview ........................................................... 98 
4.6.2 Incentives ............................................................................................... 99 
4.6.3 Target sample size .............................................................................. 100 
4.6.4 Experimental treatments ................................................................... 100 
4.6.5 Measuring performance and individual differences .................... 102 
4.6.6 Information sheets .............................................................................. 104 
4.6.7 Informed consent and anonymity .................................................... 105 
4.6.8 Experimental procedure .................................................................... 106 
4.6.9 Eligibility criteria .................................................................................. 107 
4.6.10 Other ethical considerations: Risks and Benefits ....................... 107 
4.6.11 Experimental flow ............................................................................. 108 
4.7 Chapter summary ........................................................................................ 109 
5 Results and analysis ............................................................................................ 111 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 111 
5.2 Overview of the framework and experimental treatments ................ 111 
5.3 Resulting experimental sample ................................................................ 112 
5.4 Incentives and performance ..................................................................... 115 
iv 
5.5 Performance between treatments .......................................................... 117 
5.6 Individual differences as predictors of performance in hybrid treatment
 ............................................................................................................................... 120 
5.7 Chapter summary ........................................................................................ 132 
6 Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 135 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 135 
6.2 Summary of the research .......................................................................... 135 
6.3 Findings ......................................................................................................... 137 
6.4 Contribution ................................................................................................. 140 
6.4.1 Contribution to theory ....................................................................... 140 
6.4.2 Contribution to practice .................................................................... 144 
6.5 Limitations .................................................................................................... 146 
6.6 Further research .......................................................................................... 151 
6.7 Final reflection ............................................................................................. 153 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 155 
APPENDICES .......................................................................................................... 169 
Appendix A Mini-IPIP scale ............................................................................. 170 
Appendix B EPO scale ...................................................................................... 171 
Appendix C BIS scale ........................................................................................ 172 
Appendix D GDMS scale .................................................................................. 173 
Appendix E Participant targeting groups ...................................................... 174 
Appendix F Experiment code (JavaScript) .................................................... 175 
Appendix G Graphical user interface ............................................................. 180 
Appendix H Electronic information sheet (professionals) ......................... 181 
Appendix I Consent form (professionals) ...................................................... 183 
Appendix J Invitations for participation ........................................................ 184 
Appendix K Sample individual report ............................................................ 185 
Appendix L Summary statistics of individual differences by group and by 
treatment (normalised values) ......................................................................... 188 
Appendix M Stability analysis of personality scales ................................... 190 
Appendix N Correlation matrix of Personality Variables ........................... 191 
v 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1 Bounded Rationality (based on Simon, 1955, 1956, 1990) ............... 3 
Figure 2 Summary of the main contributions of this thesis ............................. 13 
Figure 3 Human and System base framework to consider decision-making 15 
Figure 4 Positioning of demand planning (Stadtler et al. 2015, p.180) ......... 19 
Figure 5 Demand planning process (Stadtler et al., 2015, p.153) .................. 20 
Figure 6 The stages of the forecasting process in the demand planning 
process (adapted from Stadtler et al., 2015, p.153) ................................. 24 
Figure 7 Main factors causing demand-planning failures ................................ 28 
Figure 8 Decision support guidance and restrictiveness (based on Silver 1991)
 ............................................................................................................................. 36 
Figure 9 Demand planning process base framework ........................................ 42 
Figure 10 Concept of Small and Large worlds (based on Savage 1961) ....... 48 
Figure 11 Classical view of rationality reduced to small worlds ..................... 48 
Figure 12 Decision Theory as a building block for Research Methodology . 51 
Figure 13 Accuracy-effort trade-off ..................................................................... 53 
Figure 14 Accuracy-effort trade-off and Less-is-more effect ......................... 54 
Figure 15 Value function of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) 58 
Figure 16 An Illustration of Equity Premium Puzzle (source: Ibbotson 
Consulting) ........................................................................................................ 60 
Figure 17 Analytical framework for demand planning decisions.................... 63 
Figure 18 Exposure-Performance Matrix ............................................................ 72 
Figure 19 Conceptual framework focused on individual differences ............ 76 
Figure 20 Complete Conceptual Framework ..................................................... 77 
Figure 21 Representation of the experimental treatments ........................... 102 
Figure 22 Experiment design ............................................................................... 108 
Figure 23 Conceptual Framework, Experimental treatments and hypothesis
 ........................................................................................................................... 112 
Figure 24 Study Overview: Sample and Incentives ......................................... 113 
Figure 25 Conceptual framework, hypothesis and results (grey = confirmed)
 ........................................................................................................................... 138 
Figure 26 Summary of the main contributions of this thesis to theory ...... 141 
vi 
Figure 27 Summary of the main contributions of this thesis to practice .... 144 
 
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Thesis structure .......................................................................................... 15 
Table 2 Chapter 2 Structure ................................................................................... 17 
Table 3 Types and source of available information (based on Fields et al. 
(2006)) ................................................................................................................ 22 
Table 4 Typology of deliberate decision guidance (adapted from Silver, 1991)
 ............................................................................................................................. 37 
Table 5 Means of system restrictions (based on Fildes & Beard, 1992; Fildes 
et al. 2006; Goodwin et al. 2011) ................................................................. 40 
Table 6 Chapter 3 structure ................................................................................... 43 
Table 7 Chapter 5 structure ................................................................................... 81 
Table 8 Individual Differences Questions ........................................................... 97 
Table 9 Population and its sub-groups ................................................................ 99 
Table 10 Summary of experimental treatments............................................... 101 
Table 11 Chapter 6 structure ............................................................................... 111 
Table 12 Naïve Students: Comparison of Incentivised and Non-Incentivised 
Experiment ...................................................................................................... 116 
Table 13 Comparison of Performance in Planning Task by Treatment and 
Sample .............................................................................................................. 118 
Table 14 Regression equations estimated by an OLS for Hybrid treatment 
(dependent variable – payoff in Newsvendor Game) – A: Naïve students
 ........................................................................................................................... 123 
Table 15 Regression equations estimated by an OLS for Hybrid treatment 
(dependent variable – payoff in Newsvendor Game) – B: Sophisticated 
Students ........................................................................................................... 124 
Table 16 Regression equations estimated by an OLS for Hybrid treatment 
(dependent variable – payoff in Newsvendor Game) – C: Professional 
Planners ........................................................................................................... 125 
Table 17 Results of the Multinomial Logit Regressions for Hybrid Treatment 
(dependent variable – sample; base category – Theory 
planners/sophisticated students) – A: Naïve Students (Naïve planners) vs 
Sophisticated Students (Theory planners) ................................................ 127 
Table 18 Results of the Multinomial Logit Regressions for Hybrid Treatment 
(dependent variable – sample; base category – Theory 
planners/sophisticated students) – A: Professional planners (practice 
planners) vs Sophisticated Students (Theory planners) ......................... 128 
viii 
Table 19 Clustered OLS regression for sophisticated students and 
sophisticated non-students ......................................................................... 131 
Table 20 Gender results by sample (profit and N subjects in brackets) ...... 132 
Table 21 Gender results by treatment (profit and N subjects in brackets) 132 
Table 22 Chapter 7 structure ............................................................................... 135 
ix 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Thank you single life, caffeine, Google, Wikipedia and my supervisors, Jan and 
Ganna for making this possible. 
In addition, all the exquisite ladies (who shall remain anonymous) contributing 
to my artistic endeavours and keeping my mind away from work. 
 
x 
DECLARATION 
This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my 
application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been composed by 
myself and has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree. 
 
xi 
ABSTRACT 
Demand planning (DP) is important for business performance. DP depends 
both on managers and on supporting systems. Managers are known to 
increase uncertainty by systematically overriding the systems and making 
unnecessary judgemental adjustments. This is a behavioural problem. 
Systems are assumed to be represented by different policies and individual 
differences by measurable traits and characteristics. The contribution of 
individual differences and policy parameters to DP performance is not clear. 
A framework is proposed based on the cumulative prospect theory (CPT) and 
myopic loss aversion (MLA). Methodology of decision making experiment 
based on the newsvendor is used. Individual differences are collected using 
previously validated psychometric scales and demographic questions. The 
sample (N=339) includes three main groups: professional planners (N=84), 
naïve students (N=166), logistics and supply chain management (L&SCM) 
students (N=56). 
The MLA hypothesis is supported. Longer planning horizons (less frequent 
decisions) outperforms short planning horizons. Regarding individual 
differences, only experience/knowledge and naïve interventionism are 
significant predictors of DP performance. L&SCM students with theoretical 
knowledge but without practical experience perform the best. No significant 
difference in performance is found between professional planners and naïve 
students. Naïve interventionism (plan instability) contributes negatively to DP 
performance. Personality (Big Five), impulsiveness, propensity to plan, 
decision-making style or demographics (e.g. age, sex, and years of experience 
or managerial level) are not significant for DP performance. 
The view that there is a ‘right’ mind-set (personality) to be a good planner is 
challenged. DP policy can offset individual differences. A MLA informed 
policy can reduce uncertainty introduced by behaviour. System 
restrictiveness (binding policy for long commitment) outperforms decisional 
guidance (non-binding policy for optional commitment).  This is one of the 
first applications of CPT and MLA to DP decisions.
xii 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research rationale 
"A bad system will beat a good person every time" 
William Edwards Deming1 
 
On 13th of October 2012, two pilots on the Sriwijaya Air flight SJ-21 ignored 
the cockpit navigation system that they assumed to be faulty. They made a 
‘visual approach’ landing an Indonesian passenger plane carrying 96 people 
relying on their own navigational skills – only to discover they were at the 
wrong airport. The incident report2 was only released 4 years later, on the 
12th of October 2016. This was not the first time this mistake had happened 
and preventive measures were in place. Pilots flying in the region must carry 
an information plate with a map and a chart with instructions containing a 
warning that the airport of Tabing can be mistaken for Minangkabau. They 
were operating in a repetitive and mostly controlled system with state of the 
art navigation technology enabling visibility and comprehensive failure 
prevention systems. Regardless, the SJ-21 pilots decided they knew better 
and landed at the wrong airport. Such level of control, technological 
sophistication, and skill requirements are unthinkable in most business 
activities, yet, mistakes caused by human judgement still happen. 
Deming (1986) suggested that people’s best efforts can be destructive when 
carried out without knowledge, understanding of variation or when the 
system is broken. Unnecessary actions, regardless of good intentions, are 
damaging. Businesses are complex systems of exchange with supply of and 
demand for goods, services, or both (Simon 1979; Deming 1986). Businesses 
are supervised by humans which are complex systems themselves (Jung 
                                                   
1 The quote by W. Edwards Deming originally appeared on a Deming Four 
Day seminar in Phoenix (Arizona) in February 1993 
2 The report with reference KNKT.12.10.21.04 can be downloaded at:  
http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/Final%20Report%20PK-
CJT.pdf 
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1951; Deming 1986; Buss & Hawley 2010). Hence, when businesses fail, it 
could be because of faulty systems within but it could also be because of 
humans who design and operate these systems (Deming 1986). Deming 
(1986) warns that management can create the best systems, understand 
variation and possess knowledge but still fail if there is no understanding of 
psychology (people). 
The attention to the importance of understanding both the system and the 
human simultaneously to ensure business success has been growing (e.g., 
Blattberg et al. 1990; Fildes et al. 2006; Kremer et al. 2011; Moritz et al. 
2013). This research considers both the human and the system in a particular 
type of decision-making task – demand planning (DP) decisions – seeking to 
contribute to the debate on the human versus systems. 
1.1.1 Imperfect decision makers 
As the human decision making ability is not perfect, humans sometimes 
require additional support in order to make good decisions (e.g., Kahneman & 
Tversky 1972; Tversky & Kahneman 1991). People make decisions 
constrained by both their cognitive resources and the task environment, a 
concept known as bounded rationality (Simon 1955; Simon 1956; Simon 
1990). As a result of these limitations, people might systematically fail to cope 
with uncertainty, e.g., while making predictions or judging probabilities (e.g., 
Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Einhorn & Hogarth 1981; Benartzi & Thaler 
1995). Uncertainty is common to most decision-making and is what makes it 
often very challenging. Failures of judgement or reasoning have been 
repeatedly demonstrated in different studies (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 
1974; Kleinmuntz 1990; Ouwersloot et al. 1998; Bazerman 2005; Lin et al. 
2014). As a result, it is commonly accepted that human judgement alone is 
often insufficient and sometimes is prone to errors. 
Since the 1970’s research on errors has been gaining significant momentum. 
There has been a preference to study what people do wrong rather than what 
people do right. This has  resulted in debate regarding over-citation biased 
towards negative performance (Crandall 1984; Evans 1984; Krueger & 
Funder 2004). One possible explanation is summarised by Crandall (1984, 
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p.1499) as ‘…mistakes are fun! Errors in judgement make humorous anecdotes, 
but good performance does not.’ As a result, there is a generalised prejudice 
against the human ability to make decisions. After reviewing the literature on 
decision making, Lopes (1991, p.65) also observed the over-citation of 
publications reporting on human errors and noted that the literature provided 
‘widely published claims that human judgement abilities are poor’. However, the 
alternative view takes into account what type of tasks are demanded from 
human judgement. Therefore, it is incorrect to assume that human judgement 
is generally poor. Humans are simply expected to perform well in 
inappropriate circumstances. Human judgement excels in many other 
circumstances (see Dreyfus 1992). 
Studying errors provides insight into how human judgement (in particular) and 
how cognitive systems (in general) work (Funder 1987). Many of these errors 
can be explained using rather simple behavioural biases. The notion of bias 
comes from the deterministic approach to choice, the Deterministic Theory 
(DT). DT is where the preference is predicted using a normative model and 
systematic deviations to the prediction constitute the bias. Biases are usually 
stable and often resistant to training (e.g., Bolton & Katok 2004). The degree 
to which an individual is prone to suffer from biases potentially depends on 
individual differences (e.g., Stanovich & West 2000; Shiloh et al. 2002; Oreg 
& Bayazit 2009). 
 
Figure 1 Bounded Rationality (based on Simon, 1955, 1956, 1990) 
Managers (as human beings) can be considered boundedly rational (Simon 
1979). Therefore, management relies on decision rules or frameworks 
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(heuristics) to make decisions. These decision rules / frameworks are 
strategies to deal with human limitations and the complexity of the real world. 
Such a view of decision-making is largely explanatory in nature and does not 
enable reliable predictions of human behaviour. Bounded rationality is built 
on two main elements (depicted on Figure 1), the task environment and 
actors’ cognitive ability (or cognitive resources). 
Considering the task environment, the world is far too complex to be seized 
or perfectly understood by the human mind. Most real-world problems may 
trigger behaviour which cannot be explained by a standard ‘rational’ decision-
theoretic model, where utility-maximizing agents are assumed to select 
optimal responses (Simon 1955; Simon 1979). Behaviour is shaped by its 
environment (e.g., Simon 1969; Gigerenzer 2001; Todd & Gigerenzer 2007; 
Wilke & Todd 2010; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier 2011). Todd et al. (2012) 
suggest that environmental structures include: 
1. Uncertainty: how well a criterion can be predicted 
2. Redundancy: the correlation between cues3 
3. Sample size: number of observations (relative to number of cues) 
4. Variability in weights: the distribution of the cue weights (e.g., skewed 
or uniform) 
Taking each of these points in turn. First, usually uncertainty determines the 
decision making approach. For example, the simpler the decision making 
approach is, the more robust it is. An example is the elementary hiatus 
heuristic, ‘a one-reason’ heuristic used to determine active and inactive 
customers. It is known to outperform more complex models with more 
information mostly because the decision making environment is highly 
uncertain (Hogarth & Karelaia 2007; Wübben & Wangenheim 2008). This can 
potentially explain why simple management frameworks are so widely used. 
Second, redundancy also tends to benefit the accuracy of inference 
strategies. For example, simple managerial heuristics tend to perform as well 
as strategies that integrate all available information in moderate to high 
                                                   
3 Cues are information used to make a decision 
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information redundancy while the opposite situation benefits the integration 
of more information (Dieckmann & Rieskamp 2007). Third, as is suggested by 
the Law of Large Numbers (von Mises 1957), sample size generally tends to 
have a positive correlation with the accuracy of predictive models (Sedlmeier 
& Gigerenzer 2000). Consequently, it is beneficial to use more robust 
(simpler) models for smaller samples (Hogarth & Karelaia 2007). Finally, 
variability in weights introduces the idea of uniformity and skewness, where 
simple heuristics fit decisions in environments of moderate to high variability 
better than more complex models (Hogarth & Karelaia 2007). 
Considering the decision-maker’s cognitive ability, the actor can use logic, 
statistics (Tversky & Kahneman 1983), or heuristics (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier 
2011) to make decisions in complex environments. Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier (2011, p.454) define heuristics as “…a strategy that ignores part of 
the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or 
accurately than more complex methods.” Heuristics are developed naturally or 
artificially to simplify the cognitive strain and to enable not perfect, but often 
‘good enough’ (satisficing) decisions (Shah & Oppenheimer 2008). Simon 
(1990) considers the limited computational capabilities of an agent as being 
recognition, memory and reaction. Models of cognition can get extremely 
complex and detailed, hence, for the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that 
human behaviour is limited on the three basic levels (Simon 1969; 1987; 
1990).:  
(i) The number of items they can memorise is relatively small, i.e., 
humans have limited short-term working memory; 
(ii) Recognition is powerful and quick but not instantaneous and is 
dependent on previous knowledge recall; 
(iii) Reaction is not instantaneous. 
1.1.2 Working around human limitations 
One of the main limitations of the human mind is memory and processing 
ability (Simon 1987). Artificial systems and developed technology can 
compensate for these limitations. They can enhance human abilities by 
allowing high frequency sequential and parallel processing. They also enable 
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relatively quick access to vast amounts of working memory. The ability to rely 
on external tools in order to process intensive repetitive tasks dramatically 
changed the ‘accuracy-effort trade-off curve’. The accuracy-effort trade-off is 
a power distribution type curve relationship between the quality of the 
decision (accuracy) and cost (effort), i.e., the greater the effort, the greater 
the accuracy (Payne et al. 1993; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer 2011). 
Artificial systems have the potential to automate a number of tasks. Uptake 
is limited by both technological limitations as well as user preference. The 
idea of relying solely on the artificial system ‘…for making important decisions 
that do not depend heavily on human inputs seems unlikely as well as 
unattractive’ (Edwards & Fasolo 2001, p. 588). People (in general) and experts 
(in particular) have a long history of resistance to ‘machines’ taking over 
decisions and judgements (Meehl 1954). 
Technology and more specifically Decision Support Systems (DSS), should not 
focus on unilateral control of the decision-making process but rather enhance 
the human decision making processes.  This can take four forms (Larrick et al. 
2004, p. 330): 
i) Basic normative algorithms that are known to be unnatural and 
hard to implement or remember for humans can be assigned to 
DSS. 
ii) Analytical decision tools and decision algorithms that are 
otherwise intimidating and hard to understand can be 
incorporated in a user-friendly DSS. 
iii) The thankless task of consistency checks, such as criteria weights 
or probabilities, can be made less intrusive, faster and effortless if 
performed by a DSS.  
iv) DSS can perform sensitivity analysis. 
Systems must be designed around human limitations, allowing a symbiosis 
between human intellectual ability enhanced by the power of high frequency 
processing and working memory that can be incorporated into the systems. 
As Silver (1991, p.106) sets ‘to establish a unified approach, one that 
recognises the importance of both technological and behavioural issues’. The 
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directive is ‘…how our mind’s design, relying on decision mechanisms tuned to 
specific environments, should be taken into account in our technology’s design, 
creating environments that can enable better decisions’ (Todd 2007, p.1317). 
1.2 Demand planning 
1.2.1 The importance of demand planning 
Planning is one of the most important processes in business and operations 
management (OM) (Lee 2004). It relies heavily on decision-making and 
decision support. The performance of planning activities in a demand-supply 
network is highly dependent on the DP outputs (Chen et al. 2007). This makes 
DP central to the concept of supply chain (SC) (Christopher 2011, p.13) 
because DP is essential for balancing supply and demand. It allows the 
company to reduce its purchasing, production and logistics costs as well 
minimizing inventory necessary to buffer for uncertainty. 
To understand the importance of DP it is important to consider its 
implications on the supply and demand mismatch (Stadtler et al. 2015). One 
of the most common means of addressing uncertainty is by holding inventory 
that buffers variation. Inventory costs are commonly estimated to be 20% on 
average across different industries globally, however, this is often an 
underestimation.4 These costs come in many forms. For example, inventory 
costs cash and the interest on that cash, insurance and taxes on inventory, 
labour to handle the inventory, warehouse rent costs to store the inventory, 
are just some of the examples. On the extreme end, failure to anticipate 
demand can result in complete inability to satisfy the customer and to do 
business (Stadtler et al. 2015). This could result in a disruption and usually has 
implications on the whole SC: ‘Disruptions occur here from a mismatch between 
a company’s projections and actual demand as well as from poor supply chain 
coordination. Consequence of which are costly shortages, obsolescence, and 
inefficient capacity utilisation. An important issue in this context, affecting 
forecast quality and therefore demand-side disruptions, is the bullwhip effect, 
                                                   
4 Source: Forbes.com 
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which is characterised by an amplification of demand volatility in the upstream 
direction of the supply chain’ (Wagner & Bode 2006, p.304). 
In practice, it is extremely difficult to accurately calculate the total cost of the 
supply and demand mismatch as such calculations need to often involve 
subjective values such as (potential or real) opportunity cost or reputation. 
For example, in 2013, poor inventory management cost Walmart $3 billion. 
The situation was contradictory because its inventory was growing faster 
than its sales but the merchandise was not on the shelves for customers to 
buy. This seriously damaged the Walmart’s reputation.5 
DP is the starting point for SC planning and its quality will affect all 
subsequent planning activities (Chen et al. 2007). Central to DP is forecasting 
(Stadtler et al. 2015). Forecasts are critical for OM and integrated part of 
functions of scheduling, resource planning, and marketing (Fildes et al. 2006). 
Generally, the forecast within a plan combines managerial judgement with 
statistical forecasts within a support system. This means that forecasts 
incorporate decisions under uncertainty involving humans and systems. 
1.2.2 Dealing with demand uncertainty 
One of the main challenges of DP is dealing with the demand uncertainty (Lee 
et al. 1997; Geary et al. 2006). Demand uncertainty makes the demand signal 
one of the most unreliable sources of information in the SC (Geary et al. 
2006). In general, the further upstream in a supply-demand chain, the greater 
the demand uncertainty as it is propagated and magnified (Lee et al. 1997; 
Geary et al. 2006). This makes the DP performance one of the greatest 
challenges in management and its improvement is a priority for business 
success. 
Demand uncertainty has different sources, uncertainty can be natural but 
often much is caused both by the planning systems as well as by managers 
themselves (Lee et al. 1997). There is no clarity about what the different 
contributions to uncertainty are and how they can be addressed, especially 
                                                   
5 Sources: Forbes.com and Bloomberg.com 
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regarding managers. For example, Wu and Katok (2006) show that training 
can improve individual knowledge and understanding of the system, which 
consequently reduces behavioural issues causing uncertainty. However, 
Sterman and Dogan (2015) conclude that irrational behaviour still persists 
even with training and perfect visibility across the chain –  managers could 
not resist the urge to introduce uncertainty under conditions of certainty. 
This highlights an important problem with DP that must be better understood. 
1.2.3 The problem with demand planning 
The DP task, especially forecasting under uncertainty, is hard. Contrary to the 
belief that greater effort leads to better results, sometimes unnecessary 
effort can have negative consequences and lead to worse results (e.g., see 
Katsikopoulos 2010). Childerhouse et al. (2003, p.135) highlight that ‘…much 
uncertainty is induced by “players” [managers] within the system as opposed to 
being introduced by the marketplace.’  In practice, managers show relatively 
little adherence to the original plan (Harrison, 1997). After the plan is 
developed, managers often intervene and make changes due to mistrust, 
second-guessing, over-reactions, and fear of losing sales (Niranjan et al., 
2009). Unnecessary interventions with the plan often have negative effects 
on the whole SC (Niranjan et al., 2009). Examples of unnecessary 
interventions include hoarding and phantom ordering, which are often 
triggered by emotional impulses (Sterman & Dogan 2015). 
Much of the irrational behaviour in DP seems to be resistant to additional 
knowledge, training or experience (e.g., Schweitzer et al. 2000; Sterman & 
Dogan 2015). In an experiment, Sterman and Dogan (2015) demonstrate that 
even with perfect visibility of demand (which was known to be constant) as 
well as perfect knowledge of the orders at each instance of the chain, 
managers cannot resist the urge to hoard, ending up destabilising the whole 
SC. On a larger scale, the behavioural effect is often cumulative and can throw 
an efficient SC out of balance (Mason-Jones & Towill 2000; Croson & 
Donohue 2006). Such behaviour causes amplification of small variations 
(over-reactions and distorted information) e.g., the Forrester effect 
(Forrester, 1958) also known as bullwhip effect (Lee et al., 1997). This results 
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in extra costs, e.g., inventory, markdowns, stock-outs or obsolescence (e.g., 
Niranjan et al., 2009). 
Managerial interventions are especially problematic for forecasting in DP. 
There is strong evidence that combining managerial judgement with 
statistical forecasts in support systems negatively affects accuracy (Fildes et 
al. 2006) and, consequently, has an adverse effect on DP performance. Part 
of the issue comes from people’s preference towards their own intuition 
(‘gut’) as opposed to the artificial rationale in the form of formulas, statistical 
or mechanical procedures (Meehl 1954; Kleinmuntz 1990; Dane et al. 2012), 
etc. While intuition and judgement can be extremely powerful in some 
situations (e.g., see Syntetos et al. 2016), it can also lead to judgement errors 
and biases (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Business management is no 
exception to this problem (Lawrence et al. 1986; Lim & O ’connor 1995; 
Bazerman 2005; Fildes & Goodwin 2007). 
Following their intuition, managers systematically disregard the existing 
forecasts in general (even though these forecasts are often quite accurate). 
Anecdotally, this is referred to as the ‘we know best’ syndrome (Mason-Jones 
& Towill, 1998, p.19) and often attributed to overconfidence (Brenner et al. 
1996; Lawrence & Sim 1999; Moore & Cain 2007). Statistical forecasts are 
often completely ignored as managers try to incorporate known special 
events (e.g., promotions) while making adjustments. This happens even when 
the statistical forecast accurately describes the underlying predictable 
pattern (Goodwin & Fildes 1999). In cases when the outputs from statistical 
models are not completely ignored, managers are prone to make frequent 
adjustments (Fildes et al., 2009) suffering from overconfidence when it comes 
to the quality of their judgement (Brenner et al. 1996; Lawrence & Sim 1999; 
Moore & Cain 2007). The quality of the adjustments to the forecast is likely 
to be linked to heuristics and biases (Goodwin 2002). When it comes to 
selecting the statistical model, managers perform poorly (Lawrence et al. 
2002) resorting to default parameters and sub-optimal models (Fildes & 
Beard 1992). In an attempt to improve the sub-optimality of the chosen 
models and parameters, managers make exaggerated judgemental 
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adjustments to the statistical forecast, which are still not ‘good enough’ when 
compared to better alternative statistical models (Goodwin et al. 2007). 
1.3 The research gap and the subsequent research 
question 
To date, literature on decision making in planning tasks primarily focused 
either on systems, management or on individual behaviour separately. On the 
one hand, decision making literature (behavioural economics and psychology) 
offers many different explanations to some sub-optimal performance in the 
real world (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Schwenk 1988; Bazerman 2005). 
This sub-optimal performance is observed in the form of systematic 
deviations (biases) from normative expectations and theoretical optima. 
Moreover, trait theory from psychology literature suggests that individual 
differences play a significant role in explaining group heterogeneity and 
differences in decision making performance (Weber & Milliman 1997; John 
et al. 2008; Fleeson & Jayawickreme 2015). On the other hand, decision 
support literature has looked into improving the way systems support human 
decision-makers (Leighton 1981; Silver 1991; Burstein & Holsapple 2008; 
Goodwin et al. 2011). Finally, OM and operations research (OR) literature 
describes a wide variety of the challenges in business, many of which are 
caused by both management systems as well as individuals, highlighting 
behavioural issues in the context of operations and supply chain management 
(O&SCM) (e.g., Lee et al. 1997; Geary et al. 2006; Bendoly 2006; Carter et al. 
2007; Niranjan et al. 2009; Kaufmann et al. 2010).  
Although the problem of managerial judgement under uncertainty has been 
observed from many different perspectives (Tversky & Kahneman 1974; 
Silver 1991; Lee et al. 1997; Bazerman 2005; Geary et al. 2006; Bendoly 
2006; Niranjan et al. 2009), the causes behind this persistent behaviour are 
not clear and there is still lack of research providing cross-field solutions. 
Recent advances in O&SCM literature offer a progressively interdisciplinary 
view on the planning problem incorporating insights from behavioural 
economics and psychology. For example, there is some empirical evidence 
suggesting that individual differences play a significant role in decisions 
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similar to the ones made in DP (Franken & Muris 2005; Lapide 2007; Moritz 
et al. 2009). Similarly, how decision-makers interact with DSS to make DP 
decisions received significant attention (O’Connor et al. 1993; Fildes & 
Hastings 1994; Webby & O’Connor 1996; Parackal et al. 2007). 
Following the call for theory in O&SCM (Carter 2011) and current absence of 
solid explanations behind some clearly observed behavioural issues in the 
literature (Bolton & Katok 2008; Gans & Croson 2008; Croson, Schultz, et al. 
2013), it is necessary to borrow theory from other relevant fields to seek an 
explanation. Without theoretical understanding of the behavioural 
mechanisms governing the ill behaviour of managers, it is hard to progress in 
understanding and solving the problem of sub-optimal decisions in DP.  
Although problems related to human behaviour have been highlighted in 
previous OM and OR research, theoretical foundations explaining the 
observed behaviour require further development. The focus of the research 
on DP to date has been on the average behaviour of a large number of 
individuals (representative agent behaviour) which is different from 
concentrating on individual heterogeneity in DP tasks (individual differences). 
While there is certainly great value in observing the average of a large sample, 
in order to derive the basic behavioural principles in various environments, 
typically, DP decisions are made by individuals rather than groups of people 
and individual heterogeneity among planners in their propensity to generate 
successful plans is important. Therefore, it is important to explore individual 
differences in the context of OM (Croson & Donohue 2002; Gans & Croson 
2008; Croson, Schultz, et al. 2013) as so far contributions relating to this 
aspect of DP decision making are limited (Zmud 1979; Strohhecker & Größler 
2013; Moritz et al. 2013). It is still unclear why individuals behave in a certain 
way when making DP decisions and, hence, necessary to understand the 
relative contribution of individual factors and systems parameters to DP 
which lies at the core of this thesis.  
The main research question is as follows: What is the contribution of individual 
differences and planning policy parameters to demand planning performance? 
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The aim of this research is to develop and test a theoretical framework 
drawing on theory from behavioural economics and psychology to identify 
planning policy parameters and individual traits that can be used to predict 
DP performance. The main contributions of this thesis can be split across four 
fields: Engineering, Management, Psychology, and Economics (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Summary of the main contributions of this thesis 
For DSS, it is provided a new understanding of how humans and systems 
interact together with innovative implications of how policy can reduce 
decision failures. 
For O&SCM it is suggested a new analytical framework explaining and 
predicting DP decisions. Moreover, it is provided new understanding of the 
important role of policy in O&SCM. Finally, the contribution to O&SCM is an 
Main Contributions of This Thesis
Engineering
Decision 
Support 
Systems
(i) new 
understanding of 
how humans and 
systems interact;
(ii) innovative 
implications about 
how policy can 
offset decision 
failures 
Management
Operations and 
Supply Chain 
Management
(i) new analytical 
framework to 
explain and 
predict planning 
decisions;
(ii) new 
understanding of 
the role of policy 
in O&SCM 
problems
(iii) innovative 
design of 
newsvendow 
problem which 
includes time 
horizons and 
business planning 
policy restrictions
Psychology
Social Psychology,
Behavioural 
Science,
Decision Science
(i) new application 
of the CPT to 
planning decisions;
(ii) new application 
of MLA to 
planning decisions;
(iii) new insights 
into how 
individual 
characteristics 
(exposure to 
planning and 
personal traits) 
influence planning
Economics
Experimental 
Economics, 
Behavioural 
Science, Decision 
Science
(i) innovative 
experimental 
design to test 
MLA in application 
to planning;
(ii) new insights 
into how a simple 
deterministic 
decision theory 
(CPT) + bias 
(Mental 
Accounting) can 
explain real-world 
phenomenon 
(planning failures)
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innovative design of the newsvendor problem that includes time horizons and 
DP policy restrictions. 
For social psychology, behavioural science and decision science it is provided 
a new application of the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) and Myopic Loss 
Aversion (MLA) to DP decisions. Additionally, a new insight is provided on 
how individual characteristics (e.g., exposure to DP and personality traits) 
influence DP performance. 
Finally, the contribution to experimental economics, behavioural science and 
decision science is an innovative experimental design to test MLA in 
application to DP. A new insight is provided into how a simple deterministic 
theory (CPT) with the mental accounting bias (as part of the MLA) can explain 
real-world phenomena (sub-optimal DP decisions). 
1.4 Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured is outlined in Table 1. Following this introduction, 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature around the task, performance and support 
of DP decisions. Chapter 3 expands the literature into theory potentially 
explaining the previously described behavioural problem, exploring models of 
human behaviour and individual differences. This is used to develop a 
conceptual framework is developed together with a set of hypothesis. 
Chapter 4 presents the research design to test the framework and hypothesis; 
it presents the adopted epistemology, reviews behavioural experiment 
methodology and outlining the experimental design used to collect data to 
test the hypothesis. Chapter 5 presents experimental results testing the 
previously developed hypothesis. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the research, 
focusing on findings, contributions, limitations, and suggests further research 
directions. 
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Table 1 Thesis structure 
Chapter Overview 
Ch. 1 Introduction Provides the research rationale, introducing the relevance of DP 
and the associated problem of mangers’ behaviour followed by 
the research question. Thesis structure is outlined. 
Ch. 2 Demand planning: 
process, performance 
and support 
DP is explored in literature. The task is described along with its 
context and the types of decisions. The problem of DP 
performance in form of instability, chaos, nervousness reviewed 
followed by the relationship between decision-makers and 
decision supporting systems. 
Ch. 3 Underpinning 
theory and hypothesis 
Because the problem of DP is greatly dependent on the 
individual behaviour, the literature review expands into 
behavioural economics and psychology to explain the previously 
identified phenomena of sub-optimal DP performance. Along 
with the theoretical development relevant hypothesis are 
derived. The chapter closes with a conceptual framework. 
Ch. 4 Research design  The ontological and epistemological positioning is explained 
followed by the description of behavioural/ decision making 
experiment used to test the framework and respective 
hypothesis. 
Ch. 5 Results and 
analysis 
The experimental results are analysed using econometric 
methodology to test the hypothesis. 
Ch. 6 Conclusions The last chapter summarizes the research, includes the review of 
the findings, contribution to both practice and theory, limitations, 
and suggest further research. 
1.5 Chapter summary 
People’s best efforts can be destructive and unnecessary actions, regardless 
of good intentions, are damaging. Mistakes occur because humans are 
imperfect decision-makers, and it is essential to consider both the decision-
maker and the environment (system) in which decisions are made. The quality 
of decisions depends on both (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Human and System base framework to consider decision-making 
DP is essential for business management. One of the main challenges in DP 
is making decisions under uncertainty and risk. Managers have a track record 
of making sub-optimal decisions in such context. Nonetheless, managers still 
trust their own judgement over decision support and statistical methods. 
Human System
 16 
Managers are known for unnecessary interventions, demonstrating mistrust, 
and over-reacting to small changes. This sub-optimal behaviour is dependent 
on both the manager as an individual as well as the system (e.g., the set of 
policies) in which decisions are made. In what follows, this thesis focuses on 
the relative contribution of (i) humans (reasoning, biases, and individual 
differences) and (ii) system (DP policy parameters) on DP performance. The 
next section reviews the literature around DP, describing the task, 
performance and DP decision support. 
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2 Demand planning: process, performance and 
support 
2.1 Introduction 
The structure of chapter 2 is outlined in Table 2. Section 2.2 positions DP in 
the broader context and presents the main concepts around DP that are 
required for understanding the potential implications of DP decisions. Section 
2.3 describes DP performance where the concepts of system nervousness 
(from the system perspective) and naïve interventionism (from the human 
perspective) are introduced. Due to the challenge of DP, DSS are used. 
However, this comes with resistance and managers often choose to do 
differently. Decision support can either restrict decision-making or guide it. 
Its application in DP is discussed. These issues are discussed in section 2.4. 
The chapter closes with a summary of the key points.  
Table 2 Chapter 2 Structure 
Section Overview 
2.2 Demand planning process This section focuses on what is the context and decisions 
made. The process of DP is broken down into its context 
of matching supply with demand. Discusses its 
dependency with the planning horizon and the nature of 
the available information that is used in the forecasting 
process.  
2.3 Demand planning 
performance 
DP performance is related to nervousness in the SC. 
Demand plan failures are explained as system 
nervousness and naïve interventionism. Individual 
differences are observed as an extension of naïve 
interventionism. 
2.4 Humans and systems: 
supporting demand planning 
decisions 
The relationship between managers and systems 
supporting DP decisions is reviewed in terms of how 
people have been resisting to automation. Follows the 
two main ways of supporting decisions via either 
decisional guidance or system restrictiveness. The section 
closes with an overview of decision support for DP 
decisions.  
2.2 Demand planning process 
2.2.1 Balancing supply and demand 
To understand the DP process, it is necessary to start by considering its 
context and reach. Businesses are complex systems of exchange with supply 
of and demand for goods, services or both (Simon 1979; Deming 1986). These 
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systems form networks which can be broadly referred to as SC. Christopher 
(2011, p.13) defines SC as a ‘...network of organizations that are involved, 
through upstream and downstream linkages, in the different processes and 
activities that produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of 
the ultimate consumer’. The concept of SC is here used instrumentally as an 
umbrella term for the broad effects of DP decisions. 
DP, even when local or contained within an organisation, has implications 
beyond firms’ boundaries (Stadtler 2005). It is critical to think about DP 
considering the broader SC since the effects of bad DP will affect the rest of 
the chain. Failure to plan affects the SC upstream, e.g., in the form of the 
bullwhip effect (Lee et al. 1997), and downstream, e.g., with disruptions 
(Craighead et al. 2007). Bullwhip effect (also known as Forrester effect) is the 
amplification of demand caused by information distortion as the demand 
signal passes through the chain (Lee et al. 1997). DP helps to addresses one 
of the greatest challenges for any business which is minimising supply and 
demand mismatch (e.g., Vitasek et al. 2003; Christopher 2011). 
Uncertain demand presents a particular challenge as it requires the ability to 
predict or react as quickly as possible (Christopher 2011). Underestimating 
demand is an issue as demand can then exceed supply, leading to out of 
stocks and poor customer service. Whilst overestimating demand does not 
affect customer service, as supply exceeds demand it can lead to the growth 
of costly inventory buffers. 
2.2.2 Demand planning process 
DP usually produces forecast data describing demand for products or groups 
of products by period over a set planning horizon. Hence, DP precedes master 
planning for demand fulfilment (Figure 4). Master planning’s main purpose 
“...is to synchronise the flow of materials along the entire supply chain” 
(Stadtler et al. 2015, p.155). Therefore, master planning process creates the 
plan for the whole SC, including purchasing and production decisions. It 
generates the plan of supply from external and internal sources. The purpose 
of DP is threefold: (a) improving forecast accuracy; (b) increasing customer 
service level; and (c) reducing inventory (Stadtler et al. 2015). 
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Figure 4 Positioning of demand planning (Stadtler et al. 2015, p.180) 
The DP process (Figure 5) is a multistage sequence. The process starts with 
the preparation of DP structures and historic data, followed by the stage of 
developing the statistical forecast. The statistical forecasting stage is followed 
by judgemental forecasting stage where managers analyse the statistical 
outputs considering additional information that is usually not available 
historically or is ignored by the forecasting models. Managers working with 
DP are often responsible for the forecasting, being required to choose the 
best forecasting methods and adjust the forecasts using their own judgement 
(Fildes & Goodwin 2007). After adjustments, a consensus stage is reached 
and planning of dependent demand stage precedes the release of the final 
forecast into the subsequent processes. It has a feedback loop through the 
master planning giving the possibility for management to revise the forecasts 
based on information about capacity constraints (e.g., need to consider how 
to create additional capacity or manage demand) or surplus (e.g., need to 
stimulate demand). The impact of the demand plan on the SC is simulated by 
the master planning process through the what-if analysis that is then fed back 
to managers who judge and adjust if necessary. This feedback loop is essential 
to understand the effect of business decisions on demand. 
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Figure 5 Demand planning process (Stadtler et al., 2015, p.153) 
Demand can be greatly influenced by business decisions. Demand is greatly 
affected by price promotions, new product launches, regional promotions and 
product bundling. These kind of decisions can be also referred to as demand 
shaping decisions (Lapide 2013) carried out primarily by marketing and sales 
managers. Although SC managers are not directly responsible for these 
decisions, it is critical to ensure that the supply meets the expected future 
demand as well as to advocate that demand shaping must consider the ability 
to supply (Lapide 2013). 
The process of DP, whilst theoretically comprehensive, can fail in practice. 
First, the nature of available information that comes from many different 
sources is imperfect and information streams need to be optimised. Second, 
the transition between statistical and judgemental forecasting stages requires 
structuring and it is necessary to understand how it depends on planner’s 
cognitive ability and training. Third, it is important to understand the effect of 
the forecast horizon and its relationship with uncertainty. The process of DP 
considers the future. The future can be split as near or far future. Therefore, 
one of the main considerations to have in DP is the planning horizon. 
2.2.3 Planning horizon 
The longer the planning horizon, the greater is uncertainty. Generally both 
statistical and judgemental forecasting become less accurate as the planning 
horizon increases (Lawrence et al. 1985; Lawrence et al. 1986). Mostly short 
term, judgemental forecast quality often suffers due to managers’ behaviour 
(e.g., Webby & O’Connor, 1996; Parackal et al., 2007). Although in some 
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cases, intermittent forecasts can be significantly improved when managers 
provide input on irregularities (Syntetos et al. 2009; Syntetos et al. 2016). 
Another important consideration about planning horizon concerns managers. 
Planning is arguably not a natural act, at least not for everybody. Hey and 
Knoll (2007, p.8) study experimentally the human propensity to plan in 
dynamic risky situations and conclude that ‘just over half of the subject plan 
fully, while the rest do not plan ahead at all.’ Bone et al. (2009, p.12) conducted 
a further experimental study and find that over half of the experimental 
subjects ‘do not appear to be planning ahead; moreover, their ability to plan 
ahead does not improve with experience’. This means that those subjects think 
only about immediate implications of their decisions and this behaviour is 
resistant to experience. 
There is no general consensus on how far ahead in time short term and long 
term forecasting looks, as it is highly dependent on the context (Taylor & 
Thomas 1982; Armstrong 2001; Goodwin 2002). It is however generally 
accepted in SC literature that short term forecast considers the ‘next period 
or periods’ and long term is ‘beyond the short term’ (Armstrong 2001). Short-
term forecasting is usually achieved with relatively simple procedures. Long 
term forecasting typically needs more than simple historical data analysis and 
goes beyond the extrapolation of the trend and seasonality. A common way 
to work around the issue of lower accuracy for long-term is by planning at a 
product family level rather than individual stock keeping units. 
Finally, time horizon plays a major role in plan instability (Blackburn et al., 
1986) and consequently affects business performance. For the purposes of 
this analysis, the focus is on the short-term time horizon as the majority of 
important DP problems occur within the short time frame. 
2.2.4 The nature of available information  
Relevant data for forecasting (Table 3) based on Fildes et al. (2006) 
constitutes time series data, information on customers’ activities, information 
on other relevant variables (e.g., major events, competitors activities, weather 
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forecasts), earlier forecasts from previous periods, other forecasts and 
information on past forecast errors. 
Table 3 Types and source of available information (based on Fields et al. (2006)) 
Type Source 
Time series data Usually has different levels of aggregation (product group, pack size, 
SKU, region, customer, day, week or month). Might require data 
cleansing (e.g., outlier removal such as special events or promotions). 
Cleansing decisions are often made based only on judgement. Time 
series analysis enable powerful insight on the true unpredictability 
(noise), trends, seasonal patterns and periods. 
Information on 
customers’ activities 
Information on activities such as discontinued products, promotions 
and new product development 
Other relevant 
variables 
Major events such as festivals or sports leagues, weather forecasts, 
competitors sales and other activities such as promotions, 
discontinued products and new product launches 
Earlier forecasts 
from previous 
periods 
One common method is rolling forecasting which updates earlier 
forecasts when approaching the forecast period 
Other forecasts Different levels in the organisation produce different forecasts, e.g., 
accounts managers are closer to their customers and can produce 
more accurate forecasts on the basis of their closer contact 
Information on past 
forecast errors 
Knowing how accurate previous forecasts were can provide relevant 
feedback for the forecasters 
Demand patterns will influence DP judgement (Theocharis & Harvey 2016). 
Accordingly to Wold’s theorem (Wold 1954), a time series (i.e., demand over 
time) consists of two parts, deterministic and stochastic. Alternatively this can 
be distinguished as regular, irregular and noise parts (Fildes et al. 2006). 
Following this approach, the deterministic part is assumed as predictable. The 
time series contains the trend, cycle and season. Trend and cycle can (in some 
cases) be merged into a common component. This can be considered all 
regular patterns or relationships. The non-deterministic (stochastic) part 
contains the random residual also known as the noise component. Importance 
must be given to outliers forming the irregular components. It is possible to 
distinguish at least two types of outliers in demand signals. One type of 
outliers is natural and the other is artificial (often foreseeable). An example of 
a natural outlier is a natural disaster or a plague, while an artificial outlier could 
be a significant promotion. While a natural disaster is often unexpected, a 
promotion is planned, and, therefore, predictable. 
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Additional sources of data can be greatly relevant in improving forecasting 
accuracy, in particular judgemental adjustments as irregular components can 
be considered. This includes information on activities such as discontinued 
products, price promotions, new product launches, regional promotions, 
product bundling, and other business decisions that can affect the demand. 
Additional relevant information can come from events such as major festivals 
(e.g., Beer Festival) or sports leagues (e.g., Premier League), weather forecasts 
(e.g., floods, rain seasons, and heat waves), competitors’ sales and other 
activities such as promotions, discontinued products and new product 
launches. 
Earlier forecasts are also relevant information for DP as one common method 
of formulating new plans is rolling forecasting which updates earlier forecasts 
when approaching the forecast period so it considers historic forecasts. The 
same organisation usually produces many different forecasts with different 
levels of aggregation or focus, e.g., accounts managers are typically close to 
their customers and can produce accurate forecasts because of their close 
contact. Finally, previous forecast accuracy is relevant as knowing that a given 
product has been accurately forecasted before or systematically off target, 
will have implications on the approach and forecasting methods used. 
2.2.5 Statistical and judgemental forecasting process 
The forecasting stages of the DP process involve human beings at every 
stage. Employees and managers who perform the DP in general and the 
demand forecasting process in particular usually have experience in 
developing forecasts but have limited theoretical knowledge of forecasting 
errors and often lack formal training in statistics or statistical methods (Fildes 
& Hastings 1994). Forecast adjustments based on judgement often happen in 
managerial meetings under time pressure as well as lack of visual means and 
flexibility to provide a quick analysis (Fildes et al. 2006). 
As illustrated in Figure 5, the DP process includes two types of forecasting 
processes. Step 2, is the computation of the statistical forecast, and step 3 is 
the judgmental forecasting process. Consensus is then reached in step 4.  
 24 
In practice, the demand forecasting process is often divided into two steps: 
(1) statistical forecast and (2) judgemental adjustment (Figure 6). Demand 
forecasting usually starts with the creation of a statistical forecast, often 
conducted automatically (when planners use a template model habitually 
applied in their organisation) or manually (when planners choose their own 
‘custom’ model). After this, the planners make judgemental adjustments to 
the statistical forecast taking into account special factors (factors relevant to 
their organisation) as well as other available information (e.g., relevant 
externalities). The outcome of this two-step procedure is a set of final 
forecasts often developed for many different products. This set, in turn, is 
used to plan SC operations (Fildes & Beard 1992; Fildes et al. 2006). This 
procedure is often repeated weekly and, sometimes, daily making the demand 
forecasting process too large to be handled manually and requiring a great 
degree of automation. This means that planners have very short time frames 
to apply judgemental adjustments. 
 
Figure 6 The stages of the forecasting process in the demand planning process (adapted 
from Stadtler et al., 2015, p.153) 
Considering the process and components of the time-series, demand 
forecasts are set to capture two types of components (e.g., patterns, 
relationships, events), which, in turn, could be regular and irregular. Regular 
components are detected and explained by statistical models during 
statistical forecasting step and irregular (but foreseeable) components by 
planners in judgemental adjustment step. In principle, evidence (e.g., Goodwin 
& Fildes 1999; Goodwin et al. 2007; Fildes et al. 2009) suggests that statistical 
models (automated systems) outperform human judgement in identifying and 
modelling the regular components. In contrast, automated systems based 
purely on statistical models often fail to forecast irregular components 
(Lawrence et al. 1986; Goodwin & Wright 1993; Syntetos et al. 2009). 
Preparation of demand 
planning structures and 
historic data
Statistical 
forecasting
Judgmental 
forecasting 
(adjustment)
Release of the 
final forecast
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The combination of statistical forecasting and judgemental adjustment steps 
can often lead to greater accuracy than each step taken separately (e.g., 
Lawrence et al. 1986; Blattberg et al. 1990). The final forecast accuracy can 
be greatly improved especially when the manager adds extra irregular 
information that is not included (or is naturally ignored) in the statistical model 
(Mathews & Diamantopoulos 1990; Donihue 1993; Goodwin & Fildes 1999; 
Fildes & Stekler 2002). However, this is not always true as managers have a 
tendency to override the statistical forecast of the regular component 
(Goodwin & Wright 1993; Harvey 1995; Lim & O ’connor 1995; Goodwin & 
Fildes 1999; Sanders & Ritzman 2001; Sanders & Manrodt 2003). While 
judgemental adjustment is often necessary and beneficial to the demand 
forecasting process, it may also harm the forecast creating such problems as 
excess inventory (Sterman & Dogan 2015), amplification of demand (Lee et 
al. 1997), to name a few. 
2.2.6 Demand planning process summary 
DP enables customer service levels to be maintained at a lower cost, as less 
inventory needs to be held to buffer against the mismatch between demand 
and supply. DP is the starting point for the subsequent planning processes 
(e.g., precedes master planning). The DP process includes statistical 
forecasting followed by judgemental adjustments to consider both the regular 
and irregular patterns. Judgement can be very powerful to incorporate 
additional information in the forecasting process (e.g., Lawrence et al. 1986; 
Mathews & Diamantopoulos 1990; O’Connor et al. 1993). Such information 
is usually known future irregular events. Irregular events are usually ignored 
by statistical models. Examples of this are demand shaping business decisions, 
information about the competition. This is both good (e.g., in case of 
intermittent demand) and bad when the separation between regular and 
irregular components is not clear and managers adjust what is highly regular 
introducing irregularity artificially. 
As a result, DP is subject to judgement errors within a system. This constitutes 
a potential source of DP failure due to a number of reasons related to 
managers’ behaviour. First, many people naturally do not plan ahead in time 
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(Hey & Knoll 2007; Bone et al. 2009). Second, often managers working with 
DP lack formal training in statistics or statistical methods for forecasting 
(Fildes & Hastings 1994). And finally, managers have a general tendency to 
override the statistical forecast introducing unnecessary adjustments to the 
statistical forecast (Goodwin & Wright 1993; Harvey 1995; Lim & O ’connor 
1995; Goodwin & Fildes 1999; Sanders & Ritzman 2001). This can 
significantly compromise DP performance. 
2.3 Demand planning performance 
The performance of DP is not the same as forecasting performance. The 
quality of a forecast is usually measured using accuracy estimates such as 
mean absolute deviation (MAD) or mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) 
while the performance of DP can be assessed in terms of profit, revenue or 
costs (Stadtler et al. 2015). Many issues can affect DP performance. The 
following sections focus specifically on DP performance from the system and 
manager’s perspective. 
2.3.1 System nervousness in the supply chain 
SC complexity and uncertainty forces cause ‘chaos’ in a SC  (Christopher & 
Lee 2001). Whilst part of complexity and uncertainty is natural, part is 
artificially induced by people. The base assumption is that the majority of 
people across the SC want to make good decisions. However, Deming (1986) 
argued that people’s best efforts can be destructive when carried out without 
knowledge, understanding variation or when the system is broken. This is 
very likely to happen in conditions of complexity and uncertainty typical to 
most modern businesses and their SC’s. Chaos in SCs makes it impossible to 
make the right decisions hence it’s also impossible to design optimal solutions 
(Christopher & Lee 2001). 
Both people and systems can be the source of the problem. On the one hand, 
the SC context is far too complex to be perfectly seized and understood. As 
a result, the part of the chaos comes from managers, in the form of mistrust, 
unnecessary interventions, distorted information, second guessing and over-
reaction across the SC  (Christopher & Lee 2001, p.2). On the other hand, 
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managers are not the only source of chaos. Several causes of chaos come 
from the system. Lee et al. (1997) suggest that information delays and 
distortion, order batching, shortage gaming, sales promotions, fluctuations of 
price and rationing contribute to chaos and instability in the SC. 
An example of such chaos is the bullwhip effect (Lee et al. 1997) where 
variation greatly increases from downstream to upstream SCs. This effect of 
amplification of small variations has been earlier described by Forrester 
(1958) and named the Forrester Effect. Lee et al., (1997) suggests that the 
bullwhip effect is a consequence of the players’ rational behaviour within the 
SC and that companies wanting to control the bullwhip effect must focus on 
modifying the infrastructure and policy rather than the decision-makers’ 
behaviour. According to Lee et al., (1997), demand signal processing is one of 
the main contributors to the bullwhip effect as managers’ perceptions and 
mistrust lead to readjustment of the perceived demand forecast. 
Deming  (1986) refers to such chaos as ‘system nervousness’ which affects 
the SC performance: ‘This increased nervousness will of course lead to higher 
costs and inefficiencies through over-ordering and “squirreling” inventory’ 
(Christopher & Lee 2001, p.2). DP can either dampen or amplify variation, 
affecting chaos. Hence, the performance of a SC is dependent on the DP 
performance. 
DP performance depends on both managers and systems. Further the 
construct of ‘nervousness’ will be used to designate also chaos in the DP 
process. The following sections explore nervousness from both human and 
system perspective in order to understand what the main factors are 
contributing to DP performance. The following review of literature on 
nervousness in the SC goes beyond the DP function alone. Processes in a SC 
are highly interconnected. Therefore, the effects of DP nervousness can be 
detected in other processes. When the demand signal propagates in the SC, 
DP nervousness can distort the demand signal and compromise the quality of 
the master plans that consequently will compromise performance of 
processes built around them. 
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Hence, part of the uncertainty comes from the system, however, some 
authors defend that ‘…much uncertainty is induced by “players” [managers] 
within the system as opposed to being introduced by the marketplace.’ 
(Childerhouse et al. 2003a, p.135) 
2.3.2 Demand planning process failures: system nervousness 
and naïve interventionism 
In practice, there are many factors which may cause the DP process to fail 
(e.g., Kerkkänen et al. 2009; Stadtler et al. 2015). These failures include but 
are not limited to the following (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 Main factors causing demand-planning failures 
Even after considering potential failures of statistical forecasting and 
judgemental adjustment, there are still general factors that may cause DP to 
fail. Specifically, the systems in which humans operate are characterised by 
inherent (endogenous) instability often labelled system nervousness. 
Furthermore, even if the plan is perfectly formulated and accurately takes 
into account system nervousness, humans may cause DP failures by simply 
not following the plan, i.e., they are unable to follow the plan and constant 
desire to alter the plan due to observed small shocks and externalities may 
General 
failures
•Human perspective: Naïve interventionism
•System perspactive: System nervourness
Judgemental 
adjustment 
failures
•Manual model specification errors
•Misjudgement of externalities and/or their severity
Statistical 
forecating failures
•Measurement errors (including miscalculations of 
demand, supply, evaluation mechanisms as well as 
data entry errors)
•Automated model specification errors
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cause serious problems (Lim & O ’connor 1995; Goodwin & Fildes 1999). For 
example, Fildes et al. (2009, p.3) analysed 60,000 forecasts and outcomes of 
four SCs and observed that not only most of the forecasts were adjusted, the 
‘relatively larger adjustments tended to lead to greater average improvements in 
accuracy, the smaller adjustments often damaged accuracy.’ This inability to 
follow the plan and intervene will be called naïve interventionism.6 The 
rationale behind naïve interventionism lies in the fact that managers have a 
tendency to intervene with the plan (earlier referred to as best efforts) and 
naivety comes from the lack of understanding of variation and knowledge. In 
what follows, the focus is on two general factors: System nervousness and 
Naïve interventionism. 
2.3.3 System nervousness 
Historically, nervousness was associated to the material requirement 
planning (MRP) systems and the two basic causes were uncertainty in 
supply/demand and variations in lot-sizing decisions (Whybark & Williams 
1976). However, both causes and effects of the problem of nervousness is 
far greater in scope. The flow in SCs is usually managed either based on the 
demand of the first tier customer downstream (next immediate company in 
the chain) or on the demand of the end customer (ultimate consumer) in the 
total SC (Van Donselaar et al. 2000). Nervousness (in this case order 
instability) is a common problem in planning systems across the whole SC 
(Blackburn et al. 1985; Blackburn et al. 1986; Kadipasaoglu & Sridharan 
1995). The assumption is that the opposite of system nervousness is system 
stability. System stability depends on plan stability. In planning systems, 
‘…plan stability is affected by policy parameters’ (de Kok & Inderfurth 1997, 
p.55).  
Nervousness in the form of order instability causes frequent plan changes 
leading to adverse effects which propagate through the SC in form of 
increased cost, reduced productivity, lower service level, and a general state 
                                                   
6 The term ‘naïve interventionism’ is borrowed from Nicholas Nassim Taleb 
(2012) book Antifragile. Due to the nature of the publication, this source is 
used just as inspiration and not a reference to the argument of this research 
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of confusion in operations (Campbell 1971; Hayes & Clark 1985; Christopher 
& Lee 2001). Plan changes contribute to operational confusion and have 
negative impact on performance. ‘Confusion (…) refers to managerial actions 
that disrupt the stability of the factory’s operations’ (Hayes & Clark 1985, p.10). 
Confusion is also referred to as ‘chaos effects’ in SCs (Christopher & Lee 2001, 
p.2). Lack of planning stability and continual changes to the plan by the 
system, drive significant short-term and medium-term adjustment efforts and 
undermine management’s confidence in planning systems (Blackburn et al. 
1985; de Kok & Inderfurth 1997). 
Time horizon plays a major role in planning nervousness (Blackburn et al. 
1986). Examining different planning heuristics (policies) in relation to the time 
horizon, Simpson (1999) identified that time-horizon sensitive logistics 
exhibit less nervousness than horizon-myopic ones. 
Other factors rather than planning horizon is uncertainty in the timing or 
quantity of demand. Zhao and Lee (1993) looked at freezing the master 
production schedule under demand uncertainty for parameters such as 
planning horizon, freezing proportions, freezing methods and replanning 
periodicity. One of the findings on freezing the planning horizon in Zhao and 
Lee (1993) suggests that longer planning horizons worsens the performance 
under demand uncertainty conditions while improves the performance under 
deterministic demand conditions. However, Kadipasaoglu and Sridharan 
(1995) identify the freezing method as the most effective to reduce 
instability. . Comparing freezing different proportions of the planning horizon, 
it is suggested that freezing the whole planning period reduces instability 
under demand uncertainty  (Zhao & Lee 1993).  Considering the inverse 
relationship between period and frequency, if shorter planning periods 
increase instability, higher planning frequency contributes to instability as 
well. ‘Higher replanning periodicity results in a lower total cost, schedule 
instability, and a higher service level under both deterministic and stochastic 
demand conditions. Less frequent replanning improves system performance’ 
(Zhao & Lee 1993, p.185). 
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There are several strategies to deal with system nervousness. No revision of 
decision within the planning horizon, also known as freezing the plan (Zhao & 
Lee 1993; Kadipasaoglu & Sridharan 1995). Freezing the whole planning 
period reduces instability under demand uncertainty (Zhao & Lee, 1993). This 
is sensitive to stock outs and must be combined with buffer stocks. One of 
the most effective to reduce changes but at a higher cost are buffer stocks 
which are also known as end-item safety stocks (Kadipasaoglu & Sridharan 
1995). Finally, Ho (1989) suggests that enforcing the distinction between 
large and small changes affects nervousness. 
2.3.4 Naïve interventionism 
As it was mentioned earlier, Deming (1986) defended that best efforts can be 
damaging if carried out without understanding. The adopted designation in 
this thesis for efforts without understanding is naïve interventionism. The 
lack of confidence in the SC leads to actions and interventions by SC 
members who believe that they can do better by devising independent 
actions that undermine the overall performance of the SC (Christopher & Lee 
2001). Similarly, unnecessary interventions upstream through the disregard 
of forecasts (even though they are often accurate) through the ‘we know best’ 
syndrome (Mason-Jones & Towill 1998, p.19) which is one of the identified 
information flow problems encountered in the practice of SCM. 
Overconfidence is suggested to be one of the main reasons why decision-
makers show strong preference towards their own judgement and the 
tendency to introduce judgemental adjustments (Kleinmuntz 1990). 
Moreover, overconfidence can morph into a form of grandiose syndrome, 
taking an example from OEMs in Childerhouse et al., (2003b, p.141), that all 
players ‘…felt that they were pro-actively leading world-class supply chains and 
saw no need to change their ways.’  
Furthermore, managers show the tendency to game the system and 
‘outsmart’ the competition in tasks related to DP.  Sterman and Dogan (2015) 
run an experiment based on the Beer Game and found that managers were 
unable to resist the urge to intervene. They exhibited hoarding and phantom 
ordering even when they had perfect visibility over the rest of the SC. 
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Considering how important forecasting is for planning and decision-making, 
managers are also infamous. ‘Forecast errors are directly related to required 
safety stocks, while frequent adjustments of demand forecasts can lead to 
dramatic changes in plans (i.e., nervousness)’ (Stadtler et al. 2015, p.582). 
Managers intervene with their statistical forecasts (Fildes et al., 2009) and are 
generally over-confident in the accuracy of their adjustment (Brenner et al. 
1996; Lawrence & Sim 1999; Moore & Cain 2007). One of the suggested 
reasons behind tweaking unnecessarily the statistical forecast (Lim & O 
’connor 1995; Goodwin & Fildes 1999) as well as preferring judgement over 
quantitative models (Lim & O’Connor 1996) is incorrect calibration of user’s 
confidence (Fildes et al. 2006). 
The separation between statistical and judgemental tasks is poorly 
implemented (Fildes et al. 2006). The two components are largely confused 
as planners often disregard the statistical analysis outputs of the regular 
component as well as mistaking noise for signal perceiving inexistent 
regularities and apparent patterns (Goodwin & Wright 1993; Harvey 1995; 
Lim & O ’connor 1995; Goodwin & Fildes 1999; Sanders & Ritzman 2001). 
In practice, inputs from judgement adjustments and statistical forecast are 
hard to separate. For example, Fildes et al. (Fildes et al. 2006) points two 
instrumental cases in which managers made adjustments to the time series in 
terms of level, trend or seasonal factors before the statistical method 
attempting to improve its accuracy. This way the output of the statistical 
forecast is already greatly altered by judgement. 
Some interventions can be positive. Expert judgement can greatly improve 
poorly performing forecasting models (Franses & Legerstee 2013).  For 
example, expert input can greatly improve intermittent demand forecasting 
(Syntetos et al. 2009). However, the majority makes many small adjustments 
to statistical forecasts which leads to waste time and often reduces accuracy 
(Fildes et al. 2009). This should not be surprising since it is known that 
planners, as human beings, are prone to decision making biases (Carter et al. 
2007; Tokar 2010; Sterman & Dogan 2015) 
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There are several ways to affect DP performance through policy affecting 
behaviour. First is necessary to recognise the central role of policy in DP. For 
example, amongst several techniques used to improve judgmental forecast 
are training with feedback (Goodwin et al. 2004), taking advice (Goodwin et 
al. 2012) decomposing the forecasting process and making a separate 
estimate for each component (Edmundson 1990; Webby et al. 2005) and 
combining predictions from several forecasters (Clemen 1989). 
2.3.5 Demand planning performance and individual differences 
So far, the review focused on literature around manager’s behaviour as a 
group. However, it is incorrect to take a one-size fits all approach, since 
results in performance are never homogeneous (e.g., Moritz et al. 2013; 
Strohhecker & Größler 2013). It is important to consider the potential 
relationship between naïve interventionism and individual differences. 
Anecdotally, it is suggested that personality types (individual differences) 
influence planning performance (Lapide 2007). Previous research on dynamic 
decision making shows performance variations across subjects, e.g., in an 
experiment by Hey and Knoll (2007, p.8) half of the subjects did not plan 
ahead, replicated in a follow up experiment (Bone et al. 2009). Considering 
broadly decision performance which has been repeatedly studied in different 
disciplines and it is generally accepted that individual differences play a 
significant role in decision making (Franken & Muris 2005). 
Decision patterns and biases have been often observed across the subject 
sample, variation at the individual level has been often ignored. Individual 
differences in OM literature have received relatively limited attention, and 
individual differences in DP decision making is even more rare (e.g., Moritz et 
al. 2013; Strohhecker & Größler 2013). The few existing studies considering 
individual differences are mostly focused on a demand-supply balancing 
problem, e.g., the newsvendor or newsboy problem where participants make 
decisions facing uncertain demand. Bolton et al. (2008; 2012) as well as 
Wachtel and Dexter (2010) observed in experimental conditions how 
professional background (exposure) matters for performance in an DP 
problem. Traits such as impulsiveness negatively affect demand and supply 
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balancing in experimental conditions (Ockenfels & Selten 2015) and this 
tendency varies significantly between individuals  (Bolton & Katok 2008). 
Moritz et al. (2013) also run experiments specifically designed to explore 
individual differences and the task of balancing supply and demand, detecting 
cognitive reflection as significant positive predictor of performance. De 
Véricourt et al. (2013) reports on significant gender differences in terms of 
risk taking showing that male subjects perform better when planning for a 
high margin product. Finally Strohhecker and Größler (2013) identify high 
intelligence as the strongest predictor of high performance in a DP type 
setting. Individual differences in context of work flows (manufacturing 
processes) are suggested to play a significant role on variability in 
performance depending on the operating policy (Doerr et al. 2004). 
2.4 Humans and systems: supporting demand planning 
decisions 
2.4.1 Resisting the ‘machines’ 
People and in particular experts have a long history of resistance to ‘machines’ 
taking over their decision making processes (e.g., Meehl 1954; Silver 1991). 
‘Machines’ are used as a broad collection of statistical algorithms, analytical 
heuristics, decision support, restrictive policies or artificial intelligence. To 
illustrate, consider the famous opposition between clinicians and (over 
performing) statistical algorithms for diagnosis (Meehl 1954). A famous 
example of this opposition is the negative reaction to Apgar’s (1953) score. 
Apgar (1953) proposed a systematic method to evaluate new-born infants 
using fast and frugal simple heuristic. It is based on a five-item list and three 
scores.  Although it significantly contributed to a lower infant mortality, 
clinicians showed great criticism. At the time clinicians claimed it was cold, 
impersonal and too simplistic. A more recent example of how experts reacted 
to Ashenfelter’s (2008) accurate formula to predict the quality and prices of 
Bordeaux wines. Oenophiles’ reactions ranging …’somewhere between violent 
and hysterical.’ (Kahneman 2012, p.222).  
Regardless of clear resistance to the artificial, DSS developed both in 
academia and in practice, are becoming essential for business and human 
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activity in general (Power et al. 2015). One of the reasons for such 
development is the fact that DSS has the ‘… ability to relax cognitive, temporal, 
and economic limits of decision makers – amplifying decision makers’ capacities 
for processing knowledge which is the lifeblood of decision making’  (Burstein & 
Holsapple 2008, p.9). This brings obvious advantages and from an 
information systems perspective is essential to support decision making in the 
modern world. 
Management practice, however, despite general adherence and investment 
in IS and DSS technologies, still shows resistance using their own judgement 
to override and adjust DSS outputs (e.g., Fildes et al. 2009; Goodwin et al. 
2011). Hence, support systems should allow better identification of 
judgemental intervention opportunities as well as enable managers to 
intervene when it is most appropriate (Fildes et al. 2006). 
2.4.2 System guidance and restrictiveness 
Systems can support different aspects of decision making in many forms and 
via varied modes. Following Silver (1991) a system supporting decision 
making can be designed to influence decision-makers via ‘decisional guidance’ 
and ‘system restrictiveness’ illustrated in Figure 8. The relationship between 
guidance and restrictiveness can be described as a trade-off and the two are 
not mutually exclusive. On one hand, a system can offer few decision making 
processes, which translates as a restricted set of possibilities. Such situation 
requires minimal guidance because alternatives are restricted a priori. On the 
other hand, unrestricted decision processes offer a wide range of possibilities 
and combinations, requiring greater levels of guidance. When considering 
systems to support decision making, it is necessary to decide between guiding 
the decision making process, restricting it or to do neither (Silver 1991). 
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Figure 8 Decision support guidance and restrictiveness (based on Silver 1991) 
Decisional guidance 
Decisional guidance is defined by Silver (1991, p.107) as ‘how a decision 
support system enlightens or sways its users as they structure and execute their 
decision making processes – that is, as they choose among and use the systems 
functional capabilities.’ Decisional guidance is significantly different from 
simple mechanical meta-support. Typical mechanical meta-support solely 
helps users with operating the system’s features, e.g., which buttons to push 
when. In contrast, decisional guidance is ‘smart’ and goes beyond simple 
mechanical interaction by providing the decision-maker with enhanced 
information-processing capabilities of the system. To illustrate, mechanical 
meta-support provides the user with the complete inventory of forecasting 
methods while decisional guidance will highlight strengths and weaknesses of 
each method given the situation. 
Guidance can influence decision-makers deliberately or inadvertently (Silver 
1991; Montazemi et al. 1996; Parikh et al. 2001). Inadvertent guidance 
happens when the consequences are unintended, as defined by Silver (1991, 
p.107) ‘…is an unintended consequence of the system’s design and is not planned 
by the system designer’. An example is when the system provides an illustrative 
example of the task and the decision-maker anchors on the values and results 
of the illustrative example rather than only considering the relevant 
information for the actual task (Frederick et al. 2010). 
The proposed typology for deliberate decision guidance by Silver (1991) 
distinguishes three main types: target; form and; mode. 
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Table 4 Typology of deliberate decision guidance (adapted from Silver, 1991) 
Dimensions Question Guidance 
Target What is the target? – Aspects of 
decision making addressed 
Structuring the process 
(Choosing Operators) 
Executing the process 
(Using Operators) 
Forms What is the form? – What guidance is 
offered 
Suggestive 
Informative 
Modes What is the mode? – How the 
mechanism for guidance works 
Predefined 
Dynamic 
Participative 
The main consideration of deliberate decisional guidance is its target, i.e., 
what aspects of decision making are addressed (Silver 1991). The suggested 
two target aspects are structuring and execution of the decision making 
process. Guidance for structuring the decision making process consists of 
choosing which operators to use and in what order. Guidance for executing 
the decision-making process focuses on how users interact with the chosen 
operators, namely how decision-makers perform predictive and evaluative 
judgements. For example, the decision support targeting process structuring 
can provide its user with recommended steps to follow and which information 
to consider to determine what supply strategy is most appropriate for a given 
product. Further, decision support targeting the execution of the decision 
making process can provide its user with an evaluation of his choices through 
what-if simulated scenarios. 
Considering the form and what guidance is offered, the two forms of 
deliberate decisional guidance are suggestive and informative guidance 
(Silver 1991). Informative form of decisional guidance is characterised by 
being unbiased, providing information that is relevant in a neutral way, i.e., 
without suggesting any specific course of action. In contrast, the suggestive 
form of decisional guidance focuses on suggesting what the decision-maker 
should follow. To illustrate both forms, informative guidance detects the life-
stage of a product while suggestive guidance would make recommendations 
for what would be the most appropriate forecasting model based on the 
detected stage. 
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Regarding how the mechanism for guidance works, three modes are 
suggested: predefined; dynamic and; participative (Silver 1991). The 
predefined mode of decisional guidance is created a priori. An example of pre-
defined decisional guidance is a checklist, while the user can choose to 
disregard or simply forget some of the steps to make a decision; it is known 
in advance that some specific considerations are necessary to make a 
balanced decision. The dynamic mode of decisional guidance depends on how 
the user interacts with the system; hence, it is not created a priori. For 
example, when the user makes adjustments the system can display what has 
been his performance in the past with similar actions against a what-if 
scenario when nothing was adjusted. The last mode is participative guidance 
that is a form of customisable mode of guidance. In the participative mode 
the user can input his preferences and objectives so the system responds with 
suggestions (Jiang & Klein 2000). 
The most common type of deliberate decisional guidance in current systems 
supporting DP is predefined informative guidance (Fildes et al. 2006). These 
systems provide ready-access to time-series data in form of graphs or tables 
along with KPIs and statistical forecasts and respective errors. The general 
assumption is that the decision-maker should be presented with rich 
information. Some less common situations include comparative analysis and 
benchmarking of different decisions going in some cases further by providing 
recommendations and respective explanations of most appropriate methods. 
System Restrictiveness 
Restrictiveness is defined by Silver (1991, p.108) as ‘The degree to which, and 
the manner in which, a DSS limits its users decision making processes’. One of the 
possible ways to restrict the user is by displaying only selected information 
or forcing the user to follow a pre-set process with a strict number of options 
denying certain actions. 
One possible example of restriction is displaying data either as a graph or as 
a table. In some cases tables work better than graphics as people are more 
prone to detect false patterns in graphical displays (Carey 1991; Hwang 1995; 
Harvey & Bolger 1996). In other cases graphics help understanding 
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dimensions better, e.g., reducing the duration neglect bias (Liersch & 
McKenzie 2009). Alternatively, the order of display and action also plays a 
significant role on the quality of the judgement (Schkade & Kleinmuntz 1994; 
Healy 2000; Theocharis & Harvey 2016). For example, people tend to 
overestimate the relative weight of most recently presented information, i.e., 
the effect of recency (Arnold et al. 2000; Tan & Ward 2000; Ashton & 
Kennedy 2002).  
Another example is restricting the time-horizon of visible data. Finally, in 
order to reduce instability under demand uncertainty, freezing the whole 
planning period so managers cannot make changes to the plan (Zhao & Lee 
1993; Kadipasaoglu & Sridharan 1995; Zhao & Lam 1997; Xie et al. 2003) 
In some cases, restricting the system’s use based on the user’s background 
and ability is desirable. For example, in cases when managers lack training in 
forecasting it is better to make unavailable the choice of different statistical 
models or adjustment of its parameters (Fildes & Hastings 1994). 
Forcing the user to work on many elementary sub-tasks rather than one 
complex task takes advantage of decomposition methods and can often lead 
to more accurate judgement (Edmundson 1990; Srivastava & Raghubir 2002; 
Abdellaoui et al. 2005). However, Fildes et all., (2006, p.355) warns that 
‘absolute restrictiveness can be dangerous if it is wrongly applied’ and that too 
much decomposition can make the judgement task unpractical. 
System restrictiveness is not necessary forcing the user to certain processes. 
It can be implemented by means of making some ‘preferred’ processes easier 
to use while leaving other more complicated and bias-prone processes less 
accessible (Payne et al. 1993; Goodwin et al. 2011). Such user manipulation 
takes advantage of the accuracy-effort trade-off (Payne et al. 1993; 
Kruglanski & Gigerenzer 2011). The two possibilities to lead the decision-
maker are either reducing the effort for desired paths or increasing it for the 
undesired ones.  By minimising the effort or even automating a desired path, 
the decision-maker is more likely to follow it (Todd & Benbasat 1999). For 
example, decision-makers often follow the default as it is the least effortful 
path, i.e., rely on the ‘default heuristic’ (Azar 2014). Setting up the system in 
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a way that optimal parameters are pre-set by default is likely to lead to better 
performance. Similarly, adding extra steps (extra effort) to undesired decision 
paths in a system can prevent damaging behaviour such as manual 
interventions and deviations from the system’s recommendation. Adding an 
extra step to the process of making a manual adjustment (e.g., request the 
change or elicit the reasons to do so) has shown to effectively reduce the 
number of unnecessary and damaging adjustments (Goodwin 2000). While 
such procedure has shown to successfully reduce the number of negative 
interventions, it has not prevented the decision-makers from making 
adjustments when they were necessary and beneficial. 
Table 5 Means of system restrictions (based on Fildes & Beard, 1992; Fildes et al. 2006; 
Goodwin et al. 2011) 
Means Making it easier Making it harder 
System Defaults Making systems’ recommendations 
available 
Creating extra effort to deviate 
from the systems’ 
recommendation 
Data-quality Allow easy access to adjustment 
when data is missing or when 
exceptional situations are detected 
Make access to manual 
adjustments harder when the 
data is available and no 
abnormalities are detected 
Product life-stages Identify the time-series type to 
encourage adjustments in stages of 
new product launch, planned 
promotions, intermittent demand or 
declining demand. 
Identify the time-series type to 
discourage adjustments in 
stages of stability such as 
steady growth and maturity 
Signal Monitoring Report exceptions (e.g., promotions) 
and abnormal deviations in real time 
to identify appropriate moments for 
manual interventions 
Report stability and reduce the 
amount of feedback on small 
variations in situations of 
normality to avoid 
misjudgement (e.g., apply 
smoothing) 
Aggregation level Allow forecasting both at individual 
and aggregate levels to drive down 
the product hierarchy common 
aggregate effects 
Prevent only individual level 
forecasting 
Method 
comparison 
Allow easy comparison of different 
forecasting methods on a test 
module 
n.a. 
Method evaluation Allow easy data split into estimation 
and test-data to evaluate the 
methods’ performance  
Prevent choosing different 
models or adjusting its 
parameters without testing its 
relative performance  
Systems’ Menus Place preferred options more 
accessible (e.g., first level menus) 
Hide undesired options out of 
immediate reach (e.g., second 
level menu) 
 41 
2.4.3 Supporting demand planning decisions 
To address decision-maker’s overconfidence the system should be designed 
in such a way that it provides guidance to improve calibration. Better 
calibration brings closer the perceived accuracy and the real accuracy hence 
enabling a better choice of strategy and better effort application (Payne et al. 
1993). 
To observe the broader context of DSS with business and management in a 
way it includes its use, it is necessary to consider business and management 
policies beyond DSS (as technology) into systems supporting DP decisions. A 
policy is a course or principle of action and it defines the scope within which 
decisions are taken acting as guidelines developed by the organisation. 
Considering DSS on its own, ‘DSSs probably support only a small percentage of 
all decisions made in organizations’ (Power et al. 2015, p.3). In contrast, 
business and management policies lie at the heart of management science 
and by default affect most of decisions made in organisations, including those 
involving DSSs. 
DP policies can both act as guidance or restriction of decision-making 
processes within an organisation. Restrictive policies will limit while guiding 
policies will direct decision-makers. For example, restrictive DP policy can 
partially restrict judgemental adjustments to the statistical forecast if these 
adjustments are smaller than a certain threshold (e.g., Fildes et al. 2009). 
Alternatively, a decisional guidance policy could direct managers to 
acknowledge the possibility of errors and providing them with additional 
information (e.g., Fildes et al. 2006). 
2.5 Chapter summary 
The process of DP is of critical importance in the SC. DP is sensitive to 
planning horizon, subject to data availability and its quality, and finally its 
process. The process of DP is therefore subject to planning horizon, policy 
and DSS (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9 Demand planning process base framework 
The process of DP involves two major stages, one is statistical forecasting and 
the second is the judgemental adjustment of the forecast to derive the final 
forecast that is fed into the master plan. However, this process is challenging 
and is subject to several sources of failure, being the two most important the 
system and the human (manager). System nervousness and naïve 
interventionism can significantly affect DP performance. Moreover, 
understanding manager’s behaviour is challenging due to individual 
differences that can also potentially explain heterogeneity in the results. 
Supporting DP decisions, the system can either be neutral, restrict or guide 
the decision-maker. The implementation of the system can be made in form 
of DP policies and integrated in the DSS. These systems have the ability to 
compensate for human limitations and improve DP performance. 
Despite the fact that both naïve interventionism and system nervousness are 
acknowledged in many different forms across the OM and OR literature, 
there is lack theoretical underpinning to explain and predict this behaviour.  
As a result, the rising field of behavioural operations has been successfully 
borrowing theory from behavioural economics, psychology and neuroscience 
(e.g., Bendoly et al. 2009; Katsikopoulos & Gigerenzer 2013). The following 
chapter focuses on the underpinning theory of decision making which is then 
used to develop the hypothesis and theoretical framework for this research. 
 
Demand 
Planning 
Process
Planning 
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Policy
Decision 
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3 Underpinning theory and hypothesis 
3.1 Introduction 
DP has been described in terms of its process, performance and support with 
emphasis on the dynamics between managers and systems. Yet, it is also 
important to consider the underlying mechanisms of DP. 
Table 6 Chapter 3 structure 
Section Overview 
3.2 Rationality and 
decision making 
This section provides a historical overview of the evolution of 
rationality and decision-making. An overview of models of 
human behaviour is provided, explaining the assumption of loss 
aversion in cumulative prospect theory and the concept of 
mental accounting which as central to this research. 
3.3 Myopic Loss 
Aversion 
Myopic loss aversion is explained in detail along with the main 
structure of the conceptual framework that relies on mental 
accounting. The main hypothesis is derived. 
3.4 Human and system: 
individual differences 
The interaction of human and systems is where managers are 
required to make choices. It is expected that individual 
differences explain the variation in performance in conditions of 
choice. Following an overview, the focus is on experience and 
naïve interventionism. Personality is described in terms of the 
Big Five along with specific constructs. Hypothesis on individual 
differences are derived. 
3.5 Complete conceptual 
framework, testable 
hypotheses and 
predictions 
This section joins previously developed components of the 
framework and summarises the hypothesis. 
This chapter (summarised in Table 6) focuses on the development of 
theoretical framework for explaining planners’ behaviour using several 
important concepts from behavioural science. These concepts (especially, the 
concepts of myopic loss aversion and individual differences) are rooted in 
both economics and psychology. In this chapter, models of rationality are 
outlined and the role of rationality in research on decision-making is 
summarised with a focus on myopic loss aversion and individual differences. 
The aim of this chapter is not to discuss rationality, decision-making, and 
individual differences exhaustively. Instead, these concepts are used 
instrumentally to inform an overarching analytical framework (developed in 
this thesis) and to define respective hypotheses in order to explain 
underperformance in DP. The chapter closes with a summary. 
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3.2 Rationality and decision making 
Rationality has been celebrated as one of the highest achievements of the 
human species. Traditional view on rationality and decision-making implies 
that humans rely on logic, statistics and heuristics. One of the first ideals of 
human reasoning and inference was logic as defined by Aristotle (384 BC – 
322 BC). Later in the 17th century, logic was replaced by the probability theory 
which acknowledged the fundamental uncertainty of human conduct (Daston 
1980). Up until mid-19th century, probability theory was considered the ideal 
way for describing common sense through calculus (Laplace 1902- originally 
published in 1814). Probability theory enabled the development of normative 
and descriptive models of decision making (Savage 1954). 
Models of decision evolved as different theories of decisions and 
perspectives on probability developed. The most recognised interpretations 
of probability are classical, frequentist, logical and subjective (Surowik 2002). 
This significantly influenced mathematical theories of decision making which 
are still being used today and are widely adopted by researchers in social and 
natural sciences (Vranas 2000; Bowers & Davis 2012). The classical view on 
decision making using probability theory articulated by Daniel Bernoulli and 
Pierre-Simon Laplace was that the probability of an event is the ratio of the 
number of favourable cases to the total number of cases being equally 
weighted. This view was followed by the frequentist idea common to 
statistical methods of hypotheses testing. The frequentist view is that the 
probability of an event equals the frequency of its occurrence in repeated 
trials. Another view on probability was developed by John Maynard Keynes, 
as Logical or Objective probability. This probability is connected with 
statements and can be deduced from the truth-value of the premises of the 
statement for which it is inferred. Finally, another widely accepted concept 
of probability adopted by Bruno de Finetti and Leonard Jimmie Savage was 
the Subjective probability. According to this view, probability is a subjective 
degree of conviction related to a single event or repeated events and 
measured by psychometric methods (e.g., observation of gambling). 
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Subjective consideration of probability was introduced by means of one of 
the greatest contributions to statistics, the Bayes’ theorem (Savage 1961). It 
has been adopted as one of the main models of human reasoning (Chater et 
al. 2006). This theorem provided a foundation for a number of models, e.g., 
the Adaptive Control of Thought theory (ACT-R) proposed by Anderson 
(1996). CAT-R is a cognitive architecture aiming at defining the most basic 
and irreducible perceptual and cognitive operations of the human brain 
(Anderson 1996). Yet, empirical tests showed that such a model better 
describes mathematical and computer programming algorithms rather than 
human behaviour. 
One of the first decision making theories was proposed by Paul Samuelson 
(1938). He defined utility as desired level of satisfaction obtained from 
available decision strategies and assumed that an agent’s goal is to maximise 
utility using a rational decision model. This marked the rise of the ‘perfectly 
rational’ economic agent or ‘homo economicus’. This agent had perfect 
information and applied principles of rationality to make an optimal decision. 
An assumption of perfect rationality was important for the development of 
simple and tractable models of behaviour such as expected utility theory 
(Neumann & Morgenstern 1947). However, evidence from empirical research 
led researchers to challenge the concept of rationality by showing that ‘well-
behaved’ axioms and assumptions of theories which had human rationality at 
its core fail in practice (Simon 1955; Simon 1969; Tversky & Kahneman 1974; 
Kahneman 2003; Shah & Oppenheimer 2008; Hilbert 2012). One of the main 
and rather unrealistic assumptions about the classical rational decision-maker 
was that he has a stable system of preferences as well as possesses advanced 
computational skills to find the highest possible point (optimal solution) on his 
preference scale (Simon 1955). However, despite the fact that the extent of 
the work of Maurice Allais (1953), Daniel Ellsberg (1961), Sarah Lichtenstein 
and Paul Slovic (1971), as well as Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1974; 
1983; 2003) challenged the classical view on rationality, the normative kernel 
is still present. The adoption of the classical view, i.e., normative approach to 
reasoning, is illustrated by the fact that reasoning errors are defined as the 
deviation from the norm governed by the laws of probability and statistics. 
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From Aristotle’s view on logic (384 BC – 322 BC) to heuristics defended by 
Gerd Gigerenzer (2001), rationality, behavioural models, and decision making 
have been hot topics. However, the behavioural science community is still  far 
from converging to one unifying theory of decision making (Gigerenzer 2008). 
From ‘homo economicus’ (term suggested by Richard Thaler 2000) to ‘homo 
sapiens’, the evolution of how rationality is perceived, changed throughout 
the development of behavioural science (Thaler 2000). The latest 
developments suggest that there is no single right view on the subject. 
Humans rely on all those different ways of thinking depending on the 
circumstances (decision context), which amounts to an ecological view of 
rationality. 
3.2.1 The unrealistic view of humans as perfect optimisers 
An ideal of rationality beyond human abilities dates back to even before the 
times of John Locke (1690) when the perspective of an omniscient God in a 
certain and deterministic nature was contrasted with humans living with 
uncertainties and inconsistencies. God was taken as the ideal of a super-
intelligence, which Pierre-Simon Laplace (1814 p.1325) characterised as: 
 ‘…an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces of which nature is 
animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it – an 
intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis … nothing would be 
uncertain and the future, the past, would be present to its eyes.’ (Laplace 1902 - 
originally published in 1814, p.1325) 
This point of view is still represented today in many decisions models such as 
Bayesian reasoning or expected utility maximisation, considering that, when 
given unlimited time, boundless knowledge and unconstrained computational 
abilities human reasoning is well described under this divine light. Despite the 
fact that the ‘old’ view of ‘unbounded’ (or divine) rationality was dropped in 
mid-twentieth century due to its relation to the theological doctrine, a similar 
perspective with rational utility-maximizing human at its core took over. The 
new perspective labelled optimisation (specifically, constrained optimisation) 
assumes that humans can be perfect optimisers. They can do so when the 
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decision context allows them to be rational and when complexity of the 
decision problem is manageable to make appropriate calculations. 
Constraints of the decision environment (or constraints of decision 
architecture) can be understood as, for example, having a finite amount of 
time, knowledge, attention, resources to spend on a given decision. One main 
difference between perfect (unbounded) rationality and all other visions of 
rationality is that under perfect rationality it is assumed that information 
search can go on endlessly while under bounded rationality this process is 
limited.  The concept of limited information search consequently brings in the 
need for having a stopping rule, i.e., when to stop looking for information. 
Optimisation from the optimisation under constraints point of view is now 
focused on finding the stopping rule that ‘optimises search with respect to the 
time, computation, money and other resources being spent’ (Todd & Gigerenzer 
2000, p.729). The main rule holds that the search stops when the costs 
outweigh benefits, assuming that the mind is able to calculate the benefits 
and costs of searching for additional pieces of information. 
The idea of optimisation under constraints turns out to be even more 
demanding from agents’ computational ability than the classical idea of 
unbounded rationality (Vriend 1996). Paradoxically, the assumption for a 
limited search for information is that the mind has unlimited time and 
knowledge to evaluate the trade-offs of further information search (Todd & 
Gigerenzer 2000). 
3.2.2 The need for small and large worlds 
In order to keep using rational models of behaviour which are based on 
perfect information and work around any informational limitations, Savage 
(1961) introduced the concept of small worlds (Figure 10). On the one hand, 
the idea of small worlds enables most of the classical analysis: it described 
situations where ‘optimal’ solutions to a problem can be determined because 
all relevant alternatives, consequences and probabilities are known and 
where the future is certain. This means that in a small world it is possible to 
hold perfect knowledge (‘god-like’ knowledge) and the conditions for rational 
decision theory are satisfied. On the other hand, a large world (or real world 
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scenario) describes situations of uncertainty that violates the conditions for 
rational decision theory where part of decision-relevant information is 
unknown and has to be estimated from smaller samples. 
 
Figure 10 Concept of Small and Large worlds (based on Savage 1961) 
Despite an obvious misfit between the idea of humans as perfect optimisers 
and reality (large world), the view of the decision-maker as the ‘homo 
economicus’ remained accepted within the context of the small world (Figure 
11) where everything that does not apply belongs to the large world. 
 
Figure 11 Classical view of rationality reduced to small worlds 
It is considered that it is inappropriate to apply small-world norms of optimal 
reasoning to large worlds (Binmore 2009). Therefore, since conditions for 
rational decisions are not satisfied in large worlds (real world scenarios), one 
cannot expect that models of rationality will provide the ‘right’ answer and 
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consequently rational expectations theory is not ‘taken seriously outside 
academic circles’ (Soros 2009, p.6). 
It is critical to understand the implications of small and large world 
considerations in practice. Situations where small world theories (economics 
and behaviour) were applied to large worlds sometimes led to disasters as 
even slight deviations from the model do matter, e.g., 2008’s financial crash 
where almost perfect information in the form of high volumes of data was 
assumed to be the same as perfect information (Stiglitz 2010). 
The segment of study of rationality in small worlds is essentially the study of 
constrained optimisation popularized by Gerd Gigerenzer (1991). It 
introduces the concept of limitations into the study of decision making while 
still assuming that there exists an ‘optimal’ solution. This was one of the most 
widely known attempts of making the ‘homo economicus’ more human.  
Stigler (1961) argues that humans do not have all the information necessary 
to make the perfect decisions available instantly, so they must search for it. 
This search is not free. There is a resource cost to the decision-maker, e.g., 
time and money. The ideal of rationality is still present while the main 
difference from previous decision theories is that the search for more 
information is stopped when the benefits no longer exceed the cost of further 
search. In a way, this information/effort trade-off is similar to Simon’s (1987) 
satisficing heuristic which implies that the decision maker looks for ‘good 
enough’ solutions when the effort and the decision accuracy are balanced 
according to the situation. The difference is that Simon (1987) argues that 
models of rationality should represent actual cognitive capacities of humans, 
therefore accounting for natural limitations in cognitive capacities such as 
memory, attention, knowledge. 
At first, this idea might sound reasonable, except it has one inconsistency.  
Humans are expected to be able to calculate the optimal stopping point in the 
decision making process (similar to the break-even point in economics). While 
finding a breakeven point in a linear problem might be tangible, most of the 
real-world scenarios are not linear in their nature. Hence, such operation can 
easily be more demanding both psychologically and mathematically than 
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assuming that people have unbounded rationality (Vriend 1996). This means 
that such theory is built on rationality norms, assuming that humans are 
perfect optimisers, therefore making such approach only applicable to small 
worlds. The paradox of optimisation under constraints lies in the fact that a 
limited search for information relies on a mind that has unlimited time and 
knowledge to evaluate the cost-benefit of further information search (Todd 
& Gigerenzer 2000). 
3.2.3 Model of human behaviour: deterministic versus 
stochastic theories and Cumulative Prospect Theory 
Decision support in many organisations is informed by the developments in 
decision theory – a field combining methodology from economics, 
psychology, and neuroscience. Decision theory provides a theoretical 
underpinning for research of human behaviour. At a very general level (refer 
to Figure 12), theories and models can be partitioned into three groups: 
bounded rationality models, deterministic theories, and stochastic theories. 
Bounded Rationality Models do not allow for a clear prediction of behaviour 
and are mostly used to explain observed decisions. A deterministic theory 
makes a prediction about human behaviour and this prediction cannot be 
altered by the features of decision environment whereas stochastic theory 
allows for such a possibility (Loomes & Sugden 1982; Hey 2005; Loomes et 
al. 2008; Starmer et al. 2009; Blavatskyy & Pogrebna 2010). 
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Figure 12 Decision Theory as a building block for Research Methodology 
Bounded rationality models 
Models of bounded rationality form a separate group in decision theory. 
Bounded rationality conceptualises empirical evidence that human rationality 
is often limited by 3 variations of constraints: (i) tractability or complexity of 
decision problem, (ii) cognitive ability of a decision maker; and (iii) time 
available for making a decision (Kahneman 2003). Bounded rationality 
models, therefore, suggest that instead of using utility-based calculations, 
people apply simple decision rules (such as simple rules of thumb). One of the 
possible manifestations of bounded rationality is the use of simple heuristics 
and biases (Tversky & Kahneman 1974), i.e., simple decision rules which allow 
to significantly decrease the computational burden which may or may not be 
present in other types of models. 
It is important not to confuse bounded rationality as a strand of decision-
theoretic modelling and heuristics and biases as concepts. While bounded 
rationality refers to a particular way of thinking about human behaviour, 
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heuristics and biases as concepts can be stand-alone phenomena. These 
phenomena could be combined with deterministic or stochastic theories to 
explain behaviour. For example, one may use Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
and ‘status quo’ bias to explain why in some situations people have a 
preference to keep to current state of affairs and resist change (Masatlioglu 
& Ok 2005). 
The father of bounded rationality is considered Herbert Simon. He devoted 
most of his research to investigating how people perform in situations where 
information is incomplete and the requirements for neoclassical rationality 
cannot be met. One of the central ideas of bounded rationality as proposed 
by Simon (1987) is that decision-makers are limited in their cognitive abilities, 
e.g., limited knowledge, attention, and memory. Simon (1990, p.6) states that: 
‘Because of the limits on their [computers and the human brain] computing speeds 
and power, intelligent systems must use approximate methods to handle most 
tasks. Their rationality is bounded.’ 
Additionally, to understand decision making it is necessary to look at not only 
actors’ computational ability (cognitive ability) but also at the task context or 
environment (Simon 1992). Therefore, given that large world situations have 
constraints such as variability, uncertainty, redundancy, and limited sample 
sizes (Todd & Gigerenzer 2007) supplemented by the limited resources and 
limited cognitive abilities of the actor, the resulting decision making rule is 
based on heuristics. Heuristics, in turn, aims at producing ‘good enough’ 
decisions rather than ‘perfectly rational’ decisions. Shah and Oppenheimer 
(2008, p.209) defined that heuristics rely on one or more effort reduction 
methods such as: 
1. Examining fewer cues 
2. Reducing the difficulty associated with retrieval and storing cue 
values 
3. Simplifying the weighting principles for cues 
4. Integrating less information 
5. Examining fewer alternatives 
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Bounded rationality brings the idea of humans using mental shortcuts 
(heuristics). Heuristics are also a central element of procedural rationality and 
which Simon (1990, p.11) defines as ‘…not optimising techniques, but methods 
for arriving at satisfactory solutions with modest amounts of computation.’ The 
‘not optimising’ technique and ‘satisfactory’ solution instantly suggest that 
heuristics provide solutions that fall below optimal. The terms ‘suboptimal’ 
and ‘shortcuts’ bring the idea that solutions provided by heuristics are always 
below the optimum (considering that there is one) which is in some cases a 
misconception when judging heuristics (Gigerenzer 2008). The usefulness of 
heuristics can be justified by two main perspectives as defended by 
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011).  First that heuristics are ecologically 
rational (i.e. they fit real-life situations). Second perspective is the accuracy-
effort trade-off that is discussed below. 
The accuracy-effort trade-off can be better understood when considering 
effort as the ‘cost’ of making a decision. Since an individual can exert only a 
limited amount of effort, one can consequently accept ‘good enough’ rather 
than optimal decisions in most circumstances. This relationship between the 
quality of the decision (accuracy) and cost (effort) usually exhibits a non-linear 
pattern (a power distribution generally) as illustrated in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13 Accuracy-effort trade-off 
The positive aspect of this non-linear trade-off relationship is that little effort 
is necessary to make relatively accurate decisions up until a certain point 
where the situation inverts and little improvements in accuracy come at great 
effort expense. This is similar to the Pareto Principle (also known as 80/20 
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rule) first described by Pareto and Page (1971). Heuristics in this case may 
help decision-makers to save effort at an expense of accuracy (Payne et al. 
1993; Shah & Oppenheimer 2008). 
 
Figure 14 Accuracy-effort trade-off and Less-is-more effect 
The accuracy-effort trade-off has been deemed as a universal rule in 
cognition, where more effort results in more accuracy. However, such 
relation is not always the case, i.e., simple decision models (heuristics) 
sometimes outperform complex ones. This is illustrated in Figure 14 with the 
Less-is-more effect (Gigerenzer & Brighton 2009). One of the first examples 
of the contradictory effect has been observed in an experiment by Gigerenzer 
and Goldenstein (1996). The experiment consisted of asking students in the 
U.S. and in Germany about the size of the population of cities in the U.S. and 
in Germany. Students were more accurate responding about overseas cities 
than their homeland. The interpretation was that participants using less 
information to make the inference outperformed others more familiar with 
the cities who automatically considered a higher range of cues (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein 1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002). 
Deterministic decision theories 
The main advantage of a deterministic theory is that it provides a clear and 
easy prediction of decisions. For example, one of the oldest deterministic 
decision theories is Expected Value theory (EV). In application to binary 
choice decisions, it says that when people evaluate two risky options A and B 
they simply choose the option which give them the highest utility (or 
satisfaction) which is calculated as the probability of each outcome (stake) 
 55 
multiplied by the value of each outcome (stake). An alternative deterministic 
theory is Expected Utility Theory (EUT). EUT was developed in response to 
the St. Petersburg Paradox discovered by Daniel Bernoulli (see e.g., 
Blavatskyy 2005) and later axiomatised by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947). Bernoulli noticed, that people do not make decisions ‘as if’ they simply 
multiply stakes and probabilities in order to calculate the relevant utilities of 
various options (e.g., that people are not risk neutral). Rather, they modify the 
stakes by taking a function of the stake (e.g., a function of constant relative 
risk aversion allows to capture behaviour of risk averse, risk seeking, and risk 
neutral individuals).  
Both EV and EUT are deterministic theories which capture the behaviour of 
the co-called ‘homo economicus’ (a perfectly rational agent) who uses simple 
utility algorithms to formulate decision strategy (e.g., Thaler 2000). The 
notion of ‘homo economicus’, was substantially criticised in the economics 
and psychology literature as many experimental tests (conducted in the 
laboratory as well as the field) provided strong and robust evidence that 
human behaviour significantly departs from the predictions of EV and EUT 
(e.g., Charness et al. 2007). One of the most significant paradoxes was a 
paradox discovered by Maurice Allais, who showed that one of the 
fundamental axioms of EUT (Independence Axiom) is violated by individuals 
(Allais 1953). Further departures from EV and EUT were found (among 
others) by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). 
As a result, they proposed Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) and 
later Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) (Tversky & Kahneman 1992) which 
allowed to explain many violations of EV and EUT (including violations of the 
Independence Axiom). Since CPT was proposed, more general formulations 
of this theory were offered in behavioural science literature giving rise to a 
whole class of so-called Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) Models of which CPT 
is a special case (Wakker 2010). Apart from RDU models, a wide variety of 
deterministic decision theories that are trying to capture non-‘homo 
economicus’ behaviour exist. The numbers of these models run well into 
several dozen (see, e.g., Starmer, 2000 for a detailed review of many of these 
theories). 
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Stochastic decision theories 
Stochastic decision theories provide an alternative to deterministic theories. 
These theories predict that a decision maker when making choices between 
alternatives A and B on some occasions will go for A and other occasions will 
choose B. In other words, unlike deterministic theories which predict that an 
individual will select either A or B with probability 𝑝 = 1, stochastic theories 
predict that A and B can be chosen with some positive probability 0 < 𝑝 < 1. 
There are two main types of stochastic decision theories: models of noise and 
models of imprecision. Models of noise (e.g., Tremble model or Fechner 
models) maintain that people have stable preferences but with some positive 
probability these preferences are distorted by noise (e.g., Blavatskyy & 
Pogrebna 2010). These stable preferences could be defined by any 
deterministic theory (e.g., EV, EUT, CPT, etc.) but then a noise parameter 
(usually normally distributed with a zero mean) is added to these preferences. 
This means, e.g., that when choosing between A and B an individual really 
prefers A to B but with a positive probability this individual will opt for B over 
A (due to tremble, fatigue, or other type of error). Models of imprecision take 
a more extreme position. They say that people alternate between A and B 
simply because they have imprecise preferences. In other words, individuals 
do not know whether they prefer A over B or B over A and make decisions 
between the two based on various factors of decision environment (such as 
context). One of the most widely used theories of this type is Random Utility 
model (Loomes et al. 2002) which says that each individual has a basket of 
utilities and, dependent on the situation, draws one utility from this basket 
which results in an observation that sometimes A is chosen over B and 
sometimes B over A. 
3.2.4 Cumulative Prospect Theory 
This dissertation uses one of the most widely accepted deterministic theories 
– Cumulative Prospect Theory – in order to formulate hypotheses about the 
performance of planners. The use of Cumulative Prospect Theory is justified 
as follows. 
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CPT, as a deterministic theory, has a very clear structure and provides one 
stable prediction of choice. Since the focus of this study is on DP decisions, 
deviations from the demand plan can be easily explained by a stochastic 
choice model. The main drawback of the stochastic approach is that while it 
can explain behaviour, it does not often provide a clear prediction of what 
people are expected to do in a similar situation. Since one of the goals of this 
dissertation is to draw conclusions for planners in practice, predicting 
(suboptimal or even surprising) behaviour is more important than finding a 
perfectly fitting function that may explain the data on planning decisions. 
Therefore, CPT is well suited to formulate predictions about planning 
behaviour. 
CPT also combines two important features: (1) it attempts to capture real 
human behaviour, i.e., tries to be sufficiently meaningful to shed light on how 
humans actually behave in practice and (2) it is quite easy to understand and 
has several important features that can help explain planning decisions. These 
features are discussed below. The theoretical approach for this thesis is to 
use the dominant decision theory (CPT) in combination with a well-known 
and generally accepted bias (mental accounting) to formulate predictions 
about human behaviour. Behavioural bias of mental accounting is necessary 
in order to capture individual attitudes towards time horizons (or time delays) 
which cannot be conceptualised by CPT alone. This is because CPT is a time-
free deterministic theory, i.e., in CPT, all decisions are assumed to be made at 
a specific (discrete) point in time and preferences towards time are not 
operationalised. Further subsections show how CPT can be combined with 
mental accounting bias in order to formulate meaningful predictions for 
planning decisions. 
The Assumption of Loss Aversion in Cumulative Prospect Theory 
One of the main assumptions of CPT is that people suffer from loss aversion, 
i.e., they feel losses more severely than derive satisfaction from equal-sized 
gains. Specifically, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) conducted a number of 
hypothetical experiments and discovered that people were much more upset 
by losses than they were uplifted by gains. Empirically, they calculated that 
the discrepancy in perceptions between losses and equal-sized gains was 𝜆 =
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2.25. In other words, if an individual lost £100, this individual felt ‘as if’ the 
actual loss is more than £200 (specifically, -£100*2.25=-£225). In CPT, this 
phenomenon was labelled loss aversion and with 𝜆 being is a loss aversion 
coefficient. 
Loss aversion is an inherent part of CPT (its main assumption) which is woven 
deeply into the CPT’s conceptual modelling framework. Specifically, because 
in CPT people derive satisfaction from changes in wealth rather than from 
absolute wealth levels, the utility function in CPT is called ‘value function’. A 
typical CPT value function is shown on Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15 Value function of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) 
According to CPT, individuals assess their changes in wealth relative to the 
so-called reference point (in the original paper Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
assume that this point is equal to an individual’s current wealth position). This 
is represented by the intercept of axes (coordinates [0,0]) on Figure 15, 
because a current wealth position can be different for different people but 
for all of them it represents a state of no gain and no loss. The value function 
is steeper for losses than for gains due to the assumption of loss aversion. 
The assumption of loss aversion is important for the argument in this 
dissertation because it can be combined with mental accounting to form 
myopic loss aversion (MLA) which is described in the following sections and 
which is used to capture planners’ behaviour. 
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Mental Accounting 
Mental accounting is a psychological bias coined by Richard Thaler which 
simply says that people may have different mental accounts for the same kind 
of resource (Thaler 1999). Thaler (1999, p. 183) defines mental accounting as 
‘the set of cognitive operations used by individuals and households’ to conduct 
financial operations. He also maintains that mental accounting has two 
manifestations: ‘[the] first captures how outcomes are perceived and 
experienced, and how decisions are made and subsequently evaluated [and the 
second] provides the inputs to be both ex ante and ex post cost-benefit analyses…’ 
(Thaler, 1999, p. 183). While mental accounting is mostly used in finance 
literature to explain why people put assets into separate accounts (second 
manifestation), the first manifestation, specifically, that people perceive 
different time horizons differently when financial outcomes are at stake is 
widely used in behavioural science literature to explain important sub-optimal 
behaviours on financial markets (such as Equity Premium puzzle which is 
explained further). Mental accounting together with previously described loss 
aversion assumption of the CPT form MLA. 
3.3 Myopic Loss Aversion 
Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) is a combination of the CPT assumption of loss 
aversion and mental accounting. It is used in behavioural finance in order to 
explain the Equity Premium Puzzle. This is a financial paradox that shows that 
while people should always invest in stocks rather than in bonds (due to a 
much higher profitability of stocks relative to bonds), large amounts of 
investment are still kept in bonds (see Figure 16). Figure 16 shows that had 
one invested $1 in small cap stocks in 1926, one would gain $18,106 by 2016. 
At the same time, by investing $1 into long-term bonds in 1926, one would 
only gain $110 by 2016. So, why would anyone want to invest into bonds? 
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Figure 16 An Illustration of Equity Premium Puzzle (source: Ibbotson Consulting) 
To provide an explanation for this Puzzle, MLA was introduced by Benartzi 
and Thaler (1995). Using both loss aversion (the main feature of CPT) and 
mental accounting (a well-known behavioural bias) they argued that people 
invest in bonds because they suffer from MLA. Loss aversion makes a 
sequence of investments under risk look less attractive in a myopic 
evaluation. Specifically, when investing in a stock, people are likely to 
evaluate their financial position frequently (at least once a year). Therefore, 
they are likely to spot losses more frequently and get more frequently upset 
and, as a result, pull their investment out due to loss aversion. At the same 
time, when investing into bonds, people are likely to evaluate their financial 
position infrequently (once every 5 years or so) which leads to the outcome 
that they simply do not spot losses frequently and are, therefore, less upset 
is they discover losses and less likely to pull their investments out. 
The concept of MLA for financial decisions was first tested and confirmed 
experimentally by Uri Gneezy and Jan Potters (Gneezy & Potters 1997) where 
the degree of myopia systematically influenced the willingness to invest in 
higher risk alternatives. It was observed that less feedback and greater 
commitment reduces evaluation myopia making the decision-maker more 
willing to accept the risk (Gneezy & Potters 1997; Thaler et al. 1997; Haigh & 
List 2005). Specifically, Gneezy and Potters (1997) designed two 
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experimental treatments: Short evaluation period treatment (Short) and Long 
evaluation period treatment (Long). Then they asked experimental 
participants to play 9 periods of the following experimental investment game. 
At the beginning of each period, each participant received an endowment 𝐸 
and was asked to invest any proportion 𝑥 of this endowment into a risky asset 
which yielded 2.5𝑥 with probability 
1
3
 and nothing with probability 
2
3
. In 
treatment Short, participants were allowed to make a new investment 
decision in each period (irrespective of the outcome, participants would get 
𝐸 anew in each period) and in treatment Long – participants chose investment 
amount 𝑥 only once every 3 periods (i.e., in periods 1, 4, and 7) and had to 
stick to their decision for the subsequent two periods. MLA predicted that in 
Long people will invest, on average, significantly more than in Short because 
loss aversion would prevent people from investing more money when they 
evaluate outcomes frequently (in the Short treatment).  This (predicted) 
behavioural pattern was indeed observed in the experiment. 
The original study by Gneezy and Potters (Gneezy & Potters 1997) was 
further replicated by Haigh and List (Haigh & List 2005) with professional 
traders (investment experts) where the effect of MLA was even stronger 
suggesting that professional experience does not reduce the bias. Markets 
also seem to have little or no influence in reducing the bias as shown by 
Gneezy et al. (2003) in an experimental market setting less frequent feedback 
and longer decision binding made prices for risky assets significantly higher. 
Focusing on markets designed to mitigate MLA, Mayhew and Vitalis (2014) 
found that MLA persists with inexperienced participants but not with 
experienced participants. However, experienced participants were unable to 
transfer this behaviour beyond the specially designed market and exhibited 
MLA again (Mayhew & Vitalis 2014). Considering individual versus team 
behaviour, despite an attenuated effect, MLA does persist with team decision 
making (Sutter 2007). 
A refined hypothesis about how myopia affects risk taking was suggested by 
Langer and Webber (Langer & Weber 2005) which was confirmed in an 
experiment similar to the original by Gneezy and Potters (1997). Both 
feedback frequency and commitment have influence on myopic evaluation of 
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assets, but the period of commitment influences myopia more than feedback 
frequency as demonstrated by Langer and Weber (Langer & Weber 2008). 
Lower feedback frequency with longer commitment period decreases myopia 
and increases willingness to invest in a risky asset (Langer & Weber 2008). 
Lower frequency feedback delivers information at a more aggregate level and 
a longer period of commitment leads decision-makers to consider a longer 
period into the future. Longer commitment period along with more frequent 
feedback might help to make obvious that occasional losses are outweighed 
by overall gains (Langer & Weber 2008). 
MLA is used as a part of the conceptual framework to test whether and to 
what extent modifying policy about evaluation periods can change the 
outcome of planning decisions. The main contribution to the MLA literature 
is that MLA was never applied to the problems of planning and MLA in 
application to planning decisions was never tested experimentally. 
3.3.1 MLA analytical framework and hypotheses 
In what follows, a new analytical framework that uses MLA to explain and 
predict DP decisions is proposed. Several hypotheses are formulated which 
are then tested experimentally. MLA as a possible explanation of failures in 
DP performance aligns with the previous research around DP performance. 
This is due to the following reasons: 
(1) MLA is based on the CPT that offers a good basis for analysing DP 
failures because of its assumption of loss aversion. 
(2) MLA represents a useful combination of a deterministic theory (CPT) 
and a cognitive bias (mental accounting) which allows not only to 
incorporate time delays into the analysis of decision-making but also 
to formulate meaningful predictions of planners’ behaviour. 
(3) Despite the fact that MLA combines CPT and mental accounting, it is 
a very simple concept which allows to easily introduce system versus 
human tests and analyse how business planning policy can affect and, 
possibly, offset the negative influence of human nature (loss aversion, 
mental accounting) or adverse effect of system nervousness (lack of 
policy) on planning decisions.  
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Figure 17 Analytical framework for demand planning decisions 
The framework is illustrated in Figure 17. This framework draws on previous 
research described in the earlier sections of this thesis. Three general variants 
of determinants of the planning performance are considered (Figure 17) as 
variants where: 
 Human nature is going to prevail over System thinking (Human); 
 System thinking is going to offset Human nature (System); 
 Both Human and System influences are possible (Human/System). 
Following the previous MLA research (e.g., Haigh & List 2005), the framework 
will also concentrate on two types of planning horizons: Short and Long (see 
Planning Horizon strand on Figure 17). In the Short planning horizon, planners 
will be asked to make decisions in every time period and in the long planning 
horizon, planners will be asked to make decisions once in every few periods. 
However, in addition to varying planning horizons the framework introduces 
several important innovations to capture important planning context. 
Specifically, the focus is on two aspects of the planning problems: Policy and 
Decision Support (see relevant strands on Figure 17). The Short time horizon 
planning problem will not be restricted by any policy and will provide no 
decision support. This situation captures a hypothetical case when planners 
can change planning decisions in every time period and are not provided with 
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any decision guidance or systemic restrictions (see first column on Figure 17). 
For simplicity, this situation is labelled as planning option Short. 
In the Long time horizon, the framework allows to capture two possibilities. 
One of these possibilities is that planners are asked to make decisions every 
few periods and the business policy of making decisions every so often is 
binding. The system, therefore, restricts planners to stick to the initial 
schedule of relatively ‘long-term’ decision and prevents them from making 
short-term adjustments to the long-term plan. This situation captures a 
hypothetical case when a company introduces strict policy that does not 
allow planners to change existing long-term plan and bind them to stick to 
their long-term decisions (see third column on Figure 17). For simplicity, this 
situation is labelled as planning option Long. 
Another possibility is more realistic and constitutes the main innovative 
component in the analytical framework. This possibility asks planners to make 
a long-term plan but has a non-binding policy that allows planners to alter the 
plan in each time period. In other words, planners have decision guidance not 
to alter the plan but they can do so if they wish. This situation captures a 
scenario that is close to the real world planning decision-making process 
within organizations when planners make a long-term plan but are then 
allowed to adjust this plan in response to various events (e.g., changes in 
demand, etc.). This situation is reflected in the second column on Figure 17. 
For simplicity, this situation is labelled as planning option Hybrid. 
Considering all three planning options (Short, Long, and Hybrid), the 
framework predicts the following. In Short, where planners are unrestricted 
by policy and have no decision guidance, the planning performance will be 
primarily influences by the human nature (specifically, by MLA). Therefore, 
planners will evaluate their plans frequently and, due to a combination of loss 
aversion and mental accounting will make too many adjustments to their 
plans at a higher magnitude which will result in decline in profits. In other 
words, the expectation is that planners’ performance in Short will be relatively 
poor (captured by the label ‘- -’ on Figure 17). In Long, the System thinking 
will prevail and offset the negative effects of MLA due to policy and systemic 
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restrictions. Therefore, in this treatment, planners will not ‘overadjust’ and 
reach a relatively good performance (captured by the label ‘+ +’ on Figure 17). 
Finally, in Hybrid the framework predicts that the performance will depend 
on the individual propensity of planners’ to follow a long-term plan. This 
performance will be relatively good if they stick to the decision guidance and 
will be relatively poor if they fail to follow the decision guidance in which case 
the MLA may prevail and negatively influence the performance. 
The proposed framework is not only consistent with the previous decision-
theoretic research, but also with literature on O&SCM. For example, Zhao 
and Lee (1993) argue that ‘…less frequent re-planning improves system 
performance…’ (Zhao & Lee, 1993, p.185) which suggests that binding the plan 
to the previous choice should have a positive effect on performance. 
Similarly, some evidence from O&SCM implied that planning with longer time 
horizons should exhibit better performance than planning with short time 
horizons (Simpson, 1999). It has also been shown that DP can be manipulated 
through policy, i.e., that planning performance may be affected by policy 
parameters (de Kok & Inderfurth, 1997). Finally, policy can be implemented 
via decision support that can either offer guidance or restrict decisions (Silver 
1991). Given the proposed framework, following hypotheses are formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: Planning performance in the planning option Long will be better 
than that in the planning option Short (i.e., planners will achieve higher profit in 
Long compared to Short).  
Hypothesis 2: Planning performance in the planning option Hybrid will depend 
on the extent to which individual planners are able to follow the long-term plan: 
those planners who stick to the long-term plan (i.e., those who mimic behaviour 
in Long) will achieve higher profit than those who try to alter the plan frequently 
(i.e., those who mimic behaviour in Short). 
3.4 Human and system: individual differences 
Since the framework predicts that in the planning option Hybrid, the 
profitability will essentially depend on the planners’ individual planning 
behaviour. Insights from psychological research are brought in to formulate 
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additional hypotheses about how (i) individual exposure to planning as well 
as (ii) other individual characteristics may help or hinder planning 
performance under conditions of this planning option. In what follows, 
relevant literature is discussed and hypotheses developed about the potential 
impact of factors (i) an (ii) on the planning performance for the Hybrid option. 
3.4.1 Overview of individual differences 
To understand the impact of individual traits and individual differences on 
planning, it is necessary to step back and first look at psychological research 
on intelligence. Intelligence is one of the most studied topics in psychology. 
One of the most replicated and consistent empirical finding was Spearman’s 
(1904) result that individuals performing well on one mental task tend to 
perform well on most others regardless of variations in the task (Deary 2000). 
This set the direction of social psychology focused on the processes that can 
predict performance in specific situations. Alternatively, individual 
differences are used in studies that try to uncover regularities between 
individuals that can be generalised across different situations. The most 
studied behavioural differences are personality traits and cognitive abilities. 
However, to date, behavioural analysis has in great part ignored individual 
differences despite the claim that the focus is on individual behavioural 
instead of group averages (Williams et al. 2008). As a result, the general trend 
in psychology is that many studies are carried out at a group level and 
individual differences (individual heterogeneity) are treated as errors rather 
than a relevant phenomenon (e.g., Williams et al. 2008; Maltby et al. 2013). 
Nonetheless, individual differences is one of the largest most interesting 
phenomena in social psychology focusing on how individuals differ from each 
other in terms of behaviour (e.g., Maltby et al. 2013). Each individual is 
considered unique. Consequently, differences can be observed at different 
levels. Individual differences can include many different measurable factors 
and dimensions offering a virtually infinite number of combinations. For 
example, individuals can differ in terms of memory, intelligence (e.g., I.Q.), 
knowledge, personality (e.g., Big Five), sex, height, age, education and 
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experience, as well as many other characteristics used to explain (part of) the 
observed variance between individuals. 
Following the idea that some cognitive types are a priori better decision-
makers than others (Davis 1982), personality has been repeatedly 
demonstrated to significantly affect decision making (e.g., Dahlbäck 1990; 
Lauriola & Levin 2001; Soane & Chmiel 2005; Davis et al. 2007; Icellioglu & 
Ozden 2012; Filiz & Battaglio 2015; Mihaela 2015). Personality traits have 
been found to be significant to many different dimensions related to decision 
making, linked to job performance (Hurtz & Donovan 2000; Furnham 2008), 
academic achievement (Barakat & Othman 2005; Poropat 2009), risk attitude 
(Dahlbäck 1990; Lauriola & Levin 2001) and, problem solving (Weinman et al. 
1985). Associated to high academic achievement and performance it has 
been found to be associated to Intellect/Openness (Heaven & Ciarrochi 
2012) and conscientiousness (Conrad & Patry 2012). 
One of cornerstones of individual differences is the study of personality and 
individual uniqueness. Personality is arguably one of the most complex and 
controversial areas of psychology research. The major complexity in the study 
of personality comes from the idea that each individual is unique and there 
are as many distinct personalities as conscious human beings ever lived on 
earth. However, the need for a simplified structure motivated researchers 
towards defining personality as a combination of traits. Larsen and Buss 
(2010, p.4) defined personality as ‘…the set of psychological traits and 
mechanisms within the individual that are organized and relatively enduring and 
that influence his or her interactions with, and adaptations to, the intrapsychic, 
physical, and social environments.’ From this definition comes that first, 
personality is relatively stable and second that it will influence one’s 
interaction with the environment, hence it will affect individual decision-
making. 
The conceptual foundations of trait theory date back to the works of 
Peterson (1968) and Mischel (1968). The basic structure of personality has 
converged to the Big Five through many trait theorists via independent 
studies (Digman 1990; Goldberg 1990; Pervin 1994; Digman 1997; John & 
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Srivastava 1999; John et al. 2008; Fleeson & Jayawickreme 2015). Formally, 
the five-factor model was suggested in the nineties by Digman (1990) based 
on a review of previous studies on personality inventories and its 
communalities. Over the last decades, the Big Five has been repeatedly 
validated and is considered a reliable instrument to represent the personality 
of an individual. The first order constructs of the Big Five are extroversion, 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, neuroticism and openness (Digman 1990; 
Goldberg 1990; Goldberg 1992; John & Srivastava 1999). 
Many businesses believe that certain personality traits can boost 
performance. For example, a large number of companies around the globe 
use Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® (MBTI) personality inventory7 to 
determine individual traits for individual development. Similarly, it is 
suggested that there is a ‘right’ mind-set (personality) for different planning 
(e.g., Lapide 2007). Yet, the tests of whether and how personality traits 
influence performance in DP have not been conducted before and it is 
difficult to derive such information from field (non-experimental) data as (i) 
managers differ in their abilities to perform their duties; and (ii) most 
importantly, there is too much complexity in the decision environment to 
distinguish between results which depend on personality and results that 
depend on external factors. Given both the evidence from the psychology 
literature as well as the consensus among practitioners that personality trait 
tests bring value to business, the expectation is that individual personality 
traits will have significant impact on performance. Since personality traits are 
likely to matter most in the Hybrid DP option, the following hypothesis is 
formulated. 
Hypothesis 3: Individual differences and individual personality traits are a 
significant predictor of demand planning performance. The effect of individual 
differences and individual personality traits should be particularly strong in the 
Hybrid planning option where individuals have a choice between following and 
not following the decision guidance to stick to the long-term plan. 
                                                   
7 See http://www.myersbriggs.org/ 
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Individual differences offer a broad range of constructs. The following section 
discusses what individual differences have been associated to decision-
making performance, with emphasis on DP. The review will concentrate on 
personality inventories and psychometric scales that measure individual 
differences relevant for the purpose of this thesis. 
3.4.2 Individual exposure to demand planning processes: 
experience versus theoretical knowledge 
The first and one of the most important individual characteristic considered 
is individual exposure to DP. The literature on leadership and business 
performance distinguishes between practical experience (henceforth, 
experience) and theoretical knowledge (henceforth, knowledge).8 Experience 
and individual knowledge are known to significantly affect decision making 
(Ackerman 1996; Bolton & Katok 2004). However, there is some 
disagreement regarding the effect of experience on performance. 
Theoretically, it is expected that training and prior experience benefits 
performance through better decisions (Ackerman 1996). The evidence 
around this is mixed with some studies observing experience as beneficial 
(e.g., Goodall & Pogrebna 2015) while others, specifically comparing naïve 
and expert groups in experiments find the opposite (e.g, Haigh & List 2005; 
Brown & Tang 2006; Bolton et al. 2012). Considering that intuition is 
recognition which comes from experience (Simon 1969) other authors 
challenge the claim that experts poses high level of intuitive skills (Sjöberg 
2003). However, intuitive forecasting by experienced managers  seems to 
benefit accuracy when combined with statistical forecasting (Blattberg et al. 
1990). 
Both practice and decision-making experiments challenge the claim that 
experience and knowledge benefit performance. For example, from a study 
on 60,000 forecasts and their outcomes, managers decided to adjust the 
forecast in most forecasts which often reduced accuracy (Fildes et al. 2009). 
                                                   
8 See, e.g., Goodall, A (2009) “Socrates in the Boardroom: Why Research 
Universities Should Be Led by Top Scholars”, Princeton University Press, for 
an extensive discussion on this literature. 
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Moreover, a study by Rieg (2010) of forecasting in automotive industry over 
15 years finds no improvement over time. In literature around expert 
judgement, this has been called the ‘process-performance paradox in expert 
judgement’ (Camerer & Johnson 1991, p.8). 
Experimental results suggest a similar relationship between experience and 
performance. Sub-optimal decision making can resist to professional 
experience or background training (Bolton & Katok 2008; Lurie & 
Swaminathan 2009; Bolton et al. 2012). This same idea links back to MLA 
hypothesis in professional traders where Haigh and List (2005) detected that 
professionals suffered from greater bias than naïve students. Moreover, in an 
inventory management experiment, both professional buyers and students 
exhibited the same behaviour (Brown & Tang, 2006). This aligns with findings 
by Bolton et al., (2012) who compared experienced procurement managers 
and naïve students to solve the newsvendor problem, finding that both 
groups exhibit the same kind of pull-to-centre bias. Bolton et al., (2012) 
detected that professional managers use information and task training no 
better than students do. Additional knowledge about the demand did not 
improve performance either in experimental settings (Schweitzer et al. 2000). 
Regarding the available information (knowledge), for example, knowing the 
demand distribution affects the behaviour but it does not lead to a better 
performance (Benzion et al. 2009). 
Considering this mixed evidence from various studies, the hypothesis about 
the relative impact of planning exposure will be based on the following 
approach.  It enables the distinction between theoretical or knowledge 
exposure to planning (labelled as Theory), practical exposure or experience in 
planning (labelled Practice) and no exposure to planning (labelled as Naïve). 
This approach is summarised in figure 16 in the Exposure-Performance 
Matrix (EPM).  
The rationale behind the EPM is the following. Naïve planners (those who do 
not have any previous exposure to planning) will exhibit the worst 
performance as they have neither theoretical knowledge nor practical 
experience of the planning issues that may arise in the planning process. 
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Theory planners (those who have theoretical knowledge rather than practical 
experience) will exhibit the best performance as they are familiar with 
potential planning problems (such as, e.g., severe overadjustment of long-
term plans) and, therefore, they are more likely to carry out the planning 
process ‘by the book’ making minimal number of overadjustment errors. EPM 
predicts that Practice planners (those who have practical experience in 
planning) will exhibit performance somewhere in-between Naïve and Theory 
planners. This is because practical knowledge of planning decisions within 
organisations will make those planners more likely to make additional 
adjustments to the long-term plan (this feature of the EPM comes from the 
empirical observations of excess adjustment observed in the real life 
decisions). In other words, Practice planner may perform as well as Theory 
planners but their practical experience will (generally) hinder their 
performance making them chase demand more than Theory planners would 
do. It is important to note that Naïve planners necessarily have neither 
theoretical nor practical exposure to planning. Theory planners necessarily do 
not have any practical experience while Practice planners may have some 
theoretical knowledge of the planning problems but they should necessarily 
have practical experience in dealing with planning problems in real-life 
situations. 
Finally, policy is a way of overriding lack of exposure and improving 
performance. Policy can be enforced via restrictiveness or guidance, e.g., 
restricting managers from making bad decisions or guiding them by providing 
the necessary information to make a good decision. 
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Figure 18 Exposure-Performance Matrix 
Considering EPM, the following hypothesis is formulated. 
Hypothesis 3-A: Individual differences with regard to exposure to planning is an 
important determinant of planning performance with Theory planners performing 
better than Practice and Naïve planners 
3.4.3 Naïve interventionism hypothesis 
DP performance is affected by naïve interventionism in the form of frequent 
adjustments to the plan. Worth noting that this considers conditions when no 
additional information is available to exclude the beneficial adjustments of 
additional knowledge about demand shaping decisions. A subject completely 
unaware, with no exposure to theory or experience, is considered perfectly 
naïve. Naïve interventionism is an individual characteristic that is related to 
individual’s background, experience and practice. Hence, such attribute 
belonging to the domain of individual differences. Naïve interventionism 
encompasses plan instability or plan changes. 
Hypothesis 3-B: Greater level of naïve interventionism leads to worse demand 
planning performance 
The following section focuses specifically on individual differences and DP 
performance. 
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3.4.4 Personality inventory: Big Five 
The field of personality traits is one of the largest in individual difference 
research. Based on the trait theory part of the researchers agree on the 
fundamental elements describing a personality (e.g., Digman 1990; Goldberg 
1990; Pervin 1994; Digman 1997; John & Srivastava 1999; John et al. 2008; 
Fleeson & Jayawickreme 2015).  
Each factor of the Big Five describes a distinct aspect of personality. 
Openness refers to curiosity, originality, and ingenuity. Alternatively, 
Openness can be referred to in different ways. It can be Culture because it 
includes intellectualism, polish, and independence of mind. In addition, 
Openness can be sometimes referred to as Intellect as it gives emphasis on 
intelligence, reflection, and sophistication. Conscientiousness includes 
dependability, responsibility, and orderliness. Sometimes referred to just as 
Dependability. Extraversion relates to energy, talkativeness, and 
assertiveness. Extraversion is sometimes called surgency. Agreeableness 
includes trust, good-naturedness, and cooperativeness – therefore some 
studies refer to it as a combination of compliance and friendliness. Finally, 
Neuroticism refers to how easy it is to upset the individual and stands 
opposite to emotional stability (which can be obtained by simply reverting the 
scores).  
Strohhecker and Größler (2013) identify intelligence as the strongest 
predictor of performance but ‘openness to new experiences’  was detrimental 
to performance. Similarly, neuroticism has been attributed to impulsive 
behaviour leading to over-reactions, mistrust and second-guessing which is 
known to have a negative impact on the SC (Christopher & Lee 2001).  
3.4.5 Specific personality construct measures 
To measure specific personality constructs there is a wide range of 
alternatives. It was particularly interesting to include a measure of 
impulsiveness, since it has been associated to underperformance in previous 
OM literature (e.g., Martin & Potts 2009; Ockenfels & Selten 2015). Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS), being one of the latest revisions referred to as BIS-
11 proposed by Patton et al. (1995) was selected as it is one of the most used 
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impulsiveness scales.  The full list of questions for the BIS is included in the 
6.7Appendix C. 
DP requires making considerations about the future events. Previous OM 
literature suggests that behaviours such as risk or loss aversion (e.g., De 
Véricourt et al. 2013; Ma et al. 2015) affect performance significantly and 
some of the anecdotal explanations mentions that it has to do with how 
individuals evaluate the consequences of their actions. Elaboration on 
Potential Outcomes (EPO) is a scale proposed by Nenkov et al. (2008) 
designed to evaluate potential positive and negative consequences of 
individual behaviours. The complete list of questions for the EPO is available 
in 6.7Appendix B. 
Finally, expert intuition has been referred to as one of the main traits involved 
in solving complex judgement problems. While expert intuition is hard to 
measure and no specific scale for DP has been proposed yet, overall intuition 
as part of decision-making style is included in the General Decision Making 
Style (GDMS) scale. Self-reported decision making style has been found to 
predict behavioural decision making (Franken & Muris 2005). The GDMS was 
designed to assess how individuals approach decision situations. One of the 
validations of the GDMS was done by Gambetti et al. (2008). The GDMS 
distinguishes between five decision styles (Scott & Bruce 1995). A rational 
style focuses on a careful search for and logical evaluation of alternatives. The 
avoidant style concerns avoiding or postponing decisions. A dependent style 
refers to searching for directions or advice from others. An intuitive style 
relies on hunches and feelings. Finally, a spontaneous style regards to 
immediacy and wish to finish the decision making process quickly. The full list 
of questions for the GDMS can be consulted in 6.7Appendix D. 
Hypothesis 3-C: Greater level of impulsiveness leads to worse demand planning 
performance 
3.4.6 Other individual differences 
Individuals can also be distinguished by demographic characteristics such as 
sex and age. Most of the previous experimental research related to DP 
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collected these demographics most of the time for descriptive purposes (e.g., 
Bolton et al. 2012; Moritz et al. 2014). De Véricourt et al. (2013) finds sex to 
be a significant predictor of DP performance. Therefore, the demographic 
sub-hypothesis 3-D is formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 3-D: Male subjects outperform female subjects in the planning task 
3.4.7 Individual differences hypothesis overview 
The conceptual framework around individual differences is illustrated in 
Figure 19. The human and system situation offers choice and this is where 
individual differences are expected to be predictors of DP performance. 
Decision support is offered as decisional guidance. Exposure, considered as 
experience or knowledge varies between naïve and theoretical with practice 
in the middle. Naïve interventionism (as plan instability) is expected to 
negatively affect performance. Psychometrics are measured using the BIG5, 
GDMS, EPO and BIS. Demographics measured are sex and age. It is expected 
that individual differences will explain at least part of the differences in 
performance. 
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Figure 19 Conceptual framework focused on individual differences  
3.5 Complete conceptual framework, testable hypotheses 
and predictions 
The following conceptual framework is proposed for this thesis (see Figure 
20). This framework is inspired by the previous theoretical and empirical 
results discussed above. The outcome of DP decisions (measured by planning 
performance) is influenced by systemic factors (organisational policies and 
processes) and human factors (individual exposure to planning decisions, 
individual propensity to follow a plan, and other individual traits and 
characteristics such a personality). 
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Figure 20 Complete Conceptual Framework 
While there could be a large number of policies and processes, the focus is 
only on systemic factors affecting time horizons. Specifically, on policy 
commitments with regard to the planning time horizons. 
In this regard, policy can ask planners to make planning decisions in each 
period (non-binding policy commitment). It can also restrict planners to only 
make decisions every several periods (Binding policy commitment). Finally, it 
can also ask planners to adopt an Optional (Hybrid) policy whereby planners 
are asked to make decisions every once in a while (once in several periods) 
but this policy in non-binding – i.e., while planners make a plan for several 
periods, then can change their decisions in every period. The empirical tests 
use non-binding (short), binding (long), and optional (hybrid) treatments to 
test whether policy affects planning outcomes. This policy is enforced via 
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decision support as none, system restrictiveness and, decisional guidance 
respectively. It is expected that, due to MLA, varying policy will lead to the 
following planning outcomes. In the Long treatment, mostly systemic factors 
will be at play and therefore, planners will stick to the original plan, be less 
hectic and reach better profit levels. In the Short treatment, human factors 
will dominate systemic factors as loss averse planners due to mental 
accounting will notice losses more frequently than those in other treatments 
and will try to change the original plan making the outcome of planning worse. 
Finally, both systemic and human factors can be at play in hybrid treatment 
where people with different individual characteristics will be converging 
either towards behaviour mimicking Long or behaviour mimicking Short 
treatments. 
With regard to individual characteristics, most interesting outcomes are 
expected from the Hybrid treatment.  The assumption is that performance in 
the Long treatment will not be affected by individual differences. Similarly, in 
Short treatment loss aversion and mental accounting combined will outweigh 
any effects of individual differences. 
With regard to the Optional (Hybrid) treatment, it is expected that people 
with no exposure to planning will drift towards behaviour similar to that in 
the Short treatment. People with theoretical exposure to planning will mimic 
Long treatment behaviour because they would have knowledge of potential 
damage that may occur due to over adjusting the plan. Finally, people with 
practical exposure may drift towards Short or Long, however, given the fact 
that over adjustment in planning is a big problem among practicing 
professionals, the expectation is that they are more likely to drift towards 
Short than Long. 
3.6 Chapter summary 
DP is subject to human judgement. The dominant model of human behaviour, 
CPT, is adopted which is a time-free deterministic theory. In CPT, all decisions 
are assumed to be made at a specific point in time and preferences towards 
time are not described. CPT with mental accounting bias can be combined in 
order to formulate meaningful predictions for planning decisions. In order to 
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understand the contribution of individual differences, the focus is on 
individual’s exposure (experience) and naïve interventionism (the plan 
instability). To observe individual differences, the focus is on personality, 
psychometrics and demographics. Personality is assumed to as combination 
of the five constructs of the big five. Psychometrics and demographics 
include decision-making style, elaboration and evaluation of planning and 
impulsiveness. Demographics include exposure (experience/education), sex 
and age. It is expected that some of the constructs will highlight the 
differences. The following chapter contains the research design adopted to 
test the framework and respective hypothesis. 
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4 Research design 
4.1 Introduction 
The theoretical framework presented in Figure 20 (p.77) is used to build a 
decision making experiment. The structure of Chapter 4 is outlined in Table 
7. Following this introduction, the philosophical positioning of this research is 
presented. After a review of decision-making experiment methodology, this 
chapter focuses on the experimental task. The experiment is based on the 
newsvendor problem due to its previous successful applications in similar 
situations. A section on measuring individual differences provides an 
overview of how personality traits, psychometrics, and demographics can be 
captured. Finally, the experimental design is presented with the description 
of the treatments, sample and other methodological choices. The chapter 
closes with a summary. 
Table 7 Chapter 5 structure 
Section Overview 
4.2 Ontological and 
epistemological perspective 
The philosophical positioning is discussed. This thesis 
adopts positivism, which is aligned with the philosophy 
adopted by most previous research informing this thesis. 
4.3 Decision making 
experiments: methodological 
considerations 
The methodology of decision-making experiments is 
reviewed along with its justification, task, validity, the 
requirements for compensation, sample size and ethical 
considerations. 
4.4 Experimental task: 
newsvendor problem 
The newsvendor problem is chosen as basis for the task 
in the decision making experiment. The justification is 
presented followed by a literature review around the 
newsvendor problem and its previous applications. 
4.5 Measuring individual 
differences 
In order to capture individual differences, a personality 
inventory, several psychometric scales and demographic 
questions are selected. 
4.6 Experimental design The experimental design section provides an overview, 
chosen strategy regarding incentives, target sample size 
and how performance and individual differences are 
going to be measured. The three experimental treatments 
are explained. As part of the requirements of decision-
making experiment methodology and ethical 
considerations information sheets and declarations of 
informed consent are developed. The experimental 
procedure is summarised followed by eligibility criteria, 
risks and benefits for participants. The section closes with 
a summary of the experimental flow. 
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4.2 Ontological and epistemological perspective 
The philosophical position is positivism due to author’s personal preference 
influenced by background training and education in engineering. The present 
research builds on contributions from the fields of Economics, Psychology, 
OR and OM which are predominantly positivistic (e.g., Kagel et al. 1995; 
Starmer et al. 2009). These fields can be considered relatively mature. The 
exception is the field of OM that due to its broad nature includes other 
philosophical views such as critical realism, action research or interpretivism. 
The advantage of a mature field is that it allows theory testing. Edmondson 
and McManus (2007) recommends keeping the philosophical consistency 
with the core literature informing the research. 
The aim of this research is to develop new knowledge and the assumption is 
that reality is objective. This means that reality is constructed of measurable 
and testable phenomena and objects that exist regardless of whether there is 
someone directly experiencing or observing it (O’Gorman & MacIntosh 2012). 
Findings from previous research are assumed independent from the 
researchers, replicable and generalizable as long as their results are 
statistically significant and valid. The same is expected of the results of this 
research. Assuming an objective reality opens the possibility to use a wide 
array of techniques, data and enables replication and comparison of the 
results with previous studies (O’Gorman & MacIntosh 2012). 
Epistemologically, valid and reliable knowledge is developed following a 
positivist tradition that matches the objective ontology. Positivism comes 
from natural sciences and is one of the most common epistemologies in 
science. From a positivistic view follows that findings can be directly 
observed, verified and replicated regardless of the observers. The desire of 
this research is to formulate claims that can be generalizable rules.  
The dominant methodologies in the positivistic paradigm are experimental 
research and survey research. Decision making experiments are widely used 
in experimental economics and other fields studying decision making (see 
Kagel et al. 1995). The most commonly used methods to analyse experimental 
results are quantitative methods, e.g., econometric analysis. 
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Any other philosophical positioning rather than positivism would invalidate 
most of the assumptions made. The closest alternative philosophy is 
pragmatism that allows the use of most methods as long as they are suited to 
the research problem and potentially avoiding philosophical debates. It 
recognises that each method has its limitations so the main characteristic is 
to use mixed methods and triangulation. This alternative is compatible with 
the present problem and the use of the same theories. However, due to 
personal preference, the drawbacks of positivist tradition are acceptable. This 
does not mean that introspective and intuitive knowledge are ignored, it is, 
however, used anecdotally to inspire objective observation.  
Positivism is often criticised as reductionist. However, the reduction of 
complexity can be advantageous. People can be very complex. However, the 
assumption is that individual differences can be objectively measured. Whilst 
an individual is an extremely complex system, the belief is that it is still an 
objective system. It is possible to measure some of higher order traits using 
psychometric scales and personality inventories developed in psychology. 
The following sections describe methodological choices and data-analysis 
techniques considering an objective reality and a positivist epistemology. 
4.3 Decision making experiments: methodological 
considerations 
The aim of this research is to test the hypotheses that behavioural biases and 
individual differences affect planners decision making following the 
methodology of decision making experiments (see Kagel et al. 1995). The aim 
is to set a task and measure performance that will depend on the subject’s 
judgement. The task will have a theoretical optimum and subject’s 
performance is expected to deviate to some degree from the optimal solution 
under the assumption of a normative view of rationality. Studying systematic 
errors and biases in judgement allows an insight on cognitive limitations and 
underlying works of statistical and logical intuition (Kahneman & Tversky 
1982). Special attention is paid to methodological rigour as application of 
behavioural experimentation in the context of O&SCM ‘provides much less 
evidence of an understanding of what “rigor” with such methods entails’ 
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(Bachrach & Bendoly 2011, p.5). There are two main alternatives to run 
decision making experiments, one is a laboratory experiment and the other is 
a framed field experiment where both can either be in form of an incentivised 
decision making experiment or a non-incentivised survey. Both 
methodologies are well established in economics and social psychology. For 
a detailed methodological overview see Plott and Smith (2008) regarding the 
methodology of laboratory experiments and Harrison and List (Harrison & List 
2004) for the methodology of framed field experiments 
4.3.1 Why experiment 
The choice to approach this study using an experiment is because it is the 
most used methodology in behavioural economics and behavioural OR, it 
allows hypothesis testing and manipulation of particular factors. Running 
experiments is now an established method to explain and/or describe 
economic and business activity bringing these fields into alignment with many 
of the natural sciences that rely on experimental methods (e.g., physics and 
biology). This is backed up by publications, citations and even a Nobel prize 
(Smith 2002). Over the last 12 years 11% of the most-cited papers in 
economics are experimental which is roughly the same number as theoretical 
papers. 
Experiments are not as common in OM and OR literature, although the 
methodology has been recently gaining increasing attention (Bachrach & 
Bendoly 2011). Beyond the context of economics, the methodology of 
decision-making experiments has been extensively used to test policy, 
designs or best practices. The advantage of using experiments is that it can 
test theories under precisely controlled and/or measured conditions that are 
typically unavailable in field data.  
4.3.2 Experimental task 
In order to design a decision making experiment it is necessary to create a 
situation where the subject is required to judge the provided information and 
make a decision (Kagel et al. 1995). The use of computer simulations to study 
judgement and decision making is widely adopted (e.g., Funke 2001). There 
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are several considerations about internal and external validity to take into 
consideration in order to retain the methodological rigour. 
This research focuses on DP performance, particularly how managers react 
to a demand signal in a situation of uncertainty. DP decisions are usually made 
repeatedly with a pre-determined frequency for an individual product or 
family of products (in case of goods). Similar happens for services. The 
problem targeted in this research is the one of mistrust, over-reactions and 
second-guessing. This irrational behaviour can have an insignificant effect as 
an isolated episode but repeated over many periods can have a significant toll 
on the overall business performance. Hence, the experiment has to have 
repeated decisions over many periods. 
Considering the demand signal, in order to observe a ‘clean’ behaviour to the 
demand signal, the simulated demand must be pattern free so any judgement 
made relies solely on the decision-maker’s interpretation. A pattern free 
demand signal can be obtained using a uniform distribution commonly used 
in decision making experiments on planning, ordering and forecasting in 
behavioural operations literature (Schweitzer et al. 2000; Bolton & Katok 
2004; Benzion et al. 2008; Bostian et al. 2008; Croson, Ren, et al. 2013). By 
presenting managers with a pattern free demand signal, it is expected that 
any judgement bias will stand out clear. 
4.3.3 External validity  
To ensure external validity, the experimental task and context must be close 
to practice. DP activity is usually made from manager’s own workstations 
(desktops or laptops). This allows to run the experiment outside laboratory 
environment, i.e., in a field setting, using a platform that can run from subject’s 
own workstation and consequently improving the ecological validity 
(Berkowitz & Donnerstein 1982). To achieve this the framed field experiment 
should be web-based. There are many other practical advantages of 
conducting the experiment online. First, it allows reaching participants more 
easily. Second, it takes advantage of the current survey platforms such as 
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Qualtrics9, which allows high levels of customisation through Java Scrip 
programming. Third, it can be disseminated via targeted mailing, advertised in 
speciality groups (e.g., linked in groups) going beyond geographical 
limitations, as subject’s physical presence in the laboratory is not necessary. 
For more a detailed overview of framed field experiment see Harrison and 
List (Harrison & List 2004). 
4.3.4 Compensation  
Compensation is common in decision making experiments (Gneezy & 
Rustichini 2000). In the previous literature on decision making experiments in 
OM, the behaviour of participants in previous studies was measured 
sometimes in incentivized experiments (e.g., Schweitzer & Cachon 2000; 
Bolton & Katok 2008; De Véricourt et al. 2013; Ovchinnikov et al. 2015) and 
sometimes in non-incentivized surveys (e.g., Brown & Tang 2006; Rudi & 
Drake 2010). However, much research in economics and social psychology  
(see Gneezy & Rustichini 2000; Camerer et al. 2004; Gneezy et al. 2011) 
shows that in a field setting (when approaching professionals) much cleaner 
(less noisy) results were obtained when professionals were asked to 
participate in non-incentivized (non-paid) surveys rather than in incentivised 
(paid) experiments. ‘Offering money did not always produce an improvement and 
subjects performed poorly’ (Gneezy & Rustichini 2000, p.791). Moreover, 
Remus et al. (1998) conducted experiments specifically to determine whether 
or not financial incentives affect judgmental forecasting experiments, finding 
that incentives had no significant impact on forecasting accuracy. Hence, the 
experimental design offers flexibility in terms of compensation and there are 
both advantages (commonly accepted practice) and disadvantages 
(introduction of noise). It is worth noting that incentives do not necessary 
need to be monetary (although it’s the most common way). Subjects, 
particularly professionals, are harder to compensate in a meaningful way with 
money as a professional’s time is usually much more expensive than the one 
of a student. However, incentives can take a different form and in return for 
                                                   
9 Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com) is a comprehensive web-based software to 
manage customer experience via survey 
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participation subjects can be offered performance feedback in form of 
individual profiles as well as access to reports on findings from the study (e.g., 
Moritz et al. 2013). Although this form is arguably not proportional to 
performance in the experimental task, it can be assumed that a subject that 
puts effort into the task will receive results that are more meaningful. 
4.3.5 Sample size requirements 
Considerations about the sample size are of critical importance with 
implications on the choice of data analysis methods (Kagel et al. 1995). Most 
commonly, experimental results are analysed using econometric 
methodology. List et al. (2011, p.168) suggests three principles to decide on 
the minimum sample size. First, ‘[with] a continuous outcome measure one 
should only allocate subjects equally across treatment and control if the sample 
variances of the outcome means are expected to be equal in the treatment and 
control groups. i.e., if the treatment effect is homogenous.’ For example, 
assuming of homogenous treatment effects, it is necessary n = 16 (64) 
observations in each treatment cell to detect a one (one-half) standard 
deviation change in the outcome variable (following the standards in the 
literature of a significance level of 0.05, and setting power to 0.80). To detect 
a one-tenth standard deviation change, 1,568 subjects are needed in each 
treatment cell. Second, ‘in those cases where the sample variances are not equal, 
the ratio of the sample sizes should be set equal to the ratio of the standard 
deviations.’ Finally, third, ‘if the cost of sampling subjects varies across 
experimental cells, then the ratio of the sample sizes is inversely proportional to 
the square root of the relative costs.’ For this thesis, the assumption is to work 
with approximately two standard deviation points. Therefore, a minimum of 
30 participants per treatment will be required in order to ensure statistical 
significance. 
4.3.6 Ethical considerations 
Given that decision making experiments involve people, it is essential to have 
appropriate ethical considerations (Kagel et al. 1995). This must include an 
information sheet about the study and a consent form. The assumption is that 
 88 
such study will only include adult participants that are not considered 
vulnerable in any way. 
Participants must be provided with an information sheet about the study that 
includes a clear identification of the researchers involved, overview of the 
purpose, information on research outlining what the participants are required 
to do. Special attention must be given to risks, and participants must be 
notified that there is a potential loss of confidentiality due to data storage 
breach in an unlikely event as well as information about information 
retraction. A highlight of potential benefits of this study should be included. 
Anonymity considerations must be made clear as results are not shared with 
third parties and identifying information is on not kept with the results that 
are codified and anonymised distinguished only by an individual ID number 
for each participant. It must be made clear that participation is voluntary and 
participants can stop the experiment at any time. Finally, any experiment of 
this nature must have an appropriate Biomedical & Scientific Research Ethics 
Committee (BSREC) ethical approval explicitly mentioned in the information 
sheet and participants must be provided with an address for complaints about 
the study in case they wish to do so for any reason. 
After the information sheet, participants are expected to be able to provide 
formal consent. For this purpose, it is often used a consent form (hard copy 
or virtual) where participants are again provided with contacts of the 
researchers. The form lists a number of points to confirm that they are legal 
adults, have understood the information sheet for the project, agree to 
participate and follow instructions provided, and understand how the 
provided information will be used as well as their participation is voluntarily. 
The consent form must have some sort of validation either via signature or 
(in case of electronic format) via a button validation where they validate that 
they do understand all the points mentioned. 
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4.4 Experimental task: newsvendor problem 
4.4.1 Why newsvendor problem 
This study is set to test hypotheses that behavioural biases and individual 
differences affect planners’ decision making via a decision making 
experiment. The crucial component of the experiment is the task that will be 
used to measure performance depending on the subject’s judgement. The 
newsvendor problem is commonly used in OM and OR research. Carlson and 
O’Keefe (1969, p.483) reported one of the first uses of the newsvendor 
problem in decision making experiments suggesting that ‘subjects can make 
reasonably good decisions on an ad hoc basis without having been taught a formal 
rule’ but finding ‘almost every kind of mistake also being made’. 
The newsvendor problem allows mathematical formulation and does have an 
optimal solution that maximises profit. This fulfils the essential task 
requirements in order to measure relative deviation in judgement assuming a 
normative view of rationality. Due to this characteristics, the newsvendor 
problem has been widely used in laboratory and field experiments 
(Schweitzer et al. 2000; Bostian et al. 2008; Bolton & Katok 2008; Becker-
Peth et al. 2013; Moritz et al. 2013). Moreover, the sub-optimal performance 
in the newsvendor task has been attributed to behavioural factors such as 
loss, risk and waste aversion and underestimation of opportunity cost (Fisher 
& Raman 1996; Schweitzer et al. 2000; Agrawal & Seshadri 2000; Benzion et 
al. 2008; Ma 2008; Wang & Webster 2009; Herweg 2013; Ma et al. 2015) 
Hence, the characteristics and application of the newsvendor problem make 
it an appropriate candidate for modification to be used in a DP scenario. 
For clarity, the newsvendor problem is not central to this research and 
although literature offers a rich insight on its theoretical formulations and 
empirical application, it is only used instrumentally to serve as basis for a DP 
task. Therefore, the following sections provide a brief overview of literature 
about the definition of the problem and empirical findings of its application. 
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4.4.2 Newsvendor problem origin 
The newsvendor problem deals with a single period inventory and is an 
iterative purchase decision of a perishable item when facing uncertain 
demand (Whitin 1955). The origin of the newsvendor problem tracks back to 
Edgeworth (1888) who presented a very similar mathematical solution to a 
problem concerning how much cash banks had to keep to meet unknown 
customer’s demand against the amount of cash to lend at a certain profit. 
It is important to mention for disambiguation that the newsvendor problem 
has been referred to with slight variations by different authors. The 
‘newsvendor’ problem is also known as ‘newsboy’ problem (Tiwari et al. 2011) 
also often referred to as newsvendor game (Ockenfels & Selten 2015), hence 
it is common to refer to decision-makers as players and the task itself as a 
game. 
The newsvendor problem is one of the two typical situations in SCs. One type 
is a monopolist facing a downward-sloping demand from the market (Tsay et 
al. 1999) and the other type is a newsvendor situation facing random demand 
from the market and exogenous retail prices (Lariviere 1999). This is one of 
the limitations of the newsvendor problem applied to O&SCM. It represents 
only certain types of products (perishables) in a real life situation.  
4.4.3 Decision making research using newsvendor 
The newsvendor problem has been repeatedly used in laboratory 
experiments (e.g., Schweitzer & Cachon, 2000; Bostian et al., 2008; Bolton & 
Katok, 2008; Becker-Peth et al., 2013) to demonstrate that the assumption 
that real decision makers act in a way that maximizes their expected utility 
does not hold – decision makers’ orders volumes systematically deviate from 
the profit maximising optimum order quantity. Subjects normally exhibit 
learning and convergence, affected by the mean demand, the size of the 
optimal order quantity and the demand of the last round, the order sizes tend 
to be between the mean demand and the optimal order quantity (Benzion et 
al. 2008). 
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Feedback and practice the newsvendor problem 
Extended task experience improves performance but more frequent 
feedback does very little (Bolton & Katok 2008). In one separate experiment, 
frequent feedback had modest improvement on the performance (Wachtel & 
Dexter 2010). However, more frequent feedback resulted in a worse 
performance because it leads to excessive attention on more recent data and 
failure to compare information across time (Lurie & Swaminathan 2009). The 
more feedback is provided, the greater is the recency effect which comes 
from greater attention to the immediate information (e.g., Lurie & 
Swaminathan, 2009; Gavirneni & Isen, 2009; Wachtel & Dexter, 2010). This 
interpretation of excessive attention to more recent data aligns with myopia 
in mental accounting (Thaler 1999). Some studies suggest that on an 
individual level such behaviour can resist to professional experience or 
background training (Bolton & Katok 2008; Lurie & Swaminathan 2009; 
Bolton et al. 2012). 
Main biases in newsvendor 
Typically, on average across decision-makers, the ordered quantity sits 
between the average demand and the optimum (Schweitzer et al. 2000). This 
has been called pull-to-centre effect by ordering few low high profit products 
and too many of low profit products (Schweitzer et al. 2000). ‘Pull-to-centre’ 
effect is defined as the average order quantities are too low when it should 
be high and vice-versa. (Bostian et al. 2008, p.590). Different interpretations 
have been offered to such behaviour (Su 2008; Kremer et al. 2010). The most 
common interpretation is demand chasing and anchoring effects. Order 
chasing effect is the bias describing the adjustment of order quantities based 
on the most recent demand. Anchoring effect is the tendency to anchor on 
the mean demand and then adjust towards the optimum, placing orders 
typically between the mean demand and expected profit-maximizing 
quantity.  Most of the subjects are able to identify the over/under costs but 
fail to transfer this into the optimal order quantity (Gavirneni & Isen 2009). 
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Newsvendor and external factors 
The newsvendor problem has been also used to consider how context factors 
affect performance (Rudi & Drake 2010). External factors can take many 
forms, such as available information, single versus group decision making, 
region and culture, and finally contracts and policies. 
Regarding the available information, for example, knowing the demand 
distribution affects the behaviour but it does not lead to a better performance 
(Benzion et al. 2009). The effect of forecast in the newsvendor problem has 
been also observed as significant (Gurnani & Tang 1999; Zheng et al. 2016). 
Expanding beyond single-player newsvendor, the newsvendor performance 
has been compared between individual decision making and groups 
(Gavirneni & Isen 2009) with a special focus on group dynamics (Gavirneni & 
Xia 2009). One of the main findings was that subjects working in groups 
exhibit less propensity for errors (Gavirneni & Xia 2009). 
In an exploratory study with a relatively small sample size, regional and 
cultural factors have been observed as potentially significant in the 
newsvendor setting (Cui et al. 2013). Although Cui et al. (2013) warns to a 
small subject pool, the main findings are interesting, suggesting that Chinese 
players compared to Americans required more information, proposed new 
numbers instead of repeating previous ones and were more aware of the 
salvaging costs. 
An important external factor can be contracts and policies. Experimental 
results suggest that performance of the newsvendor problem can be 
improved through contracts designed considering a behavioural model over 
contracts designed using standard models (Becker-Peth et al. 2013). 
Finally, it has been demonstrated over an inventory control task (arguably 
sharing some similarities to the newsvendor) in experimental conditions that 
feedback format plays an important role in how well subjects perform (Atkins 
et al. 2002). Although Atkins et al. (2002) did not look specifically at the 
newsvendor problem, the conditions and the type of decisions that subjects 
had to make are potentially compatible and findings are applicable. 
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Individual differences in newsvendor 
Considering individual differences in judgement, some interesting 
contributions have been arising over the last years suggesting that some traits 
can be good predictors of performance in the conditions similar to the 
newsvendor game. Strohhecker & Größler (2013) tested personal traits in an 
inventory management simulation game (sharing some communality with the 
newsvendor problem) concluding that intelligence was the strongest 
predictor of performance. Considering other individual traits such as intuition, 
training or experience, it is expected that experienced players can arrive at 
the solution of the newsvendor problem based on intuition (Bolton et al. 
2012). However, previous experiments show that both MBA students and 
professional buyers deviate from the optimal (Brown & Tang 2006).  Counter-
intuitively, experimental results suggest that years of experience for 
professionals had a negative correlation with performance while the 
managerial position had a positive correlation instead (Bolton et al. 2012). 
Looking at other behaviour that is trait compatible, such as impulsiveness, 
newsvendor performance seems to be affected by impulses (Ockenfels & 
Selten 2015) and this tendency varies significantly between individuals  
(Bolton & Katok 2008). 
Focusing on differences in professional background for two distinct groups, 
the behaviour of operating room managers working in planning is not 
significantly different to the behaviour exhibited by students, potentially 
suggesting that organisational and professional background play no role in 
the newsvendor performance (Wachtel & Dexter 2010). 
Considering attitude to risk, it has been observed how subjects cope with loss 
aversion in newsvendor problem (Sun & Xu 2015).  Comparing the risk averse 
and risk neutral newsvendors in a condition where the demand is a function 
of the price determined by the newsvendor, Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) 
found that comparing to a risk neutral newsvendor, a risk averse one will 
charge higher prices and order less when the price affects the scale of the 
distribution. However, in a condition when the change in price will only affect 
the location of the distribution the risk averse will charge a lower price 
compared to a risk neutral. 
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Performance affected by impulses, feedback and decision frequency 
Emerging from a number of distinct contributions using newsvendor, 
different authors suggest that decision and feedback frequency (Lurie & 
Swaminathan 2009), as well as impulsivity (Ockenfels & Selten 2015) are 
important for the task performance. One of the perspectives on the 
newsvendor problem was that of the fact that the ‘newsvendors are driven by 
impulses which occur whenever there is an ex post inventory error’ and that by 
constraining the standing order for a sequence of periods moves the average 
orders towards the optimum (Ockenfels & Selten 2015, p.1). This points to 
two interesting aspects, first that of impulsivity trait being potentially 
significant10 and second, to decision-frequency (or myopia) aligning with 
other contributions suggesting that less frequent interventions and longer 
commitment benefits overall performance. An alternative interpretation to ex 
post inventory error is demand chasing which is observed at the individual 
level (Kremer et al. 2010). An alternative way to improve performance was to 
offer fewer choices and placing the optimal order quantity in the middle 
rather than an extreme value leads to better performance, complementing 
the flat-maximum hypothesis. (Feng et al. 2011). Finally, restricting making 
quick decisions based on insufficiently large samples had a positive effect on 
the newsvendor performance (Bolton & Katok 2008). Again, highlighting the 
importance of individual differences, the tendency to make quick decisions 
based on insufficient data seems to vary depending on the individual level 
(Bolton & Katok 2008). This suggests two possible interpretations, first 
restrictiveness had a dampening effect on impulsivity and second it reduced 
the frequency of decisions which aligns with previous research (Ockenfels & 
Selten 2015).  
4.4.4 Newsvendor formulation 
In the newsvendor problem, the decision maker decides the order quantity of 
goods for the next selling period. The decision is on a single-period inventory 
                                                   
10 To our best knowledge no research has tested the impulsiveness trait as 
predictor of performance in the newsvendor game using a relevant scale (e.g., 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al., 1995)) 
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(Whitin 1955). The cost minimisation problem is only equivalent to profit 
maximisation when other variables external to cost minimisation are assigned 
optimal values (Whitin 1955) 
The historical demand is known and the actual demand is updated but the 
future demand is unknown. Demand is usually generated from a uniform 
distribution (Schweitzer et al. 2000; Benzion et al. 2008; Bolton & Katok 
2008; Bostian et al. 2008; Gavirneni & Isen 2009). In fact, most studies use 
uniform distribution (e.g., Schweitzer & Cachon, 2000; Bolton & Katok, 2008; 
Feng et al., 2011) and very few studies use normal distribution (Benzion et al. 
2008; Benzion et al. 2009; Moritz et al. 2013) 
In a typical formulation, the surplus (unsold inventory) has no value after the 
sales period. Behind this lies one of the basic assumptions of the newsvendor 
problem that assumes single-period decisions not influencing following 
periods as unsold stock is lost or has a salvaging cost. In the original 
newsvendor problem, the decision-maker chooses the order quantity q at the 
beginning of each selling period. D is the stochastic demand of the product 
with mean μ that is unknown before the end of the selling period. F is the 
distribution function of demand and f the density function. The two standard 
assumptions are that: (a) F is continuous, differentiable and strictly increasing, 
and (b) the decision maker has an unbiased forecast of demand distribution. 
The cost of each unit is c and selling price per unit is p, where p>c. In case of 
overstock (q>D), the salvage value of each remaining product unsold is s, 
where s<c. If the order quantity q is ordered, then min(q,D) units are sold. The 
number of unsold product is max(q-D,0). The cost of ordering is qc. Profit(q,D) 
is the realised daily profit (Eq. 1): 
 Profit(q, D) = p min(q, D) + s max(q - D, 0) - qc Eq. 1  
Optimal solution derived by Gallego (1995). From the normative perspective, 
it is assumed that the decision-maker wants to maximise profit. Therefore, 
the optimal order quantity q* per period is given by Eq. 2: 
 F(q*) = (p – c) / p Eq. 2 
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4.5 Measuring individual differences 
Measures for individual differences offer a vast array of possibilities. This 
section lists the selected question together with a brief rationale. In general, 
the selected questions and psychometric scales include particular traits that 
have been reported previously as significant. It is worth noting that due to 
plethora of possibilities the selection of scales does not aim at being 
exhaustive including every single possible scale. Instead, the rationale is to 
use questions that have been previously used in similar experiments of 
decision-making. Included psychometric scales must have been previously 
validated at least once and published in high quality academic journals. It is 
also essential for the study to keep the wording in the scales exactly as it is in 
the original publication to ensure that this research is comparable with 
previous studies and publishable. 
The aim is to measure individual differences most commonly mentioned in 
previous OR and OM literature as significant for planning-related tasks (e.g., 
forecasting, inventory management, purchasing). Table 8 provides a summary 
of the selected questions. The first part includes basic demographics together 
with some speciality questions. Follows a personality inventory (BIG five) and 
specific psychometric scales such as Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et 
al., 1995), Elaboration on Potential Outcomes (Nenkov et al., 2008) and 
General Decision Making Style (Scott & Bruce, 1995). The following sections 
will provide further detail about the selected questions to measure individual 
differences. 
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Table 8 Individual Differences Questions 
Question Pro Student Observations Also used in 
Gender 
Age 
Yes Yes Standard demographic 
questions 
(common to most, 
gender reported as 
significant in De 
Véricourt et al. 2013) 
Background 
education 
No Yes Students could be enrolled in 
different degrees. This 
question was omitted from 
the professionals 
questionnaire as it is 
potentially sensitive for 
professionals who could have 
progressed in the industrial 
career without formal 
education 
(Franken & Muris 2005; 
Bolton & Katok 2008; 
Bolton et al. 2012; 
Moritz et al. 2013) 
Managerial 
Level 
Yes No Managers could be junior, 
middle and upper 
Active student 
of L&SCM (or 
related)  
No Yes Students enrolled in speciality 
degrees such as Logistics and 
Supply Chain Management (or 
related) are assumed to have 
theoretical knowledge of DP 
Experience (in 
Planning) 
Yes No If the subject has experience 
in planning and if so how 
many years. Assumed not 
applicable to students. 
Sector Yes No Which sector they work in, 
for sample descriptive 
purposes 
(Moritz et al. 2013) 
BIG Five 
(mIPIP) 
Yes Yes See 6.7Appendix A (Donnellan et al. 2006) 
Elaboration on 
Potential 
outcomes 
(EPO) 
Yes Yes See 6.7Appendix B (Nenkov et al., 2008) 
Barrat 
Impulsiveness 
Scale (BIS) 
Yes Yes See 6.7Appendix C (Patton et al., 1995) 
Global 
Decision 
Making Style 
(GDMS) 
Yes Yes See 6.7Appendix D (Scott & Bruce, 1995) 
There are many different versions of questionnaires to measure personality 
traits. The Big Five, being one of the most commonly used and is composed 
of 60 questions. In order to make the assessment quicker, several reduced 
versions have been suggested (e.g., Gosling et al. 2003; Donnellan et al. 2006)  
The Mini International Personality Item Pool (mIPIP) was designed and 
successfully validated both as a 10 item and a 20 item version to assess the 
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original constellation of traits defined by the Five Factor Theory of 
Personality  (Donnellan et al. 2006). The full list of questions can be consulted 
in 6.7Appendix A. 
One of the most basic individual differences are demographic-type items (e.g., 
gender, age). In line with previous studies (e.g., Haigh & List 2005; Brown & 
Tang 2006; Bolton & Katok 2008; Kremer et al. 2011; Moritz et al. 2013), 
some basic demographic questions are included together with some context 
specific questions. Worth noting, that professionals and students had two 
different sets of demographic questions.  
To capture exposure, the assumption is that L&SCM students have 
theoretical exposure of DP while professionals have practical exposure. 
There was no control over which modules students attended and their results. 
Nor a knowledge test was performed to verify their theoretical knowledge. 
This can potentially constitute a limitation. If the assumption about 
theoretical exposure is incorrect, there will be no difference between 
students from specialised degrees (e.g., L&SCM) and students from any other 
degree (e.g., Art History). This is intrinsically incorporated in the exposure 
hypothesis that will be tested further. 
4.6 Experimental design 
4.6.1 Experimental design overview 
The experiment was made up of two parts, first an incentivised decision 
making experiment and second a questionnaire (with students) and a survey 
(with professionals). It was carried out under the ethical approval by the 
Biomedical & Scientific Research Ethics Committee (BSREC) with reference 
REGO-2016-1736. 
The methodological approach used in the study consists of two separate 
stages that should not be viewed as a unified randomized control trial. The 
main objective of the study is to test the MLA hypothesis via treatments to 
the decision-frequency relying on system’s restrictiveness or systems 
guidance against a control group.  
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Table 9 Population and its sub-groups 
Population Incentives 
Students Incentivised decision making experiment 
Questionnaire 
Professionals Survey 
The study targets two populations (listed in Table 9), students and 
professionals. Stage 1 of the study, relies on the methodology of a laboratory 
experiment where participants (all students at the university of Warwick) 
either participate in the incentivised decision making experiment (with 
monetary compensation) or a non-incentivised survey (without monetary 
compensation). Stage 2 uses a methodology of a framed field experiment in a 
form of a non-incentivised survey conducted with professionals. Worth 
noting that although stage 2 is a non-incentivised survey, it is important to 
distinguish that there is no performance-based monetary compensation. To 
attract participants to the study a non-monetary incentive for all interested is 
offered regardless of their performance. 
The experimental design follows the approach of a seminal paper on 
comparison between laboratory and field experiments proposed by Haigh 
and List (2005) which since have been used in numerous top-published 
papers in business, management, economics, and social psychology literature. 
One of the aims is to compare behaviour of professionals with that of 
students in a non-incentivized (survey) setting using the Newsvendor task. 
4.6.2 Incentives 
In the previous literature on Newsvendor task, the behaviour of participants 
was measured sometimes in incentivised experiments and sometimes in non-
incentivized surveys. While student behaviour in incentivised experiments 
and non-incentivised surveys appears to be similar, the first contribution of 
this study to the existing literature (achieved in stage 1) is to provide a 
comparison between these two conditions. The hypothesis is that providing 
incentives will not make any difference: i.e., it is expected to obtain similar 
results in incentivised experiment and non-incentivised survey. Should results 
in incentivised experiment be different from results in a survey, it would be 
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necessary to conduct an additional (incentivised study) with professionals. 
Conducting an incentivised experiment is not the main aim of the proposed 
research. 
Another rationale for conducting non-incentivized study with professionals is 
that while the budget11 allows to offer sufficiently large monetary incentive 
to students (i.e., on average £10 per 30 minutes of work), this rate will not be 
sufficient to incentivise professionals who have much higher hourly rates. 
Much research in economics and social psychology  (see e.g., Gneezy et al., 
2011; Camerer et al., 2011) shows that in a field setting (when approaching 
professionals) much cleaner (less noisy) results were obtained when 
professional were asked to participate in non-incentivised (non-paid) surveys 
rather than in incentivised (paid) experiments. In this case, this research 
follows a well-established approach replicated in numerous studies. 
4.6.3 Target sample size 
For sample size calculation, the assumption is to work with approximately two 
standard deviation points, i.e., a minimum of 30 participants per treatment 
each providing 152 replies/observations in order to ensure statistical 
significance. Therefore, in order to reach the necessary statistical significance, 
it is necessary to recruit a sample size of at least 30 people per treatment.  In 
total, the study must include at least 180 students for three treatments (90 
paid and 90 non-paid) and 60 professionals (considering two-treatments). 
This follows the main principles proposed by List et al. (2011) of 
economics/social psychology experiment design principles which is based on 
maximizing the propensity of obtaining statistical significance. 
4.6.4 Experimental treatments 
The methodology of behavioural experiment was used by the core 
contribution by Haigh and List (2005) on MLA comparing laboratory and field 
                                                   
11 Financial support for the study was provided by the Research Councils 
UK/Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council grant EPL023911/1 
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experiments. The treatments are set to detect the presence of in DP. These 
treatments allow testing both Hypothesis 1 and 2 via comparison of means 
using Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) and Kruskal-Wallis Tests (KW Test). 
Variations in treatment represent different DP policies via either system 
restrictiveness or system guidance (refer to Silver 1991), the base line has 
neither guidance nor restrictiveness. The following Haigh and List (2005) 
variation between treatments regards to frequency of decisions (or 
commitment length). The relationship between commitment period and 
decision frequency is inverse. Key differences from Haigh and List (2005) 
treatments is that first, feedback frequency is not altered, i.e., participants 
receive feedback each period; and second, a hybrid situation where 
participants are offered a recommendation and can choose to keep the 
previous decision or adjust it. 
Table 10 Summary of experimental treatments 
Treatment Policy Decision 
Frequency 
Commitment Decision 
Support 
Description 
T1 None High Short n.a. Baseline when subjects 
can make decisions each 
period without 
restrictiveness or 
guidance 
T2 Binding Low Long System’s 
Restrictiveness 
Subjects can only make 
decisions each third 
period, forced to order the 
same volume three times 
T3 Non-
binding 
Varied Hybrid  Decisional 
Guidance 
Subjects are 
recommended to make 
decisions make decisions 
each third period but have 
the possibility of adjusting 
their choice 
Each participant is assigned to a different treatment randomly when starting 
the experiment. Demand planners in treatment one can make decisions each 
period (Short Commitment) which also corresponds to high frequency 
decisions. In treatment two, planners make decisions three in three periods 
forced to keep the previous decision for second and third periods (Long 
Commitment) corresponding to low decision frequency. Finally, the third 
treatment consists of a hybrid situation where planners are recommended to 
keep the original decision for second and third rounds (Hybrid commitment) 
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so the decision frequency varies. Considering DP policy (decision support) 
terminology, the three treatments can be referred to as unrestricted policy, 
restricted policy and guiding policy. The three treatments are summarised in 
Table 10 and represented in relation to planning periods in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21 Representation of the experimental treatments 
One particularity of the experiment in this study is that participants are 
primed with a forecast in all three treatments. They are instructed that the 
system’s recommendation is a fixed amount per period. Unknown to 
participants is the fact that the recommended volume per period is the 
optimal solution to the problem. This is done to represent a common situation 
in practice when the system offers a recommendation and managers can 
either follow it or dismiss it. Since the problem focuses on mistrust, second-
guessing and unnecessary reactions the provided recommendation must be 
the best possible to detect whether participants trust the recommendation 
considering all the information they have available. 
4.6.5 Measuring performance and individual differences 
The experimental task consists of a DP task (based on a modified newsvendor 
problem) where participants will be asked to plan consumer demand and 
make planning decisions. The survey is programmed in a web-based software 
Qualtrics. The experimental task was programmed from scratch along with 
the user interface (HTML), the Java Script code can be seen in 6.7Appendix F 
and the graphical interface together with the instructions in 6.7Appendix G. 
Considering user feedback and the discussion between the advantages of 
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tabular versus graphical feedback, the decision was to include both in an 
interactive format. Participants had access to numerical feedback as well as a 
detailed graphical representation of the past demand and their decisions in a 
double-bar chart. The time-series graphic allowed zooming in and out, 
provided numerical feedback with mouse overlay. The participant is first 
presented with 9 practice rounds that do not count for the total profit, which 
is clearly identified in the interface in bold and red type font, followed by 30 
decision rounds that count for the total profit. Feedback is provided after 
each round in a numeric and graphical format. However, the number of 
decisions they make during the 39 rounds will depend on which one of the 
three treatments they are assigned to at random when they launch the 
experiment. The number of rounds is decided based on multiples of three 
(following Haigh and List, 2005) with a relatively few practice periods, set to 
be less than one fourth of the total length of the experiment to mitigate 
learning biases and ‘video-gaming’ effect (Strohhecker & Größler 2013). The 
number of periods in previous applications of newsvendor problems varies 
significantly, ranging from 15 decision periods (e.g., Schweitzer & Cachon 
2000) extending up to 100 periods (e.g., Bolton & Katok 2004). Greater 
number of periods allows greater experience which positively affects 
performance, however the improvement is on average very slow (Bolton & 
Katok 2004). Hence, the number of rounds was set to 30 for this experiment. 
Periods are abstract successive measures of time and are not timed to avoid 
inducing any time pressure to allow careful reasoning for as long as necessary 
(following suggestion in Größler 2004). Task information is kept standard, 
including standard provided in previous newsvendor settings (Benzion et al. 
2008). In order to keep this as close to real-life situation as possible, 
characterisation of the demand distribution is excluded in order to address 
some of the main criticisms about unrealistic information in decision making 
experiments (e.g., Davern et al. 2008). Previous research shows that providing 
participants with the underlying demand distribution does not improve 
performance nor does it bring closer to the optimal solution (Benzion et al. 
2009). In order to provide participants with some exposure to the underlying 
demand, practice rounds are provided. 
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After completing the DP task, participants are presented with some 
demographic questions and asked to answer several questions about their 
personality preferences using self-reporting scales12. For this, already 
validated and approved psychometric scales are used. They include the mIPIP 
(Donnellan et al. 2006) which can be consulted in 6.7Appendix A. Regarding 
specific personality constructs, it is included Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) 
(Patton et al. 1995) available in 6.7Appendix C, Elaboration on Potential 
Outcomes (EPO) (Nenkov et al. 2008) listed in 6.7Appendix B and finally, 
General Decision Making Style (GDMS) (Scott & Bruce 1995) as in 
6.7Appendix D.  
The above measures are used to test hypothesis about the contribution of 
individual differences to DP performance in the hybrid treatment (where 
participants have a choice). Specifically, to test hypothesis 3, 3A, 3B, 3C and 
3D outlined in Chapter 3. This is achieved using regression analysis since all 
variables are numeric continuous. The main reason to choose regression 
analysis is that its outputs are easy to interpret. It is also one of the most 
commonly used analysis in the fields of psychology and economics. 
4.6.6 Information sheets 
In stage 1 of the study, students will be selected at random either to 
participate in an incentivised experiment or in non-incentivised survey 
through Decision Research at Warwick (DR@W) online recruitment system 
SONA13 which to date has 1521 eligible participants who enrol in the study 
voluntarily. Much literature in economics and social psychology describes the 
dangers of changing the experimental information due to the so-called 
‘procedural invariance’ effect (e.g., Loomes & Pogrebna, 2015). In previous 
studies with Newsvendor task, researchers either provided incentives or did 
not provide incentives and did not explain why incentives are provided or not. 
In fact, the mere mention of incentive provision in one group and no such 
                                                   
12 Scales selected from the list of well-defined and accepted and previously 
validated psychological scales listed on  http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/ and 
http://ipip.ori.org/ 
13 SONA https://warwick.sona-systems.com/default.aspx 
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provision in the other group can change participants’ behaviour that (a) will 
make it impossible to compare the results of this study with existing results 
reported in the previous literature and, ultimately, (b) make this research 
unpublishable. For example, the results may be contaminated with envy 
considerations exhibited by participants in non-incentivized survey. The 
present study, therefore, relies on two separate Electronic Information 
Sheets (e.g., 6.7Appendix H) – one explaining the incentive provision (for paid 
experiment) and the other explaining the terms of participation in a non-
incentivized survey. Participants are assigned randomly to either experiment 
or survey but then, in the invitation, are informed about all conditions of 
participation – i.e., all participants (in either experiment or survey) are fully 
informed about the conditions of participation and decide whether they want 
or do not want to take part. Therefore, participants in both experiment and 
survey have full information to provide informed consent. Participation in 
both experiment and survey is voluntary and participants can withdraw at any 
point in time. 
4.6.7 Informed consent and anonymity 
The consent for participation is gathered by requesting participants consent 
in the beginning of the survey (6.7Appendix I) where relevant information 
about the study is provided, allowing acceptance to continue or not. By 
pursuing with the experiment the participant is giving his/hers informed 
consent. This study uses an online consent form. 
All data from the experiment is anonymised and answers are not associated 
with any personal information (name, address, etc.) from the participants. 
Participants will not receive any information about results and identities of 
other participants in this study. Participants’ email addresses (should such 
addresses be provided for individual feedback) will be kept separate from the 
study data. All email addresses will be deleted after individual feedback is 
provided. The email address (if supplied) might reveal some personal 
information. The study data will include only an identification number for 
each participant. Once the questionnaire has been submitted, the data cannot 
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be retrieved. However, if the participant opts to provide their email address, 
the record can be retrieved and deleted upon request. 
4.6.8 Experimental procedure 
The experiments are conducted online. The payments to the incentivised 
group of students (paid) is made to participants confidentially and in cash in 
person at the end of the experiment at agreed times between experimenters 
and participants. The earnings in the experiment are performance-based (the 
greater the total profit, the more they will earn). The estimate is that the mean 
earnings in the experiment to be 10 GBP that is equivalent to the standard 
experimental participation rate in the University of Warwick. The 
experimental task performance is measured in experimental tokens, which 
are converted into a monetary value (GBP) using a non-linear formula (Eq. 3). 
 
£ 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
(
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
10 000 )
3
2
 
Eq. 3 
Participants' personal data is confidentialised and unlinked, i.e., each 
participant is assigned a confidential ID number and participants' name 
and/or mail address is never associated with the data provided in 
experiments. 
After results from the laboratory experiments are obtained and analysed, the 
proposed treatments will be repeated with actual planners (professionals) in 
the field experiment. Although professionals are expected to participate in a 
non-incentivised survey, there is still compensation offered. Practitioners are 
offered individual feedback and/or access to research report and findings, 
where participants can choose either or both. This optional compensation to 
professionals is offered just for participating regardless of their performance 
that should not be confused with performance-based monetary 
incentivisation used with students. Actual planners receive an invitation 
(6.7Appendix J) to take part in the online study along with the link to the 
experiment, attached to the mail invitation comes a sample individual report 
(6.7Appendix K). The recruitment of planners is done through the SCIP 
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network14, so participants will be directly invited to be part of the study. To 
broaden the reach of the call, invitation to participate in the experiment is 
disseminated across speciality groups around O&SCM particularly groups 
focused on planning. A full list of targeted groups can be consulted in 
6.7Appendix E. 
4.6.9 Eligibility criteria 
Through all the treatments and groups it is applied the principle of non-
discrimination: i.e., participants are not selected based on their gender, age, 
ethnicity or any other characteristic. It is required however, that all 
participants are adults of 18 years of age or older so that they could provide 
informed consent to study participation themselves. The online consent form 
(6.7Appendix I) is displayed in the beginning of the survey and the participant 
is informed explicitly that by continuing he or she agrees to its terms. The 
participants are expected to speak English sufficiently well to understand 
experimental instructions. These restrictions are clearly communicated to all 
potential participants prior to the study. Information about the study is 
provided in an Information Sheet (6.7Appendix H) that the participant can 
access at the beginning of the study. 
4.6.10 Other ethical considerations: Risks and Benefits 
This experiment is low-risk. It is non-invasive and only uses a survey based 
on a simple planning task and questions build from the list of well-defined and 
accepted psychological scales listed on http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/ and 
http://ipip.ori.org/. 
The data will be electronically stored on the University of Warwick secure 
server equipped with the latest safe authentication methodology and secure 
TLS tunnel for a period of ten years. 
The major risk would be if Qualtrics servers are hacked and someone gains 
access to the data, similarly to if someone breaks into WMG offices at 
                                                   
14  http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/sci/wmg/research/scip/ 
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University of Warwick and gets hold of the hard drive containing the raw 
data. Yet, these potential risks are minor since both Qualtrics and the 
University of Warwick have excellent cybersecurity rating and the 
precedence of confidentiality loss due to hacking have never happened 
before. 
There are no immediate direct benefits to student participants in this 
research. However, this research will provide an opportunity to better 
understand how personality traits affect planning ability that will benefit the 
academic knowledge as well as industrial practice. Planners who take part in 
the field experiment may directly benefit from this research, as they will be 
able to understand how their personality affects their efficiency at work. 
4.6.11 Experimental flow 
Finally, the experiment follows the logic illustrated in Figure 22. At the very 
beginning after the information sheet and informed consent, the participant 
is assigned at random to one of the three experimental treatments. The 
participant is unaware of the alternative treatments. After the completion of 
the task, the participant responds to a questionnaire collecting and measuring 
data on individual differences. Two alternative sets of demographic questions 
are available, one for students and another for professionals. Follows four 
psychometric scales. The task is estimated to last from 15 to 30 minutes. At 
the end of the survey the participant (in the voluntary survey) can provide a 
mail contact and choose if he or she wishes to receive the individual report 
and/or access to a report on the main findings of the study. 
 
Figure 22 Experiment design 
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4.7 Chapter summary 
The problem of sub-optimal DP decisions is partly attributed to behavioural 
issues considering both the individual as well as its relation with the decision 
support. To test the MLA and individual differences hypothesis an experiment 
is set following decision-making experiment methodology and relying on 
previously validated and widely accepted psychometric scales. The 
experiment targeted three distinct groups: professional and two groups of 
non-professionals (majority students) which parted in incentivised and non-
incentivised groups. The experimental task is a modified newsvendor problem 
with unknown demand distribution but priming via a recommended order 
quantity (forecast) for each period with the optimum. The chosen uniform 
distribution is demand with equal probability of occurrence from 1 to 300 on 
a high-profit product (price of 12 and cost of 3) where the respective 
optimum planned volume is 225 per period. Participants go through 9 
practice rounds followed by 30 rounds. The number of decisions made 
depend on the randomly assigned treatment at the beginning of the 
experiment. First treatment participants make decisions each period, second 
treatment participants are forced to keep the previous decision for second 
and third periods, and finally third treatment participants are recommended 
to keep the previous decision over to second and third periods. This 
corresponds to no decision support, system restrictiveness and decisional 
guidance respectively. Alternatively, considering commitment and decision 
frequency to high frequency short commitment, low frequency long 
commitment and finally varied frequency and optional commitment. The first 
and second treatments are designed to detect MLA while the third is 
expected to highlight potential personality traits affecting decision due to 
either offering a choice to follow or not the recommendation. 
After the experimental task participants answer two distinct demographic 
question sets (for professionals and non-professionals) followed by common 
psychometric scales and personality inventory. Personality is measured using 
Mini-IPIP - Mini International Personality Item Pool (Donnellan et al., 2006) 
composed of 20 questions measuring measures 5 constructs (4 questions 
each). The measured constructs are: (a) Extraversion; (b) Agreeableness; (c) 
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Conscientiousness; (d) Emotional Stability and; (e) Imagination. Impulsiveness 
is measured using BIS - Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al., 1995) over 
30 questions. The BIS questions measure 3 first order constructs with 6 
second order constructs (2 each). Follows EPO - Elaboration on Potential 
Outcomes (Nenkov et al., 2008) with 13 questions to measure 3 constructs 
(6, 3 and 4 questions per construct). Finally, GDMS - General Decision Making 
Style (Scott & Bruce, 1995) uses 25 questions to measure 5 constructs (5 
questions each construct). The questionnaire finishes with the suggestion to 
leave a contact address so individual feedback and early access to results can 
be sent back if the participant wishes so. On overall, the experiment is 
estimated to last 15 minutes on average. 
This thesis contributes methodologically to the newsvendor problem 
literature with an innovative design. The newsvendor problem allows 
variation of the planning horizon/ decision frequency. Treatments are 
enforced via different DP policy. Finally, the experimental design 
incorporates personality inventories and psychometric scales which has not 
been tested before with the newsvendor problem. 
This research is carried out under the ethics approval from Biomedical & 
Scientific Research Ethics Committee (BSREC) reference REGO-2016-1736. 
The following chapter reports on the results and analysis. 
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5 Results and analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
Following the previously defined research design, the following section 
focuses on the results and analysis. The structure of Chapter 5 is outlined in 
Table 11. After this introduction, the resulting sample is broken into groups 
based on professional background, incentives and education. The 
performance of incentivised and non-incentivised groups is compared 
followed by the analysis of performance across treatments to validate the 
MLA hypothesis. Finally, the analysis focuses on the hybrid treatment to 
observe what are the traits predicting performance. This is done for 
sophisticated students (L&SCM students), professionals and overall. 
Table 11 Chapter 6 structure 
Section Overview 
5.2 Overview of the framework 
and experimental treatments 
The previously defined framework is reviewed because it 
provides the structure for the analysis 
5.3 Resulting experimental  Provides a summary of the participants and the sub-
groups. A total of 339 participants after clearing 
incomplete responses with 222 students and 117 non 
students of which 84 are professional planners. 
5.4 Incentives and performance As the choice of incentives is deeply rooted into decision-
making, one of the first analysis concerns the effect of 
incentives on performance. 
5.5 Performance between 
treatments 
The performance between treatments is analysed across 
groups and treatments 
5.6 Individual differences as 
predictors of performance in 
hybrid treatment 
Focusing on the human and system interactions the 
analysis of the hybrid treatment (optional policy) 
participants allows the understanding of what attributes 
are predictors of performance. The analysis is first done 
over the sophisticated students, followed by professional 
planners and finishes with an overview of individual 
differences and performance 
5.2 Overview of the framework and experimental 
treatments 
The conceptual framework with the hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 23. 
Following the descriptive analysis of the resulting samples, performance is 
compared between treatments and between groups to test Hypothesis 1, 
Hypothesis 2 and partially Hypothesis 3 (H3A). Regression analysis is then 
used to understand differences in performance in the hybrid treatment. This 
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allows testing the remaining of Hypothesis 3 (including H3B, H3C and H3D) 
focusing on individual differences and personality traits. 
 
Figure 23 Conceptual Framework, Experimental treatments and hypothesis 
5.3 Resulting experimental sample  
Overall, 339 participants took part in the study (see Figure 24). The ultimate 
goal was to understand whether and to what extent professional planners 
were prone to MLA and whether MLA could explain planners’ decisions. 
However, it was also important to conduct a baseline study with a sample of 
‘naïve’ people. Naïve people did not have previous exposure to planning tasks. 
The aim was to later compare naïve with professionals. The average number 
of years of experience for professional planners was approximately 10 years 
and 4 months. For the purposes of this study, the recruited ‘naïve’ people 
were students who did not have planning experience in the industry. 
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Therefore, of the 339 participants, 222 were students at the University of 
Warwick while 117 were non-students (professional planners, consultants, 
non-academic researchers, and other people who did not belong to the 
student population).  
 
Figure 24 Study Overview: Sample and Incentives 
To introduce several layers of comparison with professionals, two types of 
individuals are distinguished within student sample: ‘naïve’ and ‘sophisticated’. 
Naïve students did not have any exposure to planning tasks before while 
sophisticated students were majoring in Logistics and Supply Chain 
Management (L&SCM) and, therefore, could have been familiarised with 
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Other 
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planning contexts within the frame of their educational programme. Since 
both types of students did not have practical experience in planning, having 
both naïve and sophisticated group of unexperienced subjects allowed not 
only to compare experienced (professional planners) and unexperienced 
(students) samples, but also to understand which of the two factors - 
theoretical or practical knowledge of planning - affects planning performance. 
By theoretical knowledge, it is meant education in Logistics or SCM which 
was the main differentiating characteristic of sophisticated students in the 
study. By practical knowledge, it is meant first-hand industrial experience in 
planning which was the main distinguishing characteristic of professional 
planners in the study.  
Naïve and sophisticated students were compared with the sample of 
sophisticated non-students - professional planners (84 participants).  It was 
also collected data from 33 non-student participants. However, their 
background was both too diverse to be combined in one sample. This 
subsample of participants included non-planners from industry, SCM 
researchers, and SCM consultants. It was also too vague to understand 
whether their exposure to planning allowed classifying them either as naïve 
or as sophisticated non-students. It was often unclear whether researchers 
and consultants had practical planning experience in industry.  Therefore, 
observations from these 33 individuals were excluded from the analysis. The 
resulting subject pool consisted of 306 participants. Amongst these 306, 
three samples are distinguished: naïve students (166); sophisticated students 
(56), and professional planners (84). 
A non-incentivised survey with professional planners was used because it 
would be difficult to design monetary incentives that would be sufficient to 
properly incentivise professional planners in the experimental planning task 
(newsvendor problem). The goal was to compare the performance and 
behaviour of professional planners with naïve and sophisticated students in 
non-incentivised study. However, since the unexperienced sample was 
student sample and the overwhelming majority of studies with students used 
incentive-compatible mechanisms, it was important to understand whether 
behaviour in incentivised setting was different from non-incentivised setting. 
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Hence, it is introduced incentivised and non-incentivised variations of 
planning task for naïve students’ sample in order to (i) have a good comparison 
of the results with previous literature and (ii) understand whether monetary 
incentives made a difference for performance in planning task. In other 
words, it is not the purpose of this study to compare experienced and 
unexperienced participants under incentivised and non-incentivised 
conditions. Rather, the aim is to test the theory of MLA in planning decisions 
under different time horizons with experienced agents (professionals), 
controlling (a) for the role of experience (comparison with naïve students) and 
education (comparison with sophisticated students) as well as (b) for the role 
of incentives (comparison between incentivised and non-incentivised 
implementation of planning task). 
In the following analysis, the measure of total profit (payoff) obtained by 
participants in the planning task (either real monetary profit or hypothetical 
profit) is used as a measure of performance in the planning task. This total 
profit, therefore, is the dependent variable in all estimations reported below 
(unless specified otherwise). 
5.4 Incentives and performance 
The analysis starts with the population widely studied in the previous 
literature: a sample of students without previous planning experience that is 
called ‘naïve’ students. A total of  109 received an incentivised planning task 
and 57 received the same planning task as a hypothetical (non-incentivised) 
problem. 
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Table 12 Naïve Students: Comparison of Incentivised and Non-Incentivised Experiment 
Treatment Incentivised 
(N participants, mean 
profit  and standard 
deviation in points) 
Non-incentivised 
(N participants, mean 
profit  and standard 
deviation in points) 
Mann-Whitney- 
Wilcoxon test 
results 
Short 32 24,683.91  
(3,639.01) 
21 25,108.00  
(2,523.54) 
z = 0.364 
p = 0.7161 
Long 41 26,660.63  
(3,301.98) 
12 27,104.75  
(1,944.97) 
z = -0.234 
p = 0.8152 
Hybrid 36 24,040.33  
(4,250.46) 
24 23,627.00  
(2,748.06) 
z = -0.573 
p = 0.5664 
Total 109 25,214.89  
3,876.98 
57 24,904.79   
(2,805.61) 
z = -0.889 
p = 0.3738 
Table 12 shows that in the sample of naïve students provision of monetary 
incentives does not influence performance in the planning task. This is true 
both for the overall comparison of profits of participants who completed the 
planning task with (109) and without (57) incentives (Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon, or MWW, test p=0.3738) and for each of the three treatments: 
Short (MWW test p=0.7161), Long (MWW test p=0.8152), and Hybrid 
(MWW test p=0.5664). Since there are no statistically significant differences 
between performance in the planning task with and without incentives, the 
data for all naïve students can be pooled. Both incentivised and non-
incentivised data can be used for comparison with other experimental 
samples (sophisticated students and professional planners).   
Since the difference between incentivised and non-incentivised planning 
tasks is not statistically significant in the most neutral sample in the 
experiment, no statistically significant differences in other samples are 
expected. In order to confirm the conjecture, a series of comparisons are 
conducted between performances of the incentivised planning task versus 
non-incentivised task among all samples. In other words, performance of 109 
naïve students who received the incentivised planning task was compared 
with all other samples - naïve students (57), sophisticated students (56) and 
professional planners (84) - who played without incentives (197 participants 
in total). No statistically significant differences are found (a) between 
incentivised and all non-incentivised samples taken together (109 vs 197 
participants, MWW test p = 0.1315). Similarly, no statistically significant 
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differences are found (b) by treatment (all MWW test probabilities are greater 
than 0.06). This analysis allows to pool data obtained from incentivised and 
non-incentivised planning tasks together to conduct further analysis. 
5.5 Performance between treatments 
The following analysis focuses on experimental treatments and testing of the 
hypotheses. As explained above, the following three following samples are 
considered: naïve students (pooled together across incentivised and non-
incentivised variations of the planning task); sophisticated students (students 
majoring in SCM and/or logistics who completed non-incentivised planning 
task), and sophisticated non-students (professional planners who also took 
part in non-incentivised planning task). A series of non-parametric tests are 
conducted to (i) test whether and to what extent different evaluation periods 
(restricted by policy) influence performance and (ii) how different samples in 
the experiment react to changes in policy. Results of the analysis are reported 
in Table 13. 
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Table 13 Comparison of Performance in Planning Task by Treatment and Sample 
Treatment Sample Total MWW & Kruskal-Wallis 
Test results Naïve 
students 
Sophisticated 
students 
Sophisticated 
non-students 
Short 24,851.94  
(3,222.99)    
24,669.00         
N=53 
25,921.58  
(3,073.68)     
25,896.00         
N=19 
24,372.00  
(3,181.95)    
24,195.00         
N=20 
24,968.51   
(3,192.85)     
24,864.00        
N=92 
Naïve students vs Sophisticated 
students: z= -1.207 p= 0.2273 
Sophisticated students vs 
sophisticated non-students: 
z= 1.447 p= 0.1478 
Naïve students vs sophisticated 
non-students: z= 0.495 p= 0.6208 
Kruskal-Wallis test:  
chi-squared = 2.239 p= 0.3264 
Long 26761.19   
(3,036.84)     
27,552.00         
N=53 
28,373.31   
(2,303.58)     
28,695.00         
N=13 
27,138.50  
(2,979.78)    
27,975.00         
N=36 
27,099.82  
(2,953.81)   
27,892.50       
N=102 
Naïve students vs Sophisticated 
students: z= -2.056 p= 0.0398 
Sophisticated students vs 
sophisticated non-students:  
z= 1.585 p= 0.1129 
Naïve students vs sophisticated 
non-students: z = -0.660 p = 
0.5090 
Kruskal-Wallis test:  
chi-squared = 4.349 p= 0.1137 
Hybrid 23875.00  
(3,701.76)   
23,860.50        
N=60 
27,574.13  
(2,118.48)   
27,922.50        
N=24 
25,095.75  
(3,941.80)    
24,498.00         
N=28 
24,972.86  
(3,756.51)     
25,371.00       
N=112 
Naïve students vs Sophisticated 
students: z= -4.624 p= 0.0000 
Sophisticated students vs 
sophisticated non-students:  
z= 2.331 p= 0.0197 
Naïve students vs sophisticated 
non-students: z= -1.407 p= 0.1596 
Kruskal-Wallis test:  
chi-squared = 20.123 p = 0.0001 
Total 
 
25,108.41  
(3,540.03) 
25,350.00 
N=166 
27,198.96  
(2,660.36) 
27,757.50 
N=56 
25,798.89  
(3,542.90)   
26,131.50 
N=84 
25,680.54  
(3,475.19)   
26,053.50 
N=306 
Naïve students vs Sophisticated 
students: z= -4.043 p= 0.0001 
Sophisticated students vs 
sophisticated non-students:  
z= 2.233 p= 0.0255 
Naïve students vs sophisticated 
non-students: z= -1.697 p= 0.0897 
Kruskal-Wallis test:  
chi-squared = 16.519 p = 0.0003 
MWW 
test  
results 
Short vs  
Long:  
z= -3.153  
p= 0.0016 
Long vs  
Hybrid: 
z= 4.355 
p= 0.0000 
Short vs  
Hybrid: 
z= 1.602 
p= 0.1091 
Short vs  
Long: 
z = -2.436 
p = 0.0148 
Long vs  
Hybrid: 
z= 1.575 
p= 0.1153 
Short vs  
Hybrid: 
z= -1.883 
p= 0.0597 
Short vs  
Long: 
z= -3.300 
p= 0.0010 
Long vs  
Hybrid: 
z= 2.098 
p= 0.0359 
Short vs  
Hybrid: 
z= -0.544 
p= 0.5866 
Short vs  
Long: 
z= -4.930 
p= 0.0000 
Long vs 
Hybrid: 
z= 4.493 
p= 0.0000 
Short vs 
Hybrid: 
z= -0.116 
p= 0.9080 
 
* Each cell of the table shows mean profit (standard deviation), median profit, and N number 
of participants. 
First, the difference between different treatments is considered. It is obvious 
from Table 13 that performance of study participants in the long treatment is 
better than that in other treatments. Indeed, the overall results (across all 3 
samples) show that participants earn more points in the Long treatment 
(27,099.82) than in the Short treatment (24,968.51). This difference is 
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statistically significant (MWW p=0.0000). This result confirms Hypothesis 1 
that says that: Planning performance in the planning option Long will be better 
than that in the planning option Short (i.e., planners will achieve higher profit in 
Long compared to Short). 
Performance in the Long treatment (across all samples) is also better than that 
in the Hybrid treatment (24,972.86). This difference is also statistically 
significant (MWW p=0.0000). However, there is no statistically significant 
differences between the Short treatment and the Hybrid treatment (MWW 
p=0.9080). These results partially confirm Hypothesis 2 that says that factors 
other than treatment variation is likely to influence performance in the Hybrid 
treatment. Yet, this result also suggests that, across all samples, participants 
react to policy: restricting the planning period to Long evaluation (binding 
policy) helps to improve planning performance and earn higher 
profit/minimise losses.  
The comparison of different samples shows results that are more interesting. 
In the Short treatment (KWallis test p=0.3264) and the Long treatment 
(KWallis test p=0.1137) performance is similar among all three samples in this 
study (naïve students, sophisticated students, and professional planners). This 
suggests that irrespective of theoretical and practical exposure to planning, 
policy equally influences performance of sophisticated and naïve people. 
Restricting evaluation period increases performance in all samples, while 
unrestricting leads to overadjustment in all samples. However, in the Hybrid 
treatment samples are dissimilar (KWallis test p=0.0001): specifically, 
sophisticated students seem to perform better than both naïve students 
(MWW p=0.0000) and professional planners (MWW p=0.0197). At the same 
time, the difference between performance of professional planners and naïve 
students in the Hybrid treatment is not statistically significant (MWW 
p=0.1596). This pattern from the Hybrid treatment also drives test results 
across all treatments where professionals and naïve students also appear 
similar and sophisticated students show better performance. Looking at 
between-treatment comparisons within each sample helps to explain this 
result (see last row in Table 13). 
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Results conducted for each sample separately show that naïve students and 
professionals behave as if the Hybrid treatment is similar to the Short 
treatment and dissimilar to the Long treatment, while sophisticated students 
behave as if Hybrid treatment is similar to the Long treatment and dissimilar 
to the Short treatment. Since the Long treatment improves performance, 
sophisticated students outperform other samples in the Hybrid treatment 
because they are mimicking the Long treatment in the Hybrid treatment while 
other samples are mimicking the Short treatment in the Hybrid treatment (see 
Table 13 for test results). 
This partially confirms Hypothesis 3 and fully confirms Hypothesis 3-A. 
Overall, the analysis shows that all participants are influenced by policy: the 
Long evaluation period improves performance which is consistent with the 
MLA hypothesis. At the same time, sophisticated students (Theory planners) 
perform better than other samples (Naïve planners and Practice planners), 
yet, this performance difference is primarily due to their behaviour in the 
Hybrid treatment. Sophisticated students (Theory Planners) seem to be better 
than other samples because in the Hybrid treatment they behave similarly to 
the Long treatment which is consistent with the Exposure-Performance 
Matrix and Hypothesis 3-A. In the next sections, it is explored whether other 
individual characteristics influence planning performance and test 
hypotheses 3-B, 3-C, and 3-D. 
5.6 Individual differences as predictors of performance in 
hybrid treatment 
The aim of following analysis is to understand what individual differences can 
explain variation in performance in the Hybrid treatment since variation in 
the Short and the Long treatments can be fully captures by MLA and policy 
(as proved by the non-parametric analysis reported above). The same three 
samples are considered: naïve students; sophisticated students (L&SCM 
students), and sophisticated non-students (professional planners). It was 
previously observed that sophisticated students significantly outperform 
both the naïve subjects and the professional planners, while naïve subjects 
and professional planners perform similarly. 
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Each participant provided 30 decisions; the quality of these decisions 
determined the total profit. Naïve interventionism is calculated as the mean 
absolute deviations in the planned demand volumes. The assumption is that 
the rational approach is to maintain the optimal and stick to the suggested 
forecast without deviations.  The task was followed by a questionnaire 
developed to capture individual differences. The Big 5, EPO, BIS and GDMS 
all provide numeric scores derived from Likert scales for its constructs and 
sub-constructs. The selected psychometric scales have been successfully 
validated in previous literature and the stability analysis is listed in 
6.7Appendix M. Additional individual differences are either categorical (e.g., 
sex), ordinal (e.g., managerial level in the organisation) or continuous numeric 
(e.g., age and years of experience). Therefore, simple OLS regressions are 
conducted followed by clustered multinomial logit regression to (i) test 
whether individual differences influence performance and (ii) how 
sophisticated students differ from naïve students and from sophisticated 
non-students (professionals). In order to obtain a more detailed insight into 
individual heterogeneity, clustered OLS regressions are used to expand on (i) 
whether individual differences influence performance. Finally, to test the 
differences between genders, MWW tests are used to compare performance 
between male and female subjects both across group and across treatments.  
First, the overview of summary statistics of the individual differences 
(6.7Appendix L) suggest that groups differ (at least numerically) from each 
other. The variation between groups seems to suggest that some individual 
characteristics may potentially predict performance considering that previous 
analysis has shown that sophisticated students significantly outperformed the 
rest. For example, Naïve students exhibit on average higher level of naïve 
interventionism compared to both sophisticated students and non-students. 
Specifically, across all treatments, naïve students tend to make average jumps 
in their adjustments of predicted demand in the newsvendor problem equal 
to 33%, while sophisticated students make only 22% jumps and professional 
planners – 24% jumps. Professional planners exhibit greater levels of 
extroversion, conscientiousness, rational decision-making style than other 
samples. Yet, professional planners also exhibit lower levels of negative 
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outcome focus, impulsiveness and avoidant decision-making style than other 
samples. 
At this point, it is difficult to tell how any of these characteristics affect 
performance. To do so, a series of regressions considering different 
hypotheses are conducted. Since the previous analysis shows that treatment 
variation and exposure to planning are important determinants of 
performance in the Short and the Long treatment (as proved by the results of 
non-parametric tests), the analysis will concentrate on the Hybrid treatment. 
Regression results are presented for each sample of subjects separately 
(Table 14; Table 15 and; Table 16) because non-parametric tests in the 
previous sections show significant differences between samples. 
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Table 14 Regression equations estimated by an OLS for Hybrid treatment (dependent 
variable – payoff in Newsvendor Game) – A: Naïve students 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Model 1 
(NI) 
Model 2  
(BIG5) 
Model 3 
(EPO) 
Model 4 
(BIS) 
Model 5 
(GDMS) 
Model 6 
(ALL) 
Naïve interventionism 
(NI) 
-5706.31***   
(974.89) 
- - - - -5963.36*** 
(1092.28) 
Big 5 Extroversion - -2506.60   
(3276.93) 
- - - -3025.609   
(2892.909) 
Big 5 Agreeableness - 216.6763   
(3543.534) 
- - - 3177.809   
(3711.617) 
Big 5 
Conscientiousness 
- 3006.368   
(3367.001) 
- - - -1618.553   
(3438.331) 
Big 5 Neuroticism - -869.1244   
(3341.483) 
- - - 171.6963   
(3938.321) 
Big 5 
Intellect/Imagination 
- 2968.267   
(3455.163) 
- - - -1822.957   
(3065.983) 
EPO Generation & 
Evaluation 
- - 7943.469*     
(3531.4) 
- - 7546.506     
(4544.1) 
EPO Positive Outcome 
Focus 
- - -4514.605   
(2921.826) 
- - -2955.272   
(2921.234) 
EPO Negative 
Outcome Focus 
- - -4761.766   
(3352.041) 
- - -2351.115   
(3616.497) 
BIS (overall) - - - -11793.83   
(5958.922) 
- -3431.408   
(8160.028) 
GDMS Rational - - - - 1105.01   
(5021.967) 
-4973.72   
(5757.708 
GDMS Intuitive - - - - 5956.937   
(4200.287) 
6264.592   
(3958.502) 
GDMS Dependent - - - - 1764.789   
(3706.795) 
-4653.381   
(4276.654) 
GDMS Avoidant - - - - -4246.261   
(3389.063) 
1444.019   
(3576.637) 
GDMS Spontaneous - - - - -7571.484   
(4310.351) 
-7183.17   
(4561.824) 
Constant 26263.09*** 
(559.0226) 
21551.15*** 
(6030.715) 
24202.16*** 
(3398.448) 
30211.51*** 
(3227.557) 
24549.71*** 
(5144.698) 
33970.37*** 
(6860.123) 
R-squared 0.3713 0.0439 0.0492 0.0643 0.1522 0.5276 
N (observations) 60 60 60 60 60 60 
*** Significant at 0.001 level; ** Significant at 0.01 level; * Significant at 0.05 level 
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Table 15 Regression equations estimated by an OLS for Hybrid treatment (dependent 
variable – payoff in Newsvendor Game) – B: Sophisticated Students 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Model 1 
(NI) 
Model 2  
(BIG5) 
Model 3 
(EPO) 
Model 4 
(BIS) 
Model 5 
(GDMS) 
Model 6 
(ALL) 
Naïve interventionism 
(NI) 
-11161.4*** 
(2118.75) 
- - - - -5542.33*   
(1858.579) 
Big 5 Extroversion  -756.344   
(3528.379) 
- - - 3246.804   
(1539.705) 
Big 5 Agreeableness - -969.5214   
(5176.804) 
- - - 17012.12***   
(3214.753)   
Big 5 
Conscientiousness 
- -3510.974   
(4615.684) 
- - - -7930.929**   
(2122.356) 
Big 5 Neuroticism - 313.4589   
(4711.668) 
- - - -12634.22**   
(2927.043) 
Big 5 
Intellect/Imagination 
- 1549.179   
(4141.662) 
- - - -8597.581**   
(1957.442) 
EPO Generation & 
Evaluation 
- - -6030.569* 
(2535.889) 
- - -6883.546**   
(1862.641) 
EPO Positive Outcome 
Focus 
- - -3302.782   
(3306.717) 
- - -8491.019**   
(2140.269) 
EPO Negative 
Outcome Focus 
- - -1932.393   
(3874.16) 
- - -2777.076   
(2609.604) 
BIS (overall) - - - 1951.031   
(7137.208) 
- -11899.88   
(6218.276) 
GDMS Rational - - - - -8190.567   
(5418.701) 
-13411.05*   
(4276.653) 
GDMS Intuitive - - - - 2131.515   
(4478.365)   
13752.97**    
(3132.54) 
GDMS Dependent - - - - -1923.659   
(4920.961) 
486.3296   
(3754.405) 
GDMS Avoidant - - - - -7021.832    
(4110.47) 
-12185.3**   
(2655.465) 
GDMS Spontaneous - - - - -1611.847   
(4694.692) 
-5415.894    
(2510.59) 
Constant 30038.93*** 
(552.6039) 
29887.52*** 
(4835.042) 
35148.96*** 
(4074.904) 
26472.61*** 
(4053.653) 
38498.71*** 
(5311.65) 
62176.99*** 
(6087.501) 
R-squared 0.5578 0.0778 0.2989 0.0034 0.3100 0.9446 
N (observations) 24 24 24 24 24 24 
*** Significant at 0.001 level; ** Significant at 0.01 level; * Significant at 0.05 level 
Note: note that in Model 6 the majority of variables become significant. This 
is most probably because there are 24 independent observations and 
estimate a large number of variables (14 variables + constant). The fact that 
the majority of these variables are not significant in Models 1-5 shows that 
personal characteristics generally do not tend to play an important role in the 
performance of sophisticated students. 
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Table 16 Regression equations estimated by an OLS for Hybrid treatment (dependent 
variable – payoff in Newsvendor Game) – C: Professional Planners 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Model 1 
(NI) 
Model 2  
(BIG5) 
Model 3 
(EPO) 
Model 4 
(BIS) 
Model 5 
(GDMS) 
Model 6 
(ALL) 
Naïve interventionism 
(NI) 
-7574.20*** 
(1269.01) 
- - - - -4561.267   
(2251.649) 
Big 5 Extroversion  9412.602   
(5841.343) 
- - - 4485.43   
(3922.912) 
Big 5 Agreeableness - -8177.142   
(8447.866) 
- - - 1299.646   
(6675.517) 
Big 5 
Conscientiousness 
- -2349.962   
(6849.004) 
- - - -2784.686   
(5071.057) 
Big 5 Neuroticism - 5150.837   
(4828.676) 
- - - 5185.63   
(5334.191) 
Big 5 
Intellect/Imagination 
- -1822.596   
(7073.359) 
- - - 3357.99    
(6359.43) 
EPO Generation & 
Evaluation 
- - -8769.407   
(5871.844) 
- - 3133.497   
(5604.055) 
EPO Positive Outcome 
Focus 
- - 4324.502   
(5650.728) 
- - 9643.395    
(4866.71) 
EPO Negative 
Outcome Focus 
- - 3678.106    
(5065.21) 
- - 1977.419   
(5756.445) 
BIS (overall) - - - 17383.89   
(9841.517) 
- 14979.29    
(14387.6) 
GDMS Rational - - - - -14420.73*   
(6840.711) 
-8977.799   
(10414.98) 
GDMS Intuitive - - - - -9757.474   
(5976.658) 
-8880.252   
(5480.624) 
GDMS Dependent - - - - 13910.63*   
(5484.582) 
-216.3101   
(6084.171) 
GDMS Avoidant - - - - -6015.357   
(4697.421) 
-8870.179   
(5870.254) 
GDMS Spontaneous - - - - 1122.701   
(5169.517) 
8438.736   
(6868.705) 
Constant 27665.57*** 
(654.6099) 
25848.38*** 
(9094.01) 
26922.86*** 
(7620.96) 
15907.12** 
(5251.166) 
35504.71*** 
(8769.427) 
13644.45    
(13227.43) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5781 0.1373 0.1125 0.1071 0.4771 0.8440 
N (observations) 28 28 28 28 28 28 
*** Significant at 0.001 level; ** Significant at 0.01 level; * Significant at 0.05 level 
The regression analysis reveals several interesting results (refer to Table 14; 
Table 15 and; Table 16). First, naïve interventionism (NI) is a significant 
determinant of planning performance (payoff in Newsvendor game) for all 
samples. This supports hypothesis 3-B. However, this variable cannot explain 
why sophisticated students do better than other samples in the experiment 
because for all samples the effect of NI goes in the same direction. 
Specifically, the higher the NI, the lower the payoff. In other words, the more 
 126 
planners adjust their plan, the worse planning performance they achieve 
(across all samples). Moreover, NI is not always robustly significant in all 
regressions. For example, considering the sample of professional planners, NI 
is significant in Model 1 but not in Model 6. In order to understand better the 
contribution of NI, further analysis is required. 
From the previous analysis with non-parametric tests follows that 
sophisticated students (Theory planners) perform better than other samples 
in the Hybrid treatment. One personal characteristic which may explain the 
differences between samples is EPO generation/evaluation variable which is 
one of the three components of the Elaboration on Potential Outcomes (EPO) 
scale proposed by Nenkov  et al. (2008). EPO generation and Evaluation 
construct evaluates the extent to which the individual considers potential 
consequences of his/her actions. For naïve students (Naïve planners) this 
variable is positive and significant, for sophisticated students (Theory 
planners) it is negative and significant and for professional planners (Practice 
planners) it is negative but not significant. 
In order to explore the differences between samples, a series of multinomial 
logit regressions are conducted. Individual characteristics are used as 
explanatory variables and sample (Naïve or Practice planners) as dependent 
variables. Since the interest is how Naïve planners (naïve students) and 
Practice planners (professional planners) differ from Theory planners 
(sophisticated students), Theory planners is the base category in the 
multinomial logit regressions (Table 17 and Table 18). 
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Table 17 Results of the Multinomial Logit Regressions for Hybrid Treatment (dependent 
variable – sample; base category – Theory planners/sophisticated students) – A: Naïve 
Students (Naïve planners) vs Sophisticated Students (Theory planners)  
Explanatory 
Variable 
Model 1 
(NI) 
Model 2  
(BIG5) 
Model 3 
(EPO) 
Model 4 
(BIS) 
Model 5 
(GDMS) 
Model 6 
(ALL) 
Naïve interventionism 
(NI) 
1.086173   
(0.5841851) 
- - - - 1.120055   
(0.6221477) 
Big 5 Extroversion  .0838016   
(0.9567409) 
- - - 0.7111813   
(1.070276) 
Big 5 Agreeableness - .5343226   
(1.131673) 
- - - -0.4681442   
(1.324114) 
Big 5 
Conscientiousness 
- .2806386   
(1.117035) 
- - - -0.8968197   
(1.349083) 
Big 5 Neuroticism - -.8743524   
(0.9337394) 
- - - -2.843971   
(1.164247) 
Big 5 
Intellect/Imagination 
- 0.3619613   
(1.066678) 
- - -   1.619874   
(1.238055) 
EPO Generation & 
Evaluation 
- - 1.272142   
(1.061026) 
- - -0.0765192   
(1.361714) 
EPO Positive Outcome 
Focus 
- - 0.3743729   
(1.035722)  
- - -0.5287629    
(1.17086) 
EPO Negative 
Outcome Focus 
- - 2.587809*   
(1.136466) 
- - 2.888265*   
(1.341246) 
BIS (overall) - - - -2.558179   
(1.970952) 
- -3.818222   
(2.885316) 
GDMS Rational - - - - 2.119413   
(1.522602) 
0.0548745   
(1.911569) 
GDMS Intuitive - - - - 0.9416385   
(1.469622) 
1.329873   
(1.559568) 
GDMS Dependent - - - - 2.842393*   
(1.291512) 
2.695333   
(1.441875) 
GDMS Avoidant - - - - 1.457123   
(1.137685) 
1.580458   
(1.369016) 
GDMS Spontaneous - - - - -1.563602   
(1.335612) 
-1.250468   
(1.538751) 
Constant 0.7941177***   
(0.2092666) 
0.6975441   
(1.421964) 
-1.708326   
(1.205288) 
2.478716*   
(1.105184) 
-3.083344   
(1.654658) 
-0.5244026   
(2.820571) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0104 0.0444 0.0890 0.0251 0.0855 0.1689 
N (observations) 306 306 306 306 306 306 
*** Significant at 0.001 level; ** Significant at 0.01 level; * Significant at 0.05 level 
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Table 18 Results of the Multinomial Logit Regressions for Hybrid Treatment (dependent 
variable – sample; base category – Theory planners/sophisticated students) – A: 
Professional planners (practice planners) vs Sophisticated Students (Theory planners) 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Model 1 
(NI) 
Model 2  
(BIG5) 
Model 3 
(EPO) 
Model 4 
(BIS) 
Model 5 
(GDMS) 
Model 6 
(ALL) 
Naïve interventionism 
(NI) 
0.2668453   
(0.6671818) 
- - - - 0.442446    
(0.732484) 
Big 5 Extroversion  1.205688   
(1.085533) 
- - - 1.523608   
(1.167813) 
Big 5 Agreeableness - 1.88103   
(1.317286) 
- - - 0.7056266   
(1.478365) 
Big 5 
Conscientiousness 
- 3.295388   
(1.319714) 
- - - 1.145372   
(1.577957) 
Big 5 Neuroticism - -2.803944**   
(1.075182) 
- - - -2.489834   
(1.310105) 
Big 5 
Intellect/Imagination 
- -.9428772   
(1.235076) 
- - - -0.5560833   
(1.389789) 
EPO Generation & 
Evaluation 
- - 4.484905***   
(1.206153) 
- - 2.200433   
(1.540314) 
EPO Positive Outcome 
Focus 
- - -2.875194*    
(1.22596) 
- - -3.408303*   
(1.349688) 
EPO Negative 
Outcome Focus 
- - -3.697672**   
(1.291566) 
- - -3.006533   
(1.555804) 
BIS (overall) - - - -8.00411*** 
(2.283878) 
- -3.197738   
(3.294688) 
GDMS Rational - - - -   
4.538446**   
(1.761031) 
3.33564   
(2.307201) 
GDMS Intuitive - - - - -1.672094   
(1.614827) 
-1.812319    
(1.74239) 
GDMS Dependent - - - - 2.713656   
(1.435263) 
2.445807   
(1.612073) 
GDMS Avoidant - - - - -2.865059*   
(1.249215) 
-0.6358813   
(1.493963) 
GDMS Spontaneous - - - - -0.6491749     
(1.5312) 
  0.7159121   
(1.762815) 
Constant 0.3432037   
(0.2314037) 
-1.857212   
(1.659884) 
1.1224     
(1.4084) 
4.683012***   
(1.243537) 
-1.786024   
(1.907126) 
0.8802183   
(3.343933) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0104 0.0444 0.0890 0.0251 0.0855 0.1689 
N (observations) 306 306 306 306 306 306 
*** Significant at 0.001 level; ** Significant at 0.01 level; * Significant at 0.05 level 
Note: Since both effects for Naïve and Practice planners are evaluated jointly, 
Table 17 and Table 18 share the same pseudo R2 and N (observations). 
The multinomial logit analysis (refer to Table 17 and Table 18) reveals that 
Naïve planners are different from Theory planners in their EPO negative 
outcome focus, while Practice planners are different from Theory planners in 
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their EPO positive outcome focus. However, since neither EPO negative 
outcome focus nor EPO positive outcome focus have a significant effect on 
performance (see the OLS regression analysis), these differences do not shed 
light on why Theory planners perform better in Hybrid treatment than other 
samples. Therefore, the only individual characteristic that seems to matter for 
performance is exposure to planning as well as the level of naïve 
interventionism. Therefore, at this stage Hypothesis 3 is only partially 
confirmed, with Hypothesis 3-A being fully confirmed. 
Finally, hypothesis 3-B and 3-C are tested using a clustered regression (Table 
19) on each decision made through the task. It is clustered by participant and 
each participant made 30 decisions. A clustered regression allows a more 
detailed insight into individual heterogeneity. The analysis for the most 
interesting two groups is listed in Table 19. For both groups, naïve 
interventionism, as previously observed, contributes negatively to DP 
performance. The negative contribution of naïve interventionism is highly 
significant (at 0.001 level). The same was observed in the previous simple OLS 
regression. Therefore, Hypothesis 3-B is supported but 3-C is rejected due to 
inconsistent significance. 
For sophisticated students, all five constructs of the big five contribute 
significantly to explain variation in performance. Extroversion and 
agreeableness contribute positively while conscientiousness, neuroticism and 
imagination contribute negatively. In terms of elaboration on potential 
outcomes, generation and evaluation as well as focus on positive outcomes 
both contribute negatively to performance. Impulsiveness (BIS) also 
contributes negatively to performance that is aligned with prior expectations. 
Surprisingly, results differ for sophisticated students and sophisticated non-
students in terms of GDMS. Preference for rational, avoidant and 
spontaneous decision-making styles all contribute negatively to performance 
while the preference towards intuition seems to benefit planning 
performance. This is different for professionals, with preference for intuitive 
decision-making style contributing negatively to performance. Although 
professionals do not differ in terms of how spontaneous decision-making 
style contributes to performance, its magnitude is significantly different. 
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Finally, for professional planners, feedback about volume and profit both 
contribute significantly to predict performance. Feedback on volume 
contributes negatively, which can be interpreted as positive variations in 
demand volume lead to worse performance that is aligned with the 
assumption of loss aversion. In contrast, feedback on profit contributes 
positively to performance, suggesting that professionals make use of this 
information. 
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Table 19 Clustered OLS regression for sophisticated students and sophisticated non-
students 
Explanatory Variable Sophisticated Students Model 
Coefficient (standard error) 
Sophisticated non-students 
Model Coefficient (standard 
error) 
Naïve interventionism -5643.8820*** (1076.0940) -4031.9210*** (1102.6180) 
Big 5 Extroversion 3430.9450*** (800.7175) 2843.81 (4462.412) 
Big 5 Agreeableness 16856.6900*** (2167.5470) -456.5991 (7213.092) 
Big 5 
Conscientiousness 
-7725.0220*** (1328.6680) -3850.434 (4994,299) 
Big 5 Neuroticism -12149.7300*** (1805.2410) 6728. 987 (4234.167) 
Big 5 
Intellect/Imagination 
-8782.9610*** (1380.6520) 3445.436 (4496.55) 
EPO Generation & 
Evaluation 
-6070.5770*** (1032.9670) 3063.979 (3291.402) 
EPO Positive Outcome 
Focus 
-8123.0830*** (1052.8700) 11738.7900** (3926.3610) 
EPO Negative 
Outcome Focus 
-2146.018 (1301.048) 70.2044 (5147.532) 
BIS (overall) -15590.2200*** (3637.5710) 21018 (11544.23) 
GDMS Rational -16027.9800*** (2777.3440) -2515.68 (10861.3) 
GDMS Intuitive 14148.4600*** (1910.8740) -11408.7700* (4251.0100) 
GDMS Dependent 932.5941 (2607.379) 10027.71 (6732.635) 
GDMS Avoidant -12261.0700*** (1559.7840) 1954.158 (6656.998) 
GDMS Spontaneous -4115.9740** (1498.9990) -10700.4000* (5139.9440) 
Feedback on volume -0.1657 (0.106386) -2.3191*** (0.6529) 
Feedback on profit 0.0169 (0.0133) 0.3321*** (0.0896) 
Absolute plan jump -0.3787 (0.3240) 0.0787 (0.5931) 
Age -79.8843 (195.5656) -306.2873 (631.7543) 
Sex 476.1240 (302.2109) -615.8712 (1449.99) 
Level in organisation n.a. 683.3845 (728.2778) 
Years of experience n.a. 118.1885 (123.2514) 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.9520 0.8625 
N (observations) 696  812 
*** Significant at 0.001 level; ** Significant at 0.01 level; * Significant at 0.05 level 
Regarding the last Hypothesis 3-D, the performance between male and 
female groups is compared across sample (Table 20). None of differences in 
performance between men and women is significant. 
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Table 20 Gender results by sample (profit and N subjects in brackets) 
Sex at birth Naïve students Sophisticated students Professional planners 
Male 25458.13         
(72) 
27359.08         
(26) 
25829.78         
(55) 
Female 24774.92         
(91) 
27203.9         
(29) 
25794.89         
(27) 
Prefer not to 
state 
26831          
(3) 
22893          
(1) 
25003.5          
(2) 
MWW test male 
vs female 
z =   1.637 
p =   0.1015 
z =   0.152 
p =   0.8794 
z =   0.059 
p =   0.9528 
The same analysis is performed across treatments (Table 21). None of 
differences in performance between men and women is significant. 
Table 21 Gender results by treatment (profit and N subjects in brackets) 
Sex at birth Short Long Hybrid 
Male 25143.26         
(46) 
27543.56         
(48) 
25191.15         
(59) 
Female 24836         
(45) 
26671.74         
(50) 
24782.42         
(52) 
Prefer not to 
state 
22893          
(1) 
27126          
(4) 
21996          
(1) 
MWW test male 
vs female 
z =   0.091 
p =   0.9273 
z =   1.396 
p =   0.1626 
z =   1.087 
p =   0.2769 
Given the non-significant results between men and women both across 
groups (Table 20) and across treatments (Table 21) Hypothesis 3-D is 
rejected. 
5.7 Chapter summary 
The analysis focuses on three main groups, naïve students, sophisticated 
students (majoring in L&SCM) and sophisticated non-students (professional 
planners). Variations in performance between long and short commitment 
treatments confirms Hypothesis 1: Planning performance in the planning 
option Long will be better than that in the planning option Short (i.e., planners will 
achieve higher profit in Long compared to Short). 
Considering experience, professional planners outperform naïve students 
numerically, but this difference is not statistically significant. In contrast, 
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sophisticated students significantly outperform the remaining two groups. 
One possible interpretation is that L&SCM students had exposure to theory 
and understand the correct strategy for the newsvendor type of game. The 
results partially confirm Hypothesis 2 that says that factors other than 
treatment variation is likely to influence performance in the Hybrid treatment. 
Yet, this result also suggests that, across all samples, participants react to 
policy: restricting the planning period to Long evaluation (binding policy) 
helps to improve planning performance and earn higher profit/minimise 
losses. 
To understand the differences in performance, the focus is on the hybrid 
treatment. Considering the contribution of individual differences to explain 
differences in performance, results only support part of Hypothesis 3: 
Individual differences and individual personality traits are a significant predictor 
of demand planning performance. The effect of individual differences and 
individual personality traits should be particularly strong in the Hybrid planning 
option where individuals have a choice between following and not following the 
decision guidance to stick to the long-term plan 
Results fully confirm Hypothesis 3-A: Individual differences with regard to 
exposure to planning is an important determinant of planning performance with 
Theory planners performing better than Practice and Naïve planners. 
Moreover, results also confirm Hypothesis 3-B: Greater level of naïve 
interventionism leads to worse demand planning performance – Worth noting 
that this was accepted because NI appears as significant in all variants of the 
analysis except in one sub-group regression including all items. The exception 
is for professional planners in an all-inclusive model. For the rest, NI appears 
as significant or highly significant always with the same negative contribution 
to performance. The remaining hypotheses 3-C and 3-D are rejected. No 
consistently significant contribution has been found from psychometric and 
demographic variables.  
The following chapter will focus on conclusions, discussing the results, 
findings, limitations and their implications to theory and practice. 
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6 Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
This is the final chapter of the thesis. Following this introduction, a summary 
of the research is provided. Findings are presented focusing on how the 
identified research gap is being addressed, followed by the contribution to 
theory and to practice. Limitations and further research are outlined. This 
thesis ends with a final personal reflection. The structure of Chapter 6 is 
summarised in Table 22. 
Table 22 Chapter 7 structure 
Section Overview 
6.2 Summary of the research A summary of the research is provided, revising the initial 
purpose, problem and research question addressed. 
6.3 Findings The section discusses the addressed research gap along 
with the findings. 
6.4 Contribution Findings are discussed in terms of contribution to theory 
and to practice. 
6.5 Limitations The section discusses the shortcomings of the chosen 
approach emphasising compromises and limitations. 
6.6 Further research Further research links back to some of the limitations 
discussed in the previous section. Recommendations for 
further work are provided. Most of further effort is an 
expansion and suggestions for alternative treatments in 
the experiment. 
6.7 Final reflection The final section is a personal view on the research, 
specifically the motivation and the individual learning. 
6.2 Summary of the research 
Balancing supply and demand is critical for increasingly complex business 
systems of exchange of goods and services (e.g., Deming 1986; Christopher 
& Lee 2001). These systems are managed by people. Managers, just as any 
human beings, are complex systems themselves. It is generally assumed that 
everyone involved in management wants to perform well and make good 
decisions. However, practice shows that often best efforts can be destructive 
(e.g., Fildes et al. 2009). One of the most common form of destructive efforts 
are unnecessary interventions. Deming (1986) proposes the idea that 
businesses cannot succeed without the following four core concepts: 
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knowledge (epistemology), understanding variation, appreciation of systems 
and, people (psychology). 
Deming’s (1986) idea can be simplified down to the duality of humans and 
systems as well as how business success depends on the consideration of 
both. DP is one of the most important processes in business. It balances 
supply and demand to deal with uncertainty. DP is one of the managerial 
processes that greatly depends on both humans and systems. DSS can offer 
system restrictiveness or decisional guidance. The predominant trend in DSS 
has been towards deliberate decisional guidance. Managers are often 
presented with options and guiding principles suggesting the best action. The 
general assumption behind decisional guidance is that managers are able to 
use the available information in the most rational way. 
One of the main issues in DP are unnecessary interventions and constant 
overriding of the system. Managers are often over-confident about their 
ability to improve statistical forecasts and make adjustments. The separation 
between what is best achieved via statistics and what is best suited for human 
judgement is often confused in practice (Fildes et al. 2006). Therefore, DP 
performance greatly depends on both system factors and human factors. 
How well managers perform will not only depend on the task, but also on 
their individual differences, e.g., personality (e.g., Lapide 2007). For example, 
one of the main approaches to improve manager’s performance is via training. 
When it comes to judgement, previous research sometimes fails to detect 
benefits of experience (e.g., improvement over time) or evidence of skill (e.g., 
consistently good performance). For example, companies do not become 
better at forecasting over time (e.g., Rieg 2010). Similarly, in experimental 
conditions, professionals perform as well as naïve subjects (e.g., Haigh & List 
2005; Bolton et al. 2012). However, this should not be surprising since many 
of the decision making biases are known to be resistant to practice or training 
(e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Similarly, some environments simply do not 
allow good judgement (Todd & Gigerenzer 2007). 
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This thesis had the following research question: What is the contribution of 
individual differences and planning policy parameters to demand planning 
performance? 
This research is one of the few studies focusing on DP because of system 
factors and individual differences. The problem has been partially observed 
by either DP system (e.g., OR literature), or individual differences (e.g., 
cognitive psychology literature). The aim was to develop a theoretical model 
drawing on theory from behavioural economics and psychology to identify 
planning policy parameters and individual traits that can be used to predict 
DP performance. 
Relying on CPT and the mental accounting bias, MLA is used to build a 
prediction around how the length of commitment will influence DP 
performance. To capture individual differences trait theory is used together 
with previously developed and validated psychometric scales. As a result, this 
thesis proposes a theoretical framework. The methodology of decision 
making experiments and econometric analysis methods are used to test three 
main hypotheses. The obtained sample represented both naïve subjects, 
sophisticated students and professional planners. 
6.3 Findings 
Following the results and analysis, Figure 25 summarises the hypothesis and 
respective results. The application of CPT to planning behaviour provides 
results consistent with the theoretical expectation. MLA is successfully 
detected in planning (H1 and H2). This can have significant implications for 
both theory and practice. Comparing treatments, MLA significantly affects 
performance. Longer commitment led to better performance while more 
frequent decisions deteriorated it. To understand the contribution of 
individual differences a hybrid treatment is used. This treatment relies on a 
non-binding policy that was enforced via decisional guidance. 
Considering the differences between treatments, an important finding 
concerns DSS, specifically, if planning decisions should be guided or restricted 
(or none). Informative guidance as a form of deliberate decisional guidance 
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has shown to have different results depending on the task. While it has been 
generally ineffective with tasks related to forecasting, it has shown to 
improve other tasks (Montazemi et al. 1996). Deliberate decisional guidance 
has been particularly effective when used as memory support (Singh 1998). 
The comparison between the treatment without decision support and the 
other two treatments shows that having decision support significantly 
improves task performance. Results suggest that when planners have no 
exposure to theory, system restrictiveness will lead to better results. 
Alternatively, when participants have good understanding of theory, 
decisional guidance can also lead to good results. In general, system 
restrictiveness leads to better results when compared to decisional guidance 
because it dampens variation. 
 
Figure 25 Conceptual framework, hypothesis and results (grey = confirmed)  
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Although individual traits and personality were expected to play a significant 
role in DP performance, hypothesis 3 is only supported partially. 
Exposure (H3A) significantly affects performance. A new model describing 
how exposure relates to DP performance is designed, the EPM. Theoretical 
knowledge allows the optimal solution while naive knowledge results in the 
worse performance. Exposure to practice is in between. Results successfully 
support a prediction that is aligned with previous research. Professional 
planners did not perform significantly better than naïve subjects (only 
numerically better). However, postgraduate L&SCM students with no 
practical planning experience significantly outperformed the remaining 
groups. L&SCM students are exposed to theory, potentially remembering 
what the best strategy for the newsvendor problem is. 
Naïve interventionism contributes negatively to DP performance as expected 
(H3B). Higher NI leads to lower profit. This means that frequent adjustments 
to the over the previously planned volume contribute negatively to 
performance (profit).  
Finally, considering personality traits (Big 5), psychometric scales (BIS, EPO, 
and GDMS) and demographics (sex, age, years of experience, and level in the 
organisation). All show inconsistent significance. Demographics such as 
gender, age or years of experience are not significantly associated with DP 
performance. This contradicts some of the previous research. Specifically, 
claims that there are differences between genders (e.g., De Véricourt et al. 
2013) are not supported. Similarly, claims that impulsiveness is associated 
with underperformance (e.g., Martin & Potts 2009; Ockenfels & Selten 2015) 
are also not supported. Overall, this thesis does not support previous research 
which claims that there is a ‘right mind-set’ for planning (e.g., Lapide 2007). 
Therefore, this thesis challenges the relevance of psychometric tests often 
used by Human Resources departments (e.g., MBTI® test) as individual 
development tool. Instead, DP policy can lead most individuals to perform 
better regardless of his/her individual characteristics. In this regard, this 
thesis supports E. Williams Deming’s (1986) idea that a bad system will beat 
a good person every time. 
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6.4 Contribution 
This is a cross-disciplinary thesis that observes a problem from O&SCM. It 
borrows theory from the fields of economics and psychology. This thesis 
contributes to the growing body of literature of the newly formed field of 
behavioural operations research (BOR). However, due to the immature state 
of BOR, further discussion is made by each field separately. Hence, this thesis 
contributes on different levels to fields of engineering, management, 
psychology and economics. 
6.4.1 Contribution to theory 
The main contributions of this thesis are to Engineering and Management 
while psychology and economics are secondary. This research seeks an 
explanation to a phenomena observed in DP using theory from psychology 
and economics. This research contributes to the theoretical understanding of 
what are the contributions of individual differences and planning policy 
parameters to DP performance. At the same time, fields of psychology and 
economics benefit from an innovative experimental design and application of 
its theory in a new context. Figure 26 provides an overview of the main 
contributions of this thesis. 
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Figure 26 Summary of the main contributions of this thesis to theory 
This research contributes to engineering and DSS with a new understanding 
of how humans and systems interact using decisional guidance or system 
restrictiveness. This can be attributed to theory in behavioural OR in three 
ways. This thesis provides an explanation of one of the tasks of DP to balance 
supply and demand. This is one of the most common types of decisions in 
OM. This is achieved by borrowing from the field of Behavioural Economics 
the CPT and using MLA to explain one of the persistent behavioural issues 
observed in practice. So far this has never been done in OM or OR. This 
constitutes the main contribution of this research. It is not new to detect that 
frequency of interventions degrade planning performance. Similarly, 
unnecessary interventions and adjustments to statistical forecasts are known 
to be negative. Whilst most of the existing research focuses on how to 
improve on the problem of integrating judgement with statistics, explanations 
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to why managers behave in such way are limited. This thesis provides an 
explanation of the human behaviour in DP through CPT using MLA. 
Contributing to O&SCM, a new analytical framework is proposed explaining 
and predicting planning decisions. It allows new understanding of the role of 
policy in O&SCM. Additionally, an innovative design of the newsvendor 
problem is proposed. It includes manipulation of the time horizon and 
planning policy that has also never been done so far. 
Previous studies of this nature have observed variation in performance 
between individuals but no explanation of potential factors have been 
provided. Despite being common good practice in experimental research to 
collect measures on individual attributes (e.g., demographics) results are 
usually reported as average and little to no explanation is provided on the 
heterogeneity of the results. Drawing on the Trait Theory from the field of 
psychology previous studies provide evidence that individual differences, 
e.g., experience, personality, can significantly impact decision making 
performance (e.g., Weinman et al. 1985; Stanovich & West 2000). This study 
tested the trait theory hypothesis through multiple previously validated 
psychometric scales, failing to detect any stable profile of what characteristics 
make up for a good planner. 
One concerning fact with this study and its results comparing 
experts/professionals with naïve subjects, similar to previous research (e.g., 
Arnold et al. 2000; Bolton & Katok 2004; Haigh & List 2005; Bolton et al. 
2012), is that it also fails to successfully detect skill. Once again it is 
successfully demonstrated how practical experience is unrelated to 
performance – Expert’s (professional planners) judgement was not 
significantly better than the judgement of naïve planners. This idea is not new 
and has been found in many studies before this one. Camerer and Johnson 
(1991, p.203) goes as far as claiming that ‘[the] depressing conclusion from these 
studies is that expert judgements (…) are no more accurate than those of lightly 
trained novices (…) expert judgement have been worse than those of simplest 
statistical models in virtually all domains that have been studied’. This thesis 
supports this view. The intuitive expectation would be that experienced 
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individuals would outperform on average naïve subjects. However, skill is not 
detected at an overall level, neither at treatment level. Whilst the 
experimental task is arguably not fully representative of the tasks 
professionals do in real life, the newsvendor situation represent one of the 
most basic decision making processes. The demand planner must make a 
decision reacting to a demand signal under uncertainty and risk. 
As secondary contributions, this thesis contributes to social psychology, 
behavioural economics and decision science with a new application of CPT to 
planning decisions. MLA is successfully applied to planning decisions. This is 
the first application of MLA to planning. New insights are provided on how 
individual differences influence planning decisions. This thesis contributes to 
methodology by its use of validated psychometric scales together with a 
multi-treatment modified newsvendor problem that is designed to represent 
a real situation from management. It is designed to detect both individual 
differences as well as overall decision-making bias. The experimental task can 
be considered representative of a real-life situation as the participant is 
presented with both a system’s recommendation, unknown incoming demand 
and graphical and tabular feedback. The performance is measured in terms of 
overall profit that is different from measuring accuracy in experiments on 
judgemental forecasting. 
Priming participants with the optimal solution has not been done before. This 
priming was intended to represent the statistical forecast offered by DSS 
systems to DP planners. All treatments included priming so no conclusions 
are made on whether it improves performance or not. However, even 
provided with the optimal solution, the majority of participants with the 
exception of very few chose to deviate from the recommendation and react 
to variations in the demand. 
Finally, contributing to the field of experimental economics, behavioural 
science and decision science, this thesis proposes an innovative experimental 
design to test MLA in application to planning. It allows drawing insights on 
how a simple deterministic theory (CPT) with the mental accounting bias (as 
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part of the MLA) can explain a real-world phenomenon of sub-optimal DP in 
O&SCM. 
6.4.2 Contribution to practice 
 
Figure 27 Summary of the main contributions of this thesis to practice 
Findings from this research have implications for DP policy design, 
recruitment of manager for DP positions, decreasing supply and demand 
mismatch and reducing induced demand uncertainty. 
DP policy is shown to be important to manipulate DP performance. 
Considering the problem of operationalisation, DSS is suggested as means to 
enforce different DP policies. One major implication for practice comes from 
the discussion between the use of decision support and elaborating on the 
idea of whether the decision-maker should be guided or restricted. Systems 
Importance of 
demand planning 
policy
Recrutiment of 
managers for 
demand planning 
positions
Decreasing 
demand 
uncertainty
Decrease supply 
and demand 
mismatch, 
reducing cost 
and waste
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should be designed in such a way that people are not exposed to situations 
where judgement failure is likely. In situations of repeatable decision-making, 
judgement should be automated as much as possible. If automation is not 
possible, the recommendation is to resort to system restrictiveness to avoid 
unnecessary or damaging interventions. However, it is important to consider 
the warning by Fildes et al., (2006, p.355) that ‘absolute restrictiveness can be 
dangerous if it is wrongly applied’. Therefore, it is essential to take into 
consideration when judgement should be allowed and where it should be 
restricted. The suggestion following this study is to moderate the intervention 
frequency. 
Another important implication for practice is that frequent interventions or 
adjustments are indeed harmful in most cases. The results suggest that 
planners, like most human beings, suffer from mental accounting and are 
prone to MLA. Whilst this is a theoretical contribution, in practice this means 
that the problem of DP should be addressed via reducing the frequency of 
interventions and increasing time horizons over which judgements are made. 
Too frequent analysis and interventions can lead to overall 
underperformance. Even if it can seem like a local improvement, considering 
MLA, it will be most likely worse overall. Informed by MLA and the negative 
effect of NI, it is possible to reduce demand amplification and information 
distortion using DP policy. Hence, enforcing MLA-informed policies will 
reduce supply and demand mismatch as well as reduce demand uncertainty. 
Considering individual differences, this thesis challenges the commonly 
accepted idea that there is a ‘right’ personality to be a good planner, as 
defended by Lapide (2007). Consequently, this affects the recruitment and 
training for the role of DP. There is a general (intuitive) belief that individual 
differences and training are very important for the role. However, this thesis 
claims that good policy is more important than personality or individual 
differences. Demand planners should not be selected based on psychometric 
tests. 
This thesis was originally set to understand what the contribution of 
individual differences to DP performance is. As a result, it would provide 
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recommendations on what aspects of one’s personality make up for a good 
demand planner. However, no significant contribution of personality traits 
nor psychometrics to DP performance was found. This allows both an 
optimistic and a pessimistic interpretation. An optimistic interpretation 
suggests that planning performance does not depend on individual’s 
personality. This does not mean, however, that in a situation of additional 
information (i.e., being aware of a promotion that the marketing planned in 
advance), a manager will not outperform an ‘unaware’ one. In situations of 
equal information, different individuals might perform as well if a system is 
designed considering the shortcomings of the human mind. A pessimistic 
interpretation of the little to no importance of individual characteristics is that 
people are simply unfit for the task of planning. This experiment fails to detect 
evidence of skill or experience as significant predictors in the DP task. If this 
is the case, then management should focus efforts on both deploying good 
planning systems and allowing greater automation by decision support. 
Planning policies must prevent people from intervening with the system and 
making unnecessary changes. This thesis advocates for the adoption of 
greater system restrictiveness over investing in decisional guidance. This is 
reinforced by the fact that participants, even provided with the optimal 
solution to the problem, quickly ignored it trying to ‘game’ the system. 
Finally, findings about naïve interventionism have implications for practice. 
Some individuals exhibited greater levels than others did. This variation had 
significant implications for performance. For example, students with 
theoretical knowledge performed less frequent but relatively large changes 
comparatively to professionals and naïve students. This can have implications 
on what kind of restrictions are imposed on planners, e.g., similarly to results 
by Fildes et al. (2009), by restricting small adjustments and allowing only 
relatively large ones. 
6.5 Limitations 
Individual traits are complex to measure and the selected psychometric scales 
as well as personality inventory are not free of criticism. Most of the criticism 
is partly linked to the positivist paradigm that is often criticised as 
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reductionist. This research inherits some of the common criticisms in the field 
of psychology on the study of individual differences and personality. Relying 
on simplified measures to describe one’s personality provides a relatively 
limited insight. However, it is unpractical to try to measure exhaustively all 
traits that define one unique self. Hence, regardless of the care to select 
relevant psychometric scales, only a small fraction about individual 
differences is actually measured and analysed. 
The use of newsvendor as decision-making task is not universal and does not 
represent all DP decisions in practice. One of the main assumptions of the 
newsvendor is that each decision is made one-shot for a single period. It does 
not influence the follow up periods. Excess is savaged and shortage is lost. In 
real-life, DP decisions are much more complex. However, the purpose of this 
experiment was to detect a fundamental decision making bias. Therefore, the 
decision making process had to be greatly reduced to its most basic 
formulation. 
Time is not considered. The timing of the decisions is ignored and the focus 
is only on its sequence. There is no control for the time taken to make the 
decisions. Moritz et al. (2014) observes the decision speed in a judgemental 
forecasting task, finding that too quick or too long decisions tend to increase 
error. How quick and how long is vaguely defined. For the purpose of this 
thesis, participants are allowed as long as necessary to make the decisions 
without any time pressure assuming that each would choose the optimum 
decision time. 
The experimental task can also be criticised because it uses only one demand 
series of 30 responses (observations). In order to minimise the possible 
effects of single series, a randomly generated sequence drawn from uniform 
distribution was used for the study. Since the purpose of this experiment was 
to study behaviour of different types of individuals across different 
treatments, it was difficult to create multiple demand scenarios because the 
experiment either would then require a much larger subject pool or would 
take significantly longer time. Another reason for limiting the task to only one 
sequence was the fact that professional respondents (planners) could only be 
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engaged in the study if a short task could be designed. A different random 
order was not generated for each participant because this would create a 
difficulty in analysing the data: this would not allow for direct comparison of 
decisions, as they would be likely to be influenced by order effects. A further 
exploration of other sequences within newsvendor problem is necessary to 
confirm the robustness of results reported in the earlier sections. 
Another limitation associated with the experimental task is the use of a single 
high profit product. In practice, managers often manage several products or 
portfolios with distinct profit margins. Observing a single high margin product 
allows isolating the parameters but is arguably only partially representative of 
reality. 
One of the limitations of the research design can be attributed to the effort 
that the subject puts in the task. To address this limitation, an incentivised 
experiment is run with part of the students. Comparing the performance 
between incentivised and non-incentivised students, no significant difference 
is found between providing incentives or not. Considering the common 
criticism of students not being able to make as good use of the provided 
information as a professional would, experimental results in this thesis show 
the opposite. Instead, naïve students and professionals do not differ in 
performance and sophisticated students significantly outperform the 
previous two. These results challenge the criticism of effort and expertise. 
However, in an ideal setting it would be better to provide meaningful 
monetary incentives to all groups. 
Another criticism could be raised with regard to the study’s subject pool. 
Specifically, the proportion of undergraduate students and postgraduate 
students was unequal in different experimental groups. Specifically, Naïve 
planners were primarily undergraduates and Theory planners were primarily 
postgraduates. This was mainly because it was impossible to find an 
undergraduate program at the University of Warwick where students would 
be sufficiently knowledgeable about the planning theory. This criticism could 
be easily addressed because (i) the overwhelming majority of undergraduates 
(96%) were in their last year of study and all postgraduates (100%) were in 
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the first (and only) year of study. Therefore, the two groups were quite close 
in terms of their level of education with the only difference that 
postgraduates had exposure to Supply Chain Management theory in their 
program.  
The response rates in the study were 75% for students and 35% for 
professionals. It could be argued that because the response rates were not 
100% a selection bias could have affected experimental results. However, this 
is highly unlikely for the following reasons. Students were drawn from a 
homogeneous population of the subject pool of the Decision Research at 
Warwick group. This homogeneity was insured by the administrators of the 
recruitment system. Furthermore, 25% dropout among students could be 
explained by the fact that they were given several days to complete the study 
online. Yet, they were also informed that once the study reaches maximum 
number of participants (110), the study will close automatically (places in the 
study were available on first-come-first-serve basis). The number 110 was 
determined based on the available budget. Therefore, 25% of students who 
started and did not finish the study were (most likely) those who 
underestimated the competition from other potential participants or those 
who were not very interested in the study. This suggests that 75% of students 
who completed the study were representative of the student population at 
the University of Warwick.   
The response rate of 35% among professionals is unprecedentedly high since 
the majority of marketing studies commissioned commercially only reach out 
to 15% of professionals. In fact, this study recruited the largest sample of 
planning professionals studied in the literature to date. Even if one assumes 
that only those professionals who were particularly interested in planning 
completed the study, this makes the study results even stronger. The study 
finds that professionals in many treatments perform worse than students do 
and if only ‘sophisticated’ planners were attracted to the study, they should 
be expected to do better instead of worse.  
One may also question the study results because it could be argued that the 
respondents intervened in the experiment (they were being asked to play an 
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active role) rather than generate reported effects due to loss aversion. Indeed, 
in the Short treatment the respondents are asked to act in every time period, 
while in the Long treatment the respondents are asked to defer actions. Yet, 
in the Hybrid treatment, participants have a choice between action and not 
acting. In the Hybrid treatment participants are asked not to act too often 
(they receive Decision Support/Policy), but, as results suggest, many of them 
do act more often than advised. Therefore, it is unlikely that reported results 
are generated by something other than a personal trait and the experimental 
design of this study is careful with separating the effect of personality 
characteristics from the impact of loss aversion that appears to explain the 
observed behaviour. 
This thesis did not detect significant contribution of personality over DP 
performance. This can be due to the adaptive nature of individual differences 
(Buss & Greiling 1999; Buss & Hawley 2010). It claims that ‘humans possess 
a complex array of evolved psychological mechanisms, only a subset of which 
is activated at any particular time’ (Buss 1999, p.259). This means that some 
personality traits essential to DP might only activate in special circumstances 
that have not been present in the simulation. Alternatively, any suggestion 
about what traits make up for a good planner are subject to this same idea. 
Up until a particular moment (i.e., need to make DP decisions) the relevant 
individual differences might not be active. Hence, attempts at measuring 
particular traits beforehand can be inconclusive or even misleading. To 
counter this limitation, subject’s personality traits are measured following the 
simulation task representative of the DP task. 
Finally, a criticism might be raised with regard to the regression models used 
in the study. Specifically, it could be argued that some of the personality 
scales’ variables do not come out significant because they could be correlated 
with Naïve Interventionism variable (i.e., the clustered regressions suffer from 
overfitting bias). Yet, it is highly unlikely that the presented analysis generated 
biased results. According to the correlation analysis (reported in Appendix N), 
Naïve Interventionism is significantly correlated with only three other 
personality measures: Extraversion (negative correlation), Neuroticism 
(positive correlation) and Negative Outcome Focus (positive correlation). 
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Furthermore, several robustness checks were reported in the regression 
summaries where Naïve Interventionism is taken out of the regression while 
other (correlated) characteristics were present as independent variables (see 
tables 14-18). The fact that Naïve Interventionism in many tables remains 
significant across models while other variables are not significant even when 
taken in isolation indicates that analysis is unlikely to produce untrustworthy 
results. 
Table 16 reports results for N=28 professionals and shows that none of the 
variables are significant when taken jointly. One may argue that this is due to 
the small sample size. However, the same table also reports that Naïve 
Interventionism is significant when taken in isolation as well as two GDMS 
traits are significant when taken separately. These GDMS traits are not 
correlated with Naïve Interventionism according to the correlation analysis 
(shown in Appendix N). It is, of course, possible that estimating a model with 
16 variables in the extended model does not return significant results because 
the sample is rather small. Yet, since variables that produce correlations in the 
narrowed-down models are not correlated with each other, statistically, we 
should expect at least one of these variables to come out significant in the 
extended model. 
6.6 Further research 
Much of the further research comes from the limitations of this study. Due to 
time limitations, alternative experimental treatments are left untested. The 
present research focused on a particular situation in DP, it was a repeated 
individual task based on a modified newsvendor problem set with a single 
high-margin product. 
Further research should focus on a replication of the experiment using a small 
margin product. It can potentially lead to very different results (behaviour 
differed between high and low margin in De Véricourt et al., 2013a). 
Individual decision making and group decision-making is different and whilst 
much of behavioural evidence suggests that the bias persists across groups, 
both personality as well as group dynamics can potentially be predictors of 
performance.  Mental accounting bias suggests that individuals will react 
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differently not only variations in frequency, but also to portfolios as opposed 
to single elements. Managing multiple products with different levels of 
aggregation is also expected to be prone to MLA. Literature discusses the 
advantage of planning at a product family level for long horizon and at stock 
keeping unit at a short horizon. However, this discussion is mostly 
explanatory and provides the recommendation as a rule of thumb. Applying 
CPT and MLA to product aggregation in the context of DP could potentially 
provide theoretical understanding of why this happens. 
Further research should also consider testing variations using a dynamically 
complex decision making task. A dynamically complex task according to 
Brehmer (1992, p.212) requires that the decisions must be made as a series 
rather than single so many decisions are required to reach a given goal. 
Moreover, the decisions must be constrained by previous decisions so they 
are not independent. Additionally, the states of the system change both with 
the context as well as with the decisions made and finally, the decisions must 
be made in real-time. A dynamically complex decision making task and 
individual differences has already been tested (Strohhecker & Größler 2013), 
however, the objective was solely focused on explaining individual 
differences. 
The newsvendor problem assumes that each decision is made one-shot for a 
single period not influencing the follow up periods where excess is savaged 
and shortage is lost. A dynamically complex decision making task comes 
closer to real-life decisions in terms of being compatible with situations of 
carrying over the excess stock for following periods as well as delivering back 
orders later. The application of the Beer Game (Forrester 1958; Niranjan et 
al. 2009; Yang et al. 2011; Ancarani et al. 2013) instead of the newsvendor is 
interesting as it would address both the shortcoming of the newsvendor 
regarding the dynamically complex decision making task as well as individual 
versus group decision making. Variations regarding system restrictiveness 
and decisional guidance relying on principles derived from MLA can lead to 
distinct results when experimental treatments vary the frequency of 
decisions made by the group or part of the group. Moreover, the application 
of a task where participants must consider flows and stock would potentially 
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provide an alternative explanation to why individuals are not good at 
understanding the effects of flows on a stock (e.g., Sweeney & Sterman 2000; 
Strohhecker & Größler 2013). 
Regarding individual differences, further research should include alternative 
psychometric scales since previous research suggests that individual 
differences significantly affect decision-making performance. Although the 
selected scales fail to support the individual differences hypothesis 
completely, other scales can potentially highlight missing personality aspects 
that can potentially predict planning performance. 
6.7 Final reflection 
The interest in the human element in OM and OR came from the frustration 
of watching people making mistakes over and over, without losing 
enthusiasm. Over the last years collaborating with industry, I was lucky to 
observe anecdotal evidence of managers worried to gather evidence to 
support their points of views rather than to develop a point of view. Any 
analysis, in practice seems to be in good part intuition driven, mostly used to 
validate rather than to discover. Coming down to small, day-to-day tasks, 
people are not afraid of making small changes without realising that if 
everyone does the same it can be a problem. Small changes would not be a 
problem if they were perfectly random – this way it would simply average 
itself and cause no harm. However, small changes are governed by some 
common decision patterns, heuristics, and prone to similar biases. This way, 
much like in a boat if all passengers make a small step to the same side, the 
whole boat will capsize. 
The interesting fact about biases is its similarity with illusions. The illusion 
does not disappear even if people are aware of it. During my years of formal 
arts education during the life-drawing sessions, most of the training was 
focused on working around the illusion. One particularity of the life-drawing 
practice was that nobody was interested in making the illusion of 
multidimensional space disappear, it was considered a pointless effort, and 
the common direction was to learn how to live with the illusions and the 
shortcomings of the mind. Instead of repeatedly showing individuals what 
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they did wrong, the training provided people with tools and warnings about 
when the mind will be playing a trick on them. People were provided with a 
mechanical aid to live with the illusion, the visual bias. This aid, as a framework 
was given in form of physical cues such as a straight pencil at a fixed distance, 
or a checked grid placed between the eye and the object. Great masters such 
as Leonardo Da Vinci during the Renascence, Johannes Vermeer during the 
Dutch Golden Age or Caravaggio during the Baroque movements used 
mechanical aids such as camera obscura, camera lucida and fixed concave 
mirrors with directional light to paint in a realistic style. Regardless of the 
criticism of ‘cheating’ on the art of painting, some of the greatest masters of 
all times relied on systems to paint. And what else is a painting than a virtually 
infinite number of decisions made by the artist. Although knowing about the 
illusion did not make it disappear, a solid mechanical aid (a framework) 
provided means to draw realistically. 
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Appendix A Mini-IPIP scale 
20 Item Mini-IPIP (Donnellan et al. 2006) 
Item Factor Text (1 = Very Inaccurate to 5 = Very Accurate) Score 
1 Extroversion Am the life of the party.  
2 Agreeableness Sympathize with others’ feelings  
3 Conscientiousness Get chores done right away.  
4 Neuroticism Have frequent mood swings (rapid changes).  
5 Intellect/Imagination Have a vivid imagination.  
6 Extroversion Don’t talk a lot. Reverse 
7 Agreeableness Am not interested in other people’s problems. Reverse 
8 Conscientiousness Often forget to put things back in their proper place. Reverse 
9 Neuroticism Am relaxed most of the time. Reverse 
10 Intellect/Imagination Am not interested in abstract ideas. Reverse 
11 Extroversion Talk to a lot of different people at parties.  
12 Agreeableness Feel others’ emotions.  
13 Conscientiousness Like order.  
14 Neuroticism Get upset easily.  
15 Intellect/Imagination Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. Reverse 
16 Extroversion Keep in the background. Reverse 
17 Agreeableness Am not really interested in others. Reverse 
18 Conscientiousness Make a mess of things. Reverse 
19 Neuroticism Rarely feel blue (sad). Reverse 
20 Intellect/Imagination Do not have a good imagination. Reverse 
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Appendix B EPO scale 
Elaboration on Potential Outcomes (EPO) by Nenkov  et al. (2008) 
Sub-scales Items (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) 
Generation/evaluation 
dimension 
Before I act I consider what I will gain or lose in the future as a 
result of my actions. 
I try to anticipate as many consequences of my actions as I can. 
Before I make a decision I consider all possible outcomes. 
I always try to assess how important the potential consequences of 
my decisions might be. 
I try hard to predict how likely different consequences are. 
Usually I carefully estimate the risk of various outcomes occurring. 
Positive outcome 
focus dimension 
I keep a positive attitude that things always turn out all right. 
I prefer to think about the good things that can happen rather than 
the bad. 
When thinking over my decisions I focus more on their positive end 
results. 
Negative outcome 
focus dimension 
I tend to think a lot about the negative outcomes that might occur 
as a result of my actions. 
I am often afraid that things might turn out badly. 
When thinking over my decisions I focus more on their negative 
end results. 
I often worry about what could go wrong as a result of my 
decisions. 
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Appendix C BIS scale 
BIS-11 Patton et al. (1995) 
BIS-11 Questions (scale:1-4 from rarely/never - Almost Always/Always) 
1. Attentional 
Impulsiveness 
1. Attention 11. I “squirm” at plays or lectures.  
28. I am restless at the theatre or lectures.  
5. I don’t “pay attention.” 
9. I concentrate easily. (R) 
20. I am a steady thinker. (R) 
6. Cognitive 
instability 
6. I have “racing” thoughts 
24. I change hobbies. 
2. Motor 
Impulsiveness 
5. Perseverance 21. I change residences.  
16. I change jobs. 
30. I am future oriented. (R)  
23. I can only think about one problem at a time. 
26. I often have extraneous thoughts when 
thinking. 
2. Motor 
Impulsiveness 
17. I act “on impulse.” 
19. I act on the spur of the moment. 
22. I buy things on impulse. 
3. I make up my mind quickly. 
2. I do things without thinking.  
25. I spend or charge more than I earn. 
4. I am happy-go-lucky 
3. Non-planning 
impulsiveness 
4. Cognitive 
complexity 
15. I like to think about complex problems. (R) 
29. I like puzzles. (R) 
10. I save regularly. (R) 
27. I am more interested in the present than the 
future. 
18. I get easily bored when solving thought 
problems. 
3. Self-control 12. I am a careful thinker. (R) 
1. I plan tasks carefully. (R) 
8. I am self-controlled. (R) 
7. I plan trips well ahead of time. (R) 
13. I plan for job security. (R) 
14. I say things without thinking. 
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Appendix D GDMS scale 
GDMS - General Decision Making Style Items 
Sub-Scales Items (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
Rational 
 
I double-check my information sources to be sure I have the right facts 
before making decisions 
I make decisions in a logical and systematic way. 
My decision making requires careful thought. 
When making a decision, I consider various options in terms of a specific 
goal. 
I explore all of my options before making a decision. 
Avoidant I avoid making important decisions until the pressure is on. 
I postpone decision making whenever possible. 
I often procrastinate when it comes to making important decisions. 
I generally make important decisions at the last minute. 
I put off making many decisions because thinking about them makes me 
Dependent I often need the assistance of other people when making important 
decisions. 
I rarely make important decisions without consulting other people. 
If I have the support of others, its easier for me to make important 
decisions. 
I use the advice of other people in making my important decisions. 
I like to have someone to steer me in the right direction when I am faced 
with important decisions. 
Intuitive When making decisions, I rely upon my instincts. 
When I make decisions, I tend to rely on my intuition. 
I generally make decisions that feel right to me. 
When I make a decision, it is more important for me to feel the decision is 
right than to have a rational reason for it. 
When I make a decision, I trust my inner feelings and reactions. 
Spontaneous I generally make snap decisions. 
I often make decisions on the spur of the moment. 
I make quick decisions. 
I often make impulsive decisions. 
When making decisions, I do what seems natural at the moment. 
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Appendix E Participant targeting groups 
 
Group Members Obs 
Demand Planning, Sales 
Forecasting, IBP and 
Supply Chain Optimization 
34,908  https://www.linkedin.com/groups/1808515 
Demand Planners, Supply 
Chain Planners, 
Forecasters 
13,112  https://www.linkedin.com/groups/1064377/profile 
S&OP, Demand Planning, 
Supply Chain in Germany 
233  https://www.linkedin.com/groups/8192918/profile 
Supply Chain, Demand 
Planning, Production 
Planning, Supply Network, 
Logistics, Transportation 
141  https://www.linkedin.com/groups/6710984/profile 
Demand Planners,Supply 
Chain Planners,Forecasters 
13,111  https://www.linkedin.com/groups/1064377/profile 
Sales & Operations 
Planning Network 
8,361  https://www.linkedin.com/groups/1812222/profile 
Sales & Operations 
Planning / CPFR 
8,191  https://www.linkedin.com/groups/1524967/profile 
S&OP – Sales and 
Operations Planning, 
Forecasting, Demand 
Management and Supply 
Planning 
13,323  
 
https://www.linkedin.com/groups/3989507/profile 
Total Estimated Reach Aprox. 
35,000 
Estimate based on largest group assuming overlap 
of members 
SCIP Collaborators Forum 29 Actively spread the survey within the company 
SCIP Network 115  
SCIP Mailing 1455  
Total mailing 1772  
Incentivised students 
across Warwick University 
registered to SONA system 
(https://warwick.sona-
systems.com) 
1639 Pre-requisites: 
 Active students 
 Based in the UK 
 Fluent in English 
 Normal vision 
Non incentivised students 
(MSc students attending 
supply chain modules and 
others) 
Aprox. 
1500 
Estimate based on total students at WMG 
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Appendix F Experiment code (JavaScript) 
var demand = [227, 241, 113, 228, 169, 149, 169, 198, 171, 93, 53, 291, 242, 23, 83, 82, 99, 193, 47, 76, 
190, 161, 212, 21, 233, 242, 54, 298, 211, 241, 178, 195, 198, 187, 162, 17, 113, 24, 236]; //Uniform 
pre-generaged signal 
var demandNow = 0; 
var satisfied = 0; 
var overage = 0; 
var shortage = 0; 
var maxPeriod = demand.length; //change back to normal demand 
var forecast = 225; // optimal order quantity 
var planNow = 0; 
var plan = []; // array plotting player's answers 
var demandPast = []; // array plotting known demand 
var price = 12; 
var manufCost = 3; 
var roundManufCost = 0; 
var savCost = 0; 
var lostSalesCost = 0; 
var roundRevenue = 0; 
var totalProfit = 0; 
var roundProfit = 0; 
var round = 1; // substitute of the i in the loop, starts with 1, so must be always compensated wuth -1 
when used in arrays 
var roundNow = 1; 
var step = 3; 
var practiceRounds = 10; //exclusive the last e.g., if 4 training rounds then the payer has 3 steps 
var wastedProductValue = 0; 
var disposalProductValue = 0; 
var foregoneSalesValue = 0; 
var min = 1; // number of treatments lower bound inclusive 
var max = 3; // number of treatments higher bound inclusive 
 
var $ =jQuery.noConflict(); // makes the Plot.ly work 
 
//Graphical interface 
var trace1 = { 
  x: ["P1", "P2", "P3", "P4", "P5", "P6", "P7", "P8", "P9", "R1", "R2", "R3", "R4", "R5", "R6", "R7", "R8", "R9", 
"R10", "R11", "R12", "R13", "R14", "R15", "R16", "R17", "R18", "R19", "R20", "R21", "R22", "R23", "R24", 
"R25", "R26", "R27", "R28", "R29", "R30" 
], 
  y: demandPast, 
  name:"Demand", 
  type:"bar" 
}; 
 
var trace2 = { 
  x: ["P1", "P2", "P3", "P4", "P5", "P6", "P7", "P8", "P9", "R1", "R2", "R3", "R4", "R5", "R6", "R7", "R8", "R9", 
"R10", "R11", "R12", "R13", "R14", "R15", "R16", "R17", "R18", "R19", "R20", "R21", "R22", "R23", "R24", 
"R25", "R26", "R27", "R28", "R29", "R30" 
], 
  y: plan, 
  name:"Plan", 
  type:"bar" 
}; 
 
var data = [trace1, trace2]; 
var layout = { 
 title: 'Results', 
 bargap:0.1, 
 bargroupgap:0.1, 
 xaxis:{ 
  title:"Periods", 
  fixedrange:true 
 }, 
 yaxis:{ 
  title:"Volume", 
  fixedrange:true 
 }, 
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 autosize: true, 
 margin:{ 
  b:30, 
  l:50, 
  r:0, 
  pad:0, 
  t:30, 
  autoexpand:true 
 }, 
 legend:{ 
  bordercolor:"rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)", 
  yanchor:"auto", 
  traceorder:"normal", 
  xanchor:"auto", 
  bgcolor:"rgba(255, 255, 255, 0)", 
  borderwidth:1, 
  y:-0.3, 
  x:1, 
  font:{ 
  color:"", 
  family:"", 
  size:11 
  }, 
 }, 
} 
//================================================================= 
var treatmentGenerator = function(min, max) { //this generates a uniform random number between min 
and max so a treatment can be assigned 
    return treatment = Math.floor(Math.random() * (max - min +1)) + min; 
}; 
 
var treatment = treatmentGenerator(min, max); //this is the number of the treatment from min to max in 
an uniform distribution 
//================================================================= 
if (treatment === 1) { 
   document.getElementById("planQuestion").innerHTML = "What is the 
planned quantity for round " + round + "?"; 
} else if(treatment === 2) { 
  if ((round-1)%step === 0) { // to modify the step, just devide by the commitment 
length 
   document.getElementById("planQuestion").innerHTML = "What is the 
planned quantity for round " + round + "? Note that you must order the same quantity for rounds " + (round 
+ 1) + " and " + (round + 2); 
  } 
} else if(treatment === 3) { 
  if ((round-1)%step === 0) { // to modify the step, just devide by the commitment 
length 
   document.getElementById("planQuestion").innerHTML = "What is the 
planned quantity for round " + round + "? Note that you should order the same quantity for rounds " + 
(round + 1) + " and " + (round + 2); 
  } 
} 
 
var resultsRound = function(){ 
    roundManufCost = manufCost * planNow; 
    if (demand[round-1]<=planNow) { // if the demand is less than planned 
        satisfied = demand[round-1]; //satisfied demand if demand is lower than planned 
        overage = planNow - demand[round-1]; // overage a.k.a. unsold inventory is null 
        shortage = 0 // shortage of product 
    } else { // if the demand is more than planned 
        satisfied = planNow; // satisfied demand if demand is greater than planned 
        overage = 0; // overage a.k.a. unsold inventory 
        shortage = demand[round-1] - planNow // shortage of product 
    } 
    roundRevenue = satisfied * price; // value of sales for the round 
    wastedProductValue = overage * manufCost; // the cost of wasted products, e.g., disposal cost 
    disposalProductValue = overage * savCost; // cost of disposing product 
    foregoneSalesValue = shortage * lostSalesCost; //the cost of not meeting the demand in full 
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    roundProfit = roundRevenue - disposalProductValue - foregoneSalesValue - roundManufCost; // profit 
of the round including all revenue minus all the costs 
    totalProfit =  totalProfit + roundProfit; //updates the total profit with the new profit 
    plan[round-1] = planNow; // shows the planned orders so far by the player 
    demandNow = demand[round-1]; // updates the demand for the current round 
    demandPast[round-1] = demand[round-1]; // shows known demand to the present round 
    round++; // this is what advances the round counter 
}; 
 
//================================================================= 
var getPlanNow = function(){ //Function that picks the order value and processes the results fields, this is 
activates with the submit button 
 if (round < practiceRounds) { 
  roundNow = round; 
  document.getElementById("practice").innerHTML = "Practice round " + round + " out 
of " + (practiceRounds - 1); // initiates 
  //document.getElementById("round").innerHTML = "Practice round: " + round; 
 } else { 
  roundNow = round - practiceRounds + 1; 
  document.getElementById("practice").innerHTML = "Real round: " + roundNow  + " 
out of " + (maxPeriod - practiceRounds + 1); // otherwise the round is 0 and must be 1 
 } 
  
 planNow = document.getElementById("planNowField").value; 
 document.getElementById("planNow").innerHTML = "Your planned quantity: " + planNow; 
 //document.getElementById("graphic").src= graphics[round-1]; // shows the graphic 
  
 resultsRound(); // runs computation of the results 
 Plotly.newPlot('myDiv', data, layout); 
 // updating the fields that show the results 
 document.getElementById("roundDemand").innerHTML = "Round demand: " + demandNow + " 
units"; 
 document.getElementById("roundProfit").innerHTML = "Round profit: " + roundProfit + " 
tokens"; 
 document.getElementById("roundManufacturingCost").innerHTML = "Round manufacturing 
cost: " + roundManufCost + " tokens"; 
 document.getElementById("roundSatisfiedDemand").innerHTML = "Round satisfied demand: " 
+ satisfied + " units"; 
 document.getElementById("roundRevenue").innerHTML = "Round revenue: " + roundRevenue 
+ " tokens"; 
 document.getElementById("roundExcessProduct").innerHTML = "Round excess product: " + 
overage + " units"; 
 document.getElementById("roundWaste").innerHTML = "Round waste value: " + 
wastedProductValue + " tokens"; 
 document.getElementById("roundShortageProduct").innerHTML = "Round shortage product: " 
+ shortage + " units"; 
 document.getElementById("totalProfit").innerHTML = "Total cumulative profit: " + totalProfit + 
" tokens"; 
 //document.getElementById("plan").innerHTML = "So far orders: " + plan; 
 //document.getElementById("demandPast").innerHTML = "So far demand: " + demandPast; 
  
//================================================================= 
// Game flow for different treatments and practice vs. real rounds 
//================================================================= 
 if(treatment === 1) { 
  document.getElementById("planQuestion").innerHTML = "What is the planned 
quantity for round " + (roundNow + 1) + "?"; 
  document.getElementById("planNowField").value = 0; //reset the order field to zero 
 } else if(treatment === 2) { 
   if ((round-1)%step === 0) { 
    document.getElementById("planQuestion").innerHTML = "What 
is the planned quantity for round " + (roundNow + 1) + "? Note that you must order the same quantity for 
rounds " + (roundNow + 2) + " and " + (roundNow + 3); 
    document.getElementById("planNowField").disabled = false;  // 
shows the order field 
    document.getElementById("planNowField").value = 0; //reset 
the order field to zero 
   } else { 
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    document.getElementById("planQuestion").innerHTML = 
"Resubmit the previous planned quantity of " + planNow + " units for the next round"; 
    document.getElementById("planNowField").disabled = true; // 
hides the order field 
   } 
 } else { 
   if ((round-1)%step === 0) { 
    document.getElementById("planQuestion").innerHTML = "What 
is the planned quantity for round " + (roundNow + 1) + "? Note that you should order the same quantity 
for rounds " + (roundNow + 2) + " and " + (roundNow + 3); 
    document.getElementById("planNowField").value = 0; //reset 
the order field to zero 
   } else { 
    document.getElementById("planQuestion").innerHTML = "Do 
you want to keep the previously planned quantity of " + planNow + " units for the next round?"; 
   } 
 } 
//================================================================= 
 if(round < practiceRounds){ // tests if we reached the end of the practice 
   //nothing 
  } else if (round === practiceRounds) { 
   document.getElementById("practice").innerHTML = "Practice round: " + 
(round - 1) + " - End of practice rounds, total profit will be reset after this round"; 
   totalProfit = 0; // resets the profit 
   if (treatment === 1) { 
    document.getElementById("planQuestion").innerHTML = "What 
is the planned quantity for real round 1?"; 
   } else if (treatment === 2) { 
    document.getElementById("planQuestion").innerHTML = "What 
is the planned quantity for real round 1? Note that you must order the same quantity for real rounds 2 and 
3"; 
   } else if (treatment === 3) { 
    document.getElementById("planQuestion").innerHTML = "What 
is the planned quantity for real round 1? Note that you should order the same quantity for real rounds 2 
and 3"; 
   } 
 
  } else { 
   //normal game 
  } 
 
//=================================================================   
 if(round <= maxPeriod){ // tests if we reached the end of the game 
   // nothing happens, game continues 
  } else { 
   document.getElementById("buttonSubmitPlan").style.visibility = 'hidden'; 
   document.getElementById("planNowField").style.visibility = 'hidden'; 
   document.getElementById("planQuestion").innerHTML = "Task complete - 
Proceed by hitting 'Next' at the bottom of the page";  
   console.log("TotalProfit = " + totalProfit); 
  }  
    }; // end of getPlanNow function 
 
//***************************************************************** 
// STATIC STUFF: first run Populate interface with values that are static and dont change over the game 
//***************************************************************** 
 document.getElementById("practice").innerHTML = "Practice round 0 out of " + 
(practiceRounds - 1); // initiates 
 //document.getElementById("round").innerHTML = "Round: " + 0; // initial first round that will 
be updated 
 document.getElementById("price").innerHTML = "Price: " + price + " tokens / unit"; 
 document.getElementById("cost").innerHTML = "Cost: " + manufCost + " tokens / unit"; 
 document.getElementById("forecast").innerHTML = "Forecast: " + forecast + " units"; 
 
Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.addOnload(function() 
{ 
 // saves the variables into the response DB 
  Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData("plan", plan); //first field is the 
embeded object in qualtrics, second field is the variable I want to save  
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  Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData("treatment", treatment); 
  
 // Hide the Next Button. Show it again when the user reaches round 40  
  this.disableNextButton(); 
     this.questionclick = function(event,element) 
  {  
          if (round > maxPeriod)  
          {  
              this.enableNextButton(); 
     Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData("totalProfit", totalProfit); 
        } 
  } 
  
   
}); 
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Appendix G Graphical user interface 
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Appendix H Electronic information sheet 
(professionals) 
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Appendix I Consent form (professionals) 
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Appendix J Invitations for participation 
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Appendix K Sample individual report 
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Appendix L Summary statistics of individual 
differences by group and by treatment (normalised 
values) 
Variable Treatment Naïve 
Students 
mean 
value 
Sophisticated 
students 
mean value 
Sophisticated 
non-students 
mean value 
Total 
Naïve 
interventionism 
Short 0.49 0.34 0.37 0.42 
Long 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.08 
Hybrid 0.42 0.22 0.34 0.35 
Total 0.33 0.22 0.24 0.28 
Big 5 Extroversion Short 0.58 0.55 0.61 0.58 
Long 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 
Hybrid 0.61 0.62 0.67 0.63 
Total 0.61 0.60 0.64 0.62 
Big 5 Agreeableness Short 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.73 
Long 0.76 0.72 0.78 0.77 
Hybrid 0.77 0.76 0.81 0.77 
Total 0.75 0.74 0.77 0.76 
Big 5 
Conscientiousness 
Short 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.71 
Long 0.69  0.65 0.77 0.72 
Hybrid 0.67 0.68 0.73 0.68 
Total 0.69 0.68 0.75 0.70 
Big 5 Neuroticism Short 0.57 0.64 0.57 0.58 
Long 0.57 0.64 0.50 0.55 
Hybrid 0.62 0.58 0.52 0.58 
Total 0.59 0.61 0.52 0.57 
Big 5 
Intellect/Imagination 
Short 0.73 0.70 0.65 0.71 
Long 0.75 0.82 0.72 0.75 
Hybrid 0.74 0.71 0.78 0.74 
Total 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.73 
EPO Generation & 
Evaluation 
Short 0.75 0.66 0.76 0.74 
Long 0.74 0.75 0.80 0.76 
Hybrid 0.75 0.69 0.77 0.75 
Total 0.74 0.69 0.78 0.75 
EPO Positive 
Outcome Focus 
Short 0.63 0.61 0.67 0.63 
Long 0.67 0.74 0.65 0.68 
Hybrid 0.67 0.72 0.69 0.69 
Total 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.66 
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EPO Negative 
Outcome Focus 
Short 0.68 0.60 0.55 0.63 
Long 0.63 0.59 0.54 0.58 
Hybrid 0.68 0.55 0.53 0.62 
Total 0.67 0.58 0.54 0.61 
BIS Short 0.56 0.57 0.52 0.54 
Long 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.52 
Hybrid 0.54 0.56 0.53 0.54 
Total 0.54 0.56 0.51 0.54 
GDMS Rational Short 0.75 0.74 0.79 0.76 
Long 0.76 0.68 0.82 0.77 
Hybrid 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.75 
Total 0.76 0.72 0.79 0.76 
GDMS Intuitive Short 0.70 0.69 0.64 0.68 
Long 0.70 0.73 0.66 0.69 
Hybrid 0.70 0.68 0.71 0.70 
Total 0.70 0.70 0.67 0.69 
GDMS Dependent Short 0.71 0.67 0.66 0.70 
Long 0.72 0.58 0.71 0.71 
Hybrid 0.74 0.68 0.71 0.72 
Total 0.73 0.65 0.70 0.71 
GDMS Avoidant Short 0.64 0.58 0.55 0.60 
Long 0.63 0.53 0.46 0.56 
Hybrid 0.62 0.59 0.53 0.59 
Total 0.63 0.57 0.50 0.58 
GDMS Spontaneous Short 0.57 0.60 0.53 0.56 
Long 0.57 0.59 0.53 0.56 
Hybrid 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.59 
Total 0.58 0.60 0.55 0.57 
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Appendix M Stability analysis of personality scales 
Scale 
Cronbach 
alpha 
Cronbach 
alpha squared 
Measurement error 
Big 5 0.80 0.64 0.36 
BIS 0.85 0.72 0.28 
GDMS 0.77 0.59 0.41 
EPO 0.71 0.50 0.50 
Note: EPO Cronbach alpha is the lowest in part because EPO is the smallest 
scale with only three constructs 
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Appendix N Correlation matrix of Personality 
Variables  
Variable  N
I 
5
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5
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Big 5 Extroversion 
(5E) 
co
e
ff
 
-0
.1
0
8
0
* 
1
             
p
 
0
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5
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7
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* significant at least at 5% level; p=0 in the table refers to p<0.0001 
 
 
